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I. ABSTRACT 
 
 
European Union institutions have been notoriously criticized for their lack of day-to-day linkage 
with European citizenry. The European Parliament as the only directly elected EU institution is 
logically one of the ‘closest’ linkage institutions to the European electorate.  However, little is 
known about how its representatives - Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) - connect, 
service and cultivate relations with their ‘home’ constituencies and citizens between two elections 
points.  This thesis attempts to fill in this missing link.  Using original data from the author’s 
self-administered 2009 MEP survey (N=145), this thesis empirically traces MEPs’ constituency 
orientations at three levels.  It first addresses the attitudinal dimensions of MEPs’ constituency 
orientations - how they think about their constituencies, the importance they attach  but also 
the types of activities they pursue as part of their constituency work.  Secondly, as ICTs and the 
Internet permeate the contemporary reality, in addition to assessing MEPs’ conventional 
constituency outreach offline, the thesis also evaluates how MEPs incorporate ICTs and the 
Internet in their constituency work. In other words, the second research question addresses 
how MEPs conduct their constituency outreach online.  Could it be that the various interactive, 
transactional and asynchronous benefits offered by the online platform prompt MEPs to 
replace their conventional physical, offline, constituency offices with their websites, blogs 
and/or social networking sites and use them as quasi virtual constituency offices? Lastly, given 
that a fair degree of variation was expected in MEPs’ constituency outreach and orientations 
both off and online, the third level examines the determinants of MEPs’ constituency outreach. 
The thesis’ findings demonst rat e  that in  spit e  the  low institutional and electoral incentives for 
MEPs to engage in constituency work and outreach, MEPs conduct a wide range of constituency 
outreach activities both offline and online.  Moreover, citizens regularly contact MEPs and request 
them for diverse forms of assistance. A fair volume of trans-border or pan-European interactions 
between MEPs and citizens that do not necessarily come from the same electoral (national) 
constituency was also observed. In the aggregate, however, majority of MEPs still show to prioritize 
their legislative activities over constituency work.  As to MEPs’ constituency outreach online, the 
findings in this thesis suggest that while ICTs and the online platform provide various new outreach 
and communication capacities for MEPs, overall, they are not replacing but rather reinforcing 
MEPs’ conventional offline constituency outreach. Hence based on the evidence found, it is 
premature to conclude that the ‘virtual constituency office’ is replacing MEPs’ conventional 
constituency outreach and offices offline. 
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CO         Constituency Orientation 
CW         Casework 
DV         Dependent variable 
EP   European Parliament 
EPPG   European Parliament party group 
 
 
\ 
 
EPRG  European Parliamentary  Research Group 
grouparGgroup 
 
EU 
EUEU 
  Euro ean Union 
ICT   Information and Communication Technologies 
 
 
IG  Interest groups 
IV   Independent variable 
MEP   Members of the European Parliament 
MNP   Members of the National Parliament 
MP   Member of Parliament 
NGO   Non governmental organization 
PC   Personal computer 
  UEN  Union for Europe of Nations 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Public representatives hold an important role in parliamentary democracies. They constitute 
a live representational link between electorates and legislative bodies.  In the EU context, 
the European Parliament (EP) is the only directly elected EU institution.  After National 
People's Congress of China, the EP is the largest legislature in the world embedded in a distinct 
transnational polity of unparalleled ‘historical precedent’ (Schmitter 1996).  Its 736 members 
(MEPs) represent over 490 million Europeans within fifty-five Euro-constituencies spread 
across European Union’s twenty-seven member states.  In this context, MEPs hold a unique role 
in being the direct, live linkages between citizens and complex web of EU institutions.  In this 
capacity, in addition to fulfilling their co-legislative roles, MEPs  should serve as 
communication channels between their home constituencies and Brussels, as points of contact 
for the redress of individual citizens’ and group grievances in relation to the EU and as national 
entry points for citizens’ access to European decision makers.  
 
However, though since its establishment in 1952 the EP has significantly evolved as a 
legislative institution in its powers, electability and visibility and though we have increasingly 
become wiser about what happens inside EP’s chambers and technical committees (Earnshaw 
& Judge 1995, 1996; Hausemer 2006; Hix 2000; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2007; Kreppel 
2002), we know relatively little about the external linkages that the EP via its representatives 
(MEPs) cultivates with those it represents. More in-depth knowledge on how MEPs reach out to 
and connect with their constituencies on a day-to-day basis continues to be limited (Farrell & 
Scully 2007). 
 
Gaining a better understanding about this micro-level of political  representation is important in 
the context of the notorious debate about the democratic deficit of EU institutions (Marquand 
1979; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; Rittberger 2003; Follesdal & Hix 2005).    On the one 
hand, based on the fact that EP is the only directly elected EU institution a n d  t h e  most 
trusted according to Eurobarometer surveys, the expectation would be that EP connects with EU 
citizens fairly well. On the other, scholars observe that the electoral connection between the EP 
via its MEPs and EU citizens continues to be rather weak (Reif & Schmitt 1980; Van der Eijk & 
Franklin 1996; Norris & Franklin 1997; Rohrschneider & Clark 2009; Farrell & Scully 2007, 
2010). The skeptics contend that though EP’s legislative powers have grown over time and its 
members have increasingly become ‘descriptively’ representative, voter turnout in European 
elections has been steadily declining (Eurostat 2011; Franklin 2004), MEPs’ roles have been 
poorly defined (Farrell & Scully 2007) while general public knowledge about the EP and 
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processes of participation continue to lag behind (Katz & Wessels 1999: 6).   
 
Some conjecture that these disconnects are partly attributable to the institutional constraints of 
EU’s limited policy competences that matter to the common citizen, such as education, health 
and taxation. With EU elections being second order to national elections (Eijk & Franklin 1996) 
which subsequently lowers their political salience and public visibility, the geographic 
remoteness of Brussels or Strasbourg and electoral changes introduced in 2002 where all EU 
member states adopted a proportional representation system (PR) for EU elections have also 
been seen as inimical to EU citizens’ ability to connect with the EP (Farrell & Scully 2007: 9).  
Consequently, it has been further posited that these electoral and institutional constraints 
provide MEPs with low incentives to proactively reach out, invest into and cultivate strong 
linkages with their national constituencies.  
 
Another possible reason why we know relatively little about micro-level linkage mechanisms 
between the EP and citizens is how political representation has been so far defined in the EU 
context.  Extant research has conceptualized political representation linkage in terms of (i) 
historical and normative considerations about what democratic legitimacy and to some extent 
accountability  in EU context ought to be (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; Schmitt & Thomassen 
1999; Rittberger 2003),  (ii) in terms of what has been referred to as ‘general studies of the 
chamber’ that look at the inner procedures and mechanics of MEPs’ work in EP committees (Hix 
2001, 2002, 2004; Neuhold 2001; Noury 2002; Mammoudh & Raunio 2003; Hausemer 2006; 
McElroy 2006), as well as in terms of (iii) the degree of policy responsiveness or congruence 
between MEPs’ roll call behavior and public preferences (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999; Schmitt 
2000; Carrubba 2001).    
The role of agent-based intermediaries such as European Party Groups (Pedersen 1996; Hix & 
Lord 1997; Hix 2001, Bardi 2002), organized interest groups (Wessels 1999; Stimson 2004; 
Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2007) and national parties (Norton 1996; Katz 1999; Raunio 2002; 
Poguntke 2007) has been another stream of research that has tried to identify different levels 
of linkages between the EU polity and citizens.  However, in spite these various scholarly 
undertakings less attention has been given to the study of micro-level linkages between the EP 
and citizens.   
 
Some relevant research in this context included studies on MEPs’ individual role orientations  
(Katz 1999; Wessels 1999) while the pioneering European Parliamentary Research Groups’ 
(EPRG) MEP Surveys (2000, 2006, 2009) have perhaps come the closest to examining MEP-
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citizen linkage at the micro-level (Scully 2005; Farrell & Scully 2007, 2010).   Though the EPRG 
surveys have become an important milestone in individual level empirical data collection on 
MEPs’ policy positioning, role orientations, and party affinities, they predominantly frame the 
constituency outreach and MEP-constituency linkage in terms of the role that electoral systems 
have on the MEP-citizen electoral connection1.  Yet they tell us less about how MEPs develop, 
cultivate relations and maintain accountability vis-à-vis their constituencies on a more 
continuous basis between two election points when the election cameras are not shining and 
when MEPs go about their daily business of representing.   
 
The bottom-up vector of representation - how citizens or constituents perceive the EU electoral 
connection from their own vantage point  - has also been inadequately addressed in existing 
research.  While some studies and surveys have attempted to empirically measure this 
dimension (e.g. Eurobarometer surveys; Farrell & Scully 2007; Clark & Rohrschneider 2009) – 
the focus tends to remain on citizens’ attitudes toward EU institutions such as the EU 
Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament but less so on their 
perceptions of MEPs (Farrell & Scully 2007).  
 
As we invest a fair degree of democratic promise in the EP to be the institution that legitimately 
links citizens to the complex EU bureaucracy, it is ironic that we have thus far invested a 
disproportionate amount of effort to better understand what defines the MEP-citizen linkage at 
the micro, constituency level where MEPs are closest to the citizens and vice versa.  
Consequently, this missing link is an instrumental point of departure for this thesis. 
 
 
Key Research Questions  
 
This thesis thus looks at political representation in the EU by examining how MEPs form 
linkages with their constituencies. However, rather than taking MEPs’ constituency outreach 
during elections as the focal point of citizen-MEP linkage – the emphasis is placed on the day-
to-day dynamics of representation.  In other words, this thesis deliberately chooses not to 
focus on the election period.  It argues that elections, when political candidates are proactive 
and ‘at their best’ to connect with citizens, reveal only a snapshot of how representatives think 
about, relate, and cater to their constituencies or voters.  
                                                          
1  For example, the 2000 EPRG battery of questions on political representation is limited to questions related to casework 
and ‘time spent on political work in their home country” and fails to be included again in 2006 (NATCEN/ EPRG MEP 
Survey). This lack of inconsistency but also scope of questions poses challenges for empirical research on the topic of 
constituency linkage. 
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Instead, it examines the EP-citizen linkage by focusing on how MEPs cultivate their constituency 
linkage role between two election points: (i) how they think about their constituencies, ii) the 
importance they attach to their political work in Brussels and at home, in their constituencies, 
and iii) the kinds of activities they pursue and how they reach out to their constituencies (or 
not).  After establishing what these intension properties of the constituency linkage are, the 
thesis is also interested in finding out whether some MEPs are more predisposed to be pro-
constituency oriented than others, and if so, what determines this degree of variation in MEPs’ 
constituency orientations? 
 
In this thesis, political representation is therefore understood as a dynamic process (Pitkin 
1967) comprising myriad communicative acts and responses between representatives and the 
represented between two election points that are conditioned by numerous institutional, 
systemic and human personal factors.  Constituency linkage in the EU context is then defined as 
a series of daily micro-representational acts between MEPs and their constituencies that 
provide two-directional opportunities for citizens’ access to information about what happens 
in Brussels, for mutual exchange of political cues, feedback loops thus accountability and sense 
of mutual proximity between MEPs and the EU electorate.  How MEPs assume and execute 
these roles in practice is therefore important to understand in order to determine the 
intension properties and quality of political representation at the EU. 
To expand our understanding about the MEP-citizen linkage in the EU context, the thesis 
pursues four levels or steps of analysis.  Firstly, the thesis seeks to outline the key 
characteristics as well as the magnitude of MEPs’ constituency orientations.  Based on the 
theoretical premise that how representatives think about their constituencies eventually 
influences how they act or represent them (Fenno 1978), the first analytical step defines and 
explores constituency orientations in terms of the following two characteristics: 
 
i) How MEPs perceive their constituencies . For example, do MEPs perceive their 
constituencies as territorial units (e.g. as countries, regions or the transnational EU as a 
whole) or as specific segments or groups in society? Moreover, given that MEPs 
function in a transnational context, what representational affinities do they have for 
European constituents beyond their national borders, if any? 
 
ii) How much importance do MEPs attach to constituency related activities? Resource 
allocation – the amount of time and staff that MEPs allocate to their constituency office 
(versus their Brussels office) are used as two proxies to measure this dimension. They 
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tell us about the priority that MEPs attach to their constituency work where the more 
time and staff – that representatives allocate to constituency work, the more pro-
constituency oriented they are expected to be.  To the contrary, MEPs who spend more 
time on their parliamentary work in Brussels would be expected to be less pro-
constituency oriented. 
 
After determining how MEPs think about and the importance they attach to their constituencies, 
the second level of analysis, looks at what MEPs actually do and the types of activities they 
pursue with respect to their constituency work.  For example:  What modes of communication 
and type of constituency outreach activities to they pursue? Do they receive casework, and if so, 
what kind of  ‘cases’ do they take on?  
 
Literature on the subject provides no conclusions as to what is normatively the right recipe for 
representation and constituency linkage. The EP also places no or very low institutional 
expectations on MEPs’ constituency obligations or their linkage with citizens. Thus given MEPs’ 
various backgrounds, their constituency orientations are expected to vary.  At the same time,  
the PR electoral system for EU elections is known to provide negative incentives for MEPs to be 
pro-constituency oriented,  hence it is expected that majority of MEPs will tend to (i) have low 
constituency orientations (H1) and spend more time in Brussels working on parliamentary, 
policy, media or interest group activities than working in their home constituencies, and (ii) 
they will likely allocate more staff to their Brussels than to their constituency offices.  
 
A particularly novel aspect in this second analytical step,  is that MEPs’ constituency outreach 
will not only be examined offline but they will also be examined in the contemporary context, 
online.  As information communication technologies (ICTs) increasingly permeate our worlds, 
examining how MEPs adapt to these new realities by using online platforms and the Internet in 
their constituency outreach is important.  While already little is known about how MEPs conduct 
their constituency outreach offline, even less is known about how they do so online.  Therefore, 
after mapping out how MEPs conduct their constituency outreach conventionally – offline, the 
thesis questions, given the long-distance relationship that majority of MEPs have with their home 
constituencies and given the distance reducing utility of ICT and the Internet (e.g. 24/7 access to 
information, tailored applications, asynchronous, flexible one-to-one and one-to-many, 
expedient, cost-effective communication), whether MEPs move some or potentially all of their 
constituency outreach functions online?   
 
Once MEPs’ constituency orientations both off and online are mapped, they are then compared. 
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By comparing MEPs’ constituency outreach offline and online, the thesis empirically explores the 
extent to which the online constituency outreach is complementing, reinforcing or perhaps 
replacing the conventional offline means of relating and cultivating relations with constituents.  
In other words, can it be assumed that MEPs simply emulate the same forms of constituency 
outreach online as they do conventionally offline?  Or, are some MEPs using the online platform 
(e.g. websites or blogs) more pro-actively for reaching out to their constituencies than they do 
other forms of offline communication?  If so, is there evidence to suggest that the online forms of 
constituency outreach is replacing conventional offline, face-to-face constituency work? In other 
words, is it conceivable that Internet platform is being increasingly used as a quasi-virtual 
constituency office? To study the constituency dimension using the comparative offline-online 
approach is relatively novel as it involves collecting data for both offline and online levels of 
MEPs’ constituency orientations and outreach. 
 
As MEPs come from different personal backgrounds and political cultures, their constituency 
orientations are likely to vary.  The last analytical level then seeks to determine the extent to 
which some MEPs are more predisposed to be pro-constituency oriented than others, and if so, what 
determines their predispositions.  OLS multiple regression analysis will be used to test four models 
of determinants to explain the observed variation in MEPs’ constituency orientations.  Based on 
theoretical grounding, while controlling for demographic variables – age, gender and education, 
the four explanatory models for MEPs’ offline constituency orientations included:  the electoral 
systems –  Model 1 based on district magnitude and ballot structure; MEPs’ attitudinal or role 
orientations –  Model 2,  political variables such as party affiliation, political responsibility, 
incumbency and former political career – Model 3; and constituency characteristics as the fourth 
explanatory model.  For each model, expected hypotheses were established. 
 
Apart from demographic factors such as age and gender as well as a country’s Internet 
penetration have been known to play a role in determining individuals’ ICT usage, little is known 
otherwise about how representatives use the Internet for constituency outreach.  Therefore, for 
determining variation in MEPs’ constituency outreach online, in addition to the demographic 
variables and Internet penetration, other exploratory variables such as distance to Brussels and 
MEPs’ personal attitudes toward Internet usage will be tested.  
 
The last analytical Step 4 pushes the argument further by comparing.   
 
Because availability of data on this topic is limited, the thesis corroborates three different 
sources of primary data including: i) an original, self-administered, cross-sectional online 2009 
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MEP survey (n=159) conducted by the author that targets MEPs serving in the sixth European 
Parliament session (2005-2009), ii) website/ blog analytics of MEP survey respondent’s 
personal websites ad blogs, and to capture the qualitative dimensions iii) 31 interviews with 
MEPs in the same cohort were conducted.  
 
Thesis Outline  
 
Overall, the thesis is structured in seven chapters.  The first two chapters conceptually 
situate MEPs’ theoretical approaches to offline and online constituency orientations in existing 
literature. W h i l e  Chapter 2 focuses on existing concepts and theories linked to the offline 
constituency outreach,  Chapter 3 examines the potential benefits and implications of Internet 
usage with respect to constituency outreach. Chapter 4 then introduces the thesis’ research 
design – detailing the operationalization of indicators, methodology used and how data was 
collected. 
The first empirical results on the observed patterns in (2006-2009) MEPs cohort’s constituency 
orientations and offline constituency outreach are introduced in Chapter 5 followed by an 
outline of the MEPs’ constituency outreach online in Chapter 6.  Determinants of MEPs’ 
constituency orientations and comparison between the two levels form the basis for Chapter 7 
while the last Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and overall draws conclusions about the 
characteristics and patterns in MEPs’ constituency outreach.  Avenues for the future research 
on the constituency dimension both off and online will also be discussed in the last chapter. 
By empirically examining the MEP  citizen linkage, this thesis aims to provide new insights 
about political representation at the day-to-day level which may seem mundane but in the 
aggregate, form important building blocks of political accountability, representation and 
legitimacy between the EP and citizens.   Findings on all three dimensions are exploratory hence 
novel. There are no previous studies on MEPs’ constituency orientations at this level of detail.  
Jointly they situate and test the EU representational linkage against the contemporary and 
evolving normative context of political representation. Politicians’ responsiveness and 
accountability are more scrutinized than ever as voters’ expectations and demands from the 
political establishment have risen.  As  citizens have become more educated, they have also 
become more critical and better able to voice their concerns (Norris, 1999; Coleman & Gotze 
2001, Wattenberg 2002)2.  In other words, where before representatives’ ‘fit-ness’ for the job 
                                                          
2 Other manifestations of this trend include: decreasing partisan politics and declining party memberships, participatory 
fragmentation along single-issues, external pressures from social movements and general distrust and public alienation are 
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was evaluated at election time, the evaluation of politicians’ merit to stay in the job between 
elections has increased (Mansbridge 2001: 517). While these conjectures target national 
representatives, it is interesting to see the extent to which these contextual factors also effect 
political representation and micro-level linkages at the EU level between MEPs and citizens.  
 
As a result, this thesis has substantive implications for the study of political representation in the 
EU.  It exposes the quality and daily building blocks of MEP-citizen linkage. Its observations also 
aim to tell us the extent to which MEPs attach importance to this part of their mandate, or not.   
This is particularly important given that so far few prescriptive measures exist about the extent 
to which MEPs should cultivate and prioritize their constituency relationships. As already noted, 
this reality is particularly ironic as EU scholars have been extensively discussing the polemics of 
EU’s democratic legitimacy and deficit thereof. At the same time, it is a good question whether 
the EP should impose any guidance pertaining MEPs’ constituency outreach expectations or if it 
should provide MEPs full freedom to interpret their mandate as they wish. By looking at the 
micro-level representational linkages this thesis hopes to contribute to this debate.  
 
In spite its many contributions, this thesis also navigates within a series of limitations. Due to 
the lack of established, well grounded theories and pertinent data on the subject in the EU 
context, the research avenues explored in this thesis are for the most part exploratory – 
particularly for the online constituency outreach dimensions. The cross-sectional approach, 
using survey data from a single EP session also provides a snapshot rather than a robust time 
series analysis. Lastly, readers should be very conscious about the fact that the thesis merely 
places a magnifying glass on one side – the supply (MEP  citizen) side of the representational 
relationship.  Ideally, to provide a full perspective on the inherently two-directional relationship 
that representation entails, a parallel citizen survey would need to be conducted to additionally 
establish how citizens perceive and enact their linkage(s) with the EP and MEP.  However, due 
to logistical and time constraints, this level of enquiry was beyond the scope of this thesis but 
the author hopes that this stream of research will be picked up by future studies. Due to these 
limitations, this thesis refrains form theory building attempts in political representation. 
Instead it hopes to fill in a missing link in extant literature on the role of MEPs in the EP-citizen 
linkage, to contribute to new insights and thereby stimulate new research avenues on political 
representation in the EU.  In a novel way, it also adopts a multi-disciplinary approach that 
intersects and combines the domains of political representation, political communication and 
more contemporary Internet studies in the EU context.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
socio-political realities in which the contemporary formal political systems navigate to retain their public value and 
existential legitimacy (Wattenberg 2002: 21-23). 
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2.    THEORY OF REPRESENTATION: CONSTITUENCY ORIENTATIONS OFFLINE 
 
 
 
American political scientist, Richard Fenno, observed that in order to understand 
legislators’ behavior requires to observe them in the “capital city as well as at home, in their 
constituencies”.  It  is  at  the  constituency  level  where  representatives  are  in  the  closest 
proximity to the voters and where representative - constituent ties are “created, nurtured 
and  changed” (Fenno 1980:3, 1978). Fenno also observed, however, that the constituency 
dimension in political representation is understudied “up close, in detail and over time” 
where we may not know enough about the process by which politicians get recruited and 
then accumulate (or dissipate) name recognition, reputation, and trust bit by bit, in multiple 
intra-constituency contexts over time?” (Fenno 1986: 4). 
 
Fenno’s work is useful in i) explaining qualitative accounts of constituency dynamics, and ii) 
conceptual categorizations through which to measure representatives’ constituency behavior 
and it will be drawn upon in this thesis.  At the same time, because Fenno’s work derives from 
the particularities American  experience  and  as theories  on the constituency  dimension  in  
the  EU  context  are  still inchoate,  this   chapter  relies  on  an  eclectic approach  in  
conceptualizing  the constituency dimension  in the EP context by drawing from a wider 
range of relevant theories on political representation and linkage in the EU political context 
and outside it. 
 
 
Overall the chapter’s objective is to conceptualize and center the study of the constituency 
dimension at the European level.   Because the majority of existing theories and empirical 
work derive from national level experiences, the chapter selects and links relevance of the 
former to the empirical study of constituency dimension in the EP context. It thereby aims to 
contribute to analytical innovation and to address gaps in existing literature on European 
politics. 
 
The chapter is structured in three parts where the first part introduces  existing  macro-
political  representation  theories relevant for  conceptualizing the role of the constituency 
dimension as linkage while the second part focuses on the operationalization of the 
constituency dimension and the ways it has been measured.   Lastly, the Chapter will 
discuss relevant theories on the determinants of variation in legislator’s constituency 
outreach. 
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 2.1 Theories of Political Representation 
 
 
Be it in theory or in practice, democratic representation is not a monolithic concept. In theory, 
political theorists have grappled with its chimerical properties where no analytic formulation 
alone has  been  able  to  adequately  depict  the  comprehensive  characteristics  and  causal 
dynamics   within   the   representative   relationship   between   public   office   holders   and 
constituents (Muller 1970:  1151).    Pinning down the latter has been particularly difficult 
because the concept does not have “an identifiable meaning applied in different but controlled 
and  discoverable  ways  in  different  contexts”  (Pitkin  1967:  8).                               
 
Moreover,  in  practice, representation is not referable to a single action by any one 
participant, but rather to an interactive institutionalized arrangement involving many people 
and groups, and the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of actors involved within 
the overall structure and the functioning of the system (Ibid.: 221 - 222). 
 
 
The multi-dimensionality and dynamic nature of political representation cannot be more true 
than in  the EU context where representatives of diverse national polities, interest groups, 
civic   organizations   interact,   pursue   multiple   activities,   are   subject   to   multiplicity   of 
institutional and systemic influences in an attempt to ‘represent’ the interests of 490 million 
European citizens. 
 
 
However,  even  in  the  complex  case  of  the  EU,  political  representation  and  its  various 
dimensions can be viewed as different forms of linkage.  Linkage theories have been used as 
flexible theoretical frames enabling the study of the ‘how and under what conditions political 
behavior at one level of aggregation affects political behavior at another and the ways the two 
levels interact’ (Lawson 1980: 5-9). Depending on the direction of the arrow in a selected 
agent-principal causal dynamic, political linkages under study can vary. Most commonly, 
however they have referred to the  various of intra-system linkages - e.g. parties (Lawson 
1980; Mair 1990); in leadership recruitment - campaigning and petitioning within parties 
(Eulau & Prewitt 1970); expression  of  performance  satisfaction- dissatisfaction of political 
authorities (Muller 1970); or citizens as the instigators of linkage. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the constituency dimension constitutes the linkage mechanism 
under  investigation.    The  constituency  dimension  is  understood  here  as a  relational  link 
between  members  of  the  European  Parliament  (ds)  and  their  constituencies  where 
representative-voter   ties   are   created,  nurtured  and  changed   (Fenno  1980:   3). 
 19 
 
More specifically, it is defined as the attitudes and activities MEPs pursue to cultivate relations 
with their constituencies between elections.   The extent to which the latter incline in favor 
(or not) of the constituency as opposed to other activities in MEPs’ mandate, reflect a 
MEPs’ constituency orientations. 
 
 
The   sections   below   discuss   different   aspects   of   territorial,   normative   and   systemic 
considerations  that  shape  the  numerous  implicit  premises  built  in  to  understanding  the 
constituency dimension as a linkage mechanism and in how it functions. 
 
 
 
 
i) Territorial dimension of representation 
 
 
Most commonly, ‘constituency’ carries a territorial connotation and is associated with the 
territory or area comprising an electoral district (Rehfeld 2007).  The territorial reference is 
linked  to  the   concept’s  historical  origins  as  constituencies  arose  in  parallel  with  the 
consolidation  of  parliaments  and  the  process of dividing national territories into smaller 
parcels to ensure more manageable and equal forms of representation. 
 
 
It also derives from Anglo-Saxon first-past-the post electoral systems where single members 
oversee  concretely delineated territorial units – their electoral districts.   In practice, this 
notion however  differs with  the understanding of the term in PR-systems where elected 
representatives oversee more abstract notions of constituencies – usually delimited to their  
‘party voters’ which may or may not be territorially concentrated.   As to be discussed in 
Chapter 4, this conceptual distinction was also reflected during interviews when some MEPs 
found it difficult  to fully relate to the English term – constituency. Moreover, in languages 
other than English (and most linked to countries with PR-systems) the term constituency 
translates  bearing  a  more  specific  political/  electoral  connotation  –  e.g.  ‘circonscription 
electorale’ (in French),  ‘circonconscrizione elettorale’ (Italian), ‘okres’ (Slovak) and so on. 
 
 
Linked to the territory, however, the term constituency implicitly embodies a ‘people’ and 
‘relational’ component.  In other words, a constituency can refer to “a body of citizens entitled 
to elect a representative to a legislative or executive position”, “the residents in an electoral 
district” but also in more abstract sense as a “group or body that patronizes, supports, or 
offers   representation”  of  some  form  or  another  (Online  Merriam  Webster  Dictionary; 
Cambridge Dictionaries Online).  The relational  principally implies here the ‘constituent’ (a 
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principal) – is the  one who authorizes another to act as representative (agent) on his/ her 
behalf. 
 
As  in  practice  constituencies  do  not  constitute  static,  single  groups  nor  homogeneous 
territorial units, the territorial or basic definitions do not account for the relational dynamics 
and  intra-constituency heterogeneity. While voters belonging to an electoral district elect 
someone to  represent them nationally are clearly one example of a core constituency, the 
latter may be further subdivided into a wider range of grouped interests – e.g. specific group 
in society such as artists, homeless, customers etc. 
 
 
In his study on US Congressmen Fenno (1978) also observed that representatives think about 
their constituencies more strategically, they perceive them as complex mosaics made up of 
subsidiary publics  or  clienteles  reflecting  -  three  “concentric  circles”  –  the  geographic, 
demographic  and  political  constituencies. While the geographic constituency commonly 
includes  standard  associations  with  territorial  definitions,  the  demographic  constituency 
refers   more  to  its  more  particular  socio-economic,  partisan  and  religious  orientations, 
ethnicity and residential patterns. The most important in terms of strategic value is are the 
accounts of the political constituency3  through which representative map out their electoral 
base of supporters and non-supporters (Ibid.: 885-889). 
 
 
At the same time, constituencies may also vary by being: 
 
“ … more or less stable, describing the extent to which their membership 
changes between elections. They may be heterogeneous...in the extent to which 
its members share a certain feature such as the same race or profession, 
territorial location, or political party membership. Each of these features will 
affect how citizens relate to each other as constituents, the choices they make 
as voters, and the incentives that representatives therefore face when 
campaigning and serving in office.” (Rehfeld 2007: 7) 
 
 
Hence the multiple sources of different constituency pressures demand representatives to 
straddle and accommodate different audiences (Eulau & Wahlke 1978: 114-115). Moreover, it 
has been observed that the existing intra-constituency dynamics and the way representatives 
carve  our  their  constituencies  (choose  their  foci  of  representation)  will  affect  the  way 
representatives pursue their legislative tasks (Fenno 1986). 
                                                          
3 According to Fenno, the political constituency is the most lucrative for Congressmen, and tends to be further 
broken down into the general re-election constituency, the primary constituency and the  intimates.  – a secure 
base of supporters “loyalists” who will elect him/ her regardless who the  challenger is; the intimates or the 
personal “home base” constituency which goes beyond the loyalists  and includes individuals, groups such as 
closest political advisors, confidants expressed by “if you  don’t keep up your home base, you don’t have 
anything” (Ibid.: 886). 
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Overall, Fenno’s and Rehfeld’s accounts are insightful as they provide a more detailed look at 
how   representatives  perceive  and  relate  to  their  constituencies.  By  acknowledging  the 
realities of internal heterogeneity and intra-constituency dynamics, they dissolve the generic 
and rather  conception of constituencies as static territorial or electoral units.   At the same 
time, these accounts allow for only basic associations but they do not capture the mechanics 
and micro-processes of how representatives receive appropriate cues to inform their policy 
position taking and parliamentary decision-making. 
 
 
 
 
ii) Descriptive Representation 
 
 
Widely debated and contested, descriptive representation falls into the normative camp of 
representation  theory  as  it  introduces  moral  or  ethical  considerations  to  the  act  of 
representation. Descriptive representation implicitly underlines the expectation placed on the 
act of  representing and simultaneously on the behavior of representatives.   It accounts for 
normative ideals (or approximations of) between a representative and the represented where 
the former is  expected to “act in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to 
them” (Pitkin 1967:  209) but also to resemble the constituency s/he represents. In other 
words, a representative should reflect a common denominator, or a representative sample of 
interests, attitudes, socio-economic background within his/ her constituency (Farrell & Scully 
2007). Hence the more a representative resembles his/ her constituency, the more s/he is one 
of “them”, the more is he/ she deemed to be representative (Mansbridge 1999). 
 
 
 
iii) Substantive representation and congruency theory 
 
 
Unlike descriptive expectations, congruency8  theories expand on the substantive elements in 
representation where the agent (the representative) and the principal (the represented) are 
behaviorally and relationally linked (Eulau et al. 1978: 112).  Policy congruency or dynamic 
representation (Stimson et al. 1995) - the degrees of “congruence” between representatives 
and   their  constituencies  where  representation  is  assumed  to  be  ‘present’  when  policy 
preferences of  the constituency and their representative’s roll-call behavior match (Jewell 
1983) – has been perhaps the most empirically studied aspect of representative–constituent 
linkage. 
 
Issue saliency, the role of intra-district dynamics (homogeneity or skewed-ness) of district 
aggregate  opinion (Fiorina 1974) and electoral considerations linked to intra-district party 
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competition   (Mayhew  1974)  were  found  to  be  influential  determinants  of  congruency 
between  representatives’ positions  on policies and constituents’ preferences (Kuklinski & 
Elling  1977). Others  found  that  congruency  hence  ‘representation’  occurs  under  two 
conditions: i)  when  representatives  think  of  themselves  as  delegates  and  are  open  to 
consider  constituency  preferences;  and  ii)  when  constituents  provide  consistent  cues  to 
enable representative(s) to develop a reasonably accurate perception of constituency opinion 
(McCrone & Kuklinski 1979: 280).    Unlike unidirectional,  elitist or top-down accounts of 
representation, the latter understanding of  representation understands representation as a 
reciprocated  two-way  process,  requiring  the   inputs   of  both  -  representatives  and  the 
represented. 
 
 
Though useful in offering a means, for instance, roll call votes and public opinion polls – for 
empirically  measuring  representation,  congruency  theories  over-assume  the  ready  made 
nature of  representatives’ decision-making and over-rely on the outputs of representation. 
But they fail to explain the mechanics of how representatives arrive to making decisions and 
how they determine constituency policy preferences.  They side step what happens inside the 
‘black box’ - representatives’ own cognitive validation in decision-making processes - and fail 
to   elaborate on  how  cues  on  policy  issues  between  citizens  and  representatives  are 
exchanged. For example, in highly heterogeneous districts, how do representatives prioritize4 
which preferences to represent?   By ignoring these dynamics, congruency theories assume 
behavioral homogeneity among  representatives  and  fall  short  on  demonstrative  how 
representatives match their preferences to those of their constituents (or vice versa). 
 
 
 
 
 
  2.2 Defining Constituency as Linkage 
 
 
 
Gaining a better understanding of constituency dynamics can offset some of the limitations of 
congruency approaches.  Rather than assessing the level of synergy between representatives’ 
and voters’ policy preferences, linkage at the constituency level refers to how representatives 
perceive,  relate to and service their constituencies (Eulau & Karps 1977).   Combined these 
aspects reflect a representatives’ homestyle. 
 
 
                                                          
4  Congruency has also been known as concordance, concurrence (Miller and Stokes 1963; Eulau 1987),  policy 
responsiveness (Hix 2002), competence logic (Schmitt & Thomassen 2002) and on the macro-level as dynamic 
representation (Stimson et. al 1995). 
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Though  a  formal  school  of  thought  on  the  constituency  linkage  does  not  exist,  three 
theoretical bodies of work have significantly contributed to it.   The first refers to the study of 
role orientations (Fenno 1978; Wahlke & Eulau 1962; Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974) which 
zeros  in  on   how  representatives  perceive  their  own  roles  as  representatives  and  the 
importance they attach to different aspects of their mandate.  What representatives do and the 
types of activities they pursue as part of constituency outreach (Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974; 
Fenno 1978; Johannes 1983; Wilson & Gronke 2001) forms the second area, while research 
on the determinants of representatives’ orientations forms the third (Bogdanor 1985; Scholl  
1986; Farrell & Scully 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1  Constituency orientations 
 
 
What representatives think about their constituencies  
 
 
As representatives are given a fair amount of freedom in how to interpret their mandate and 
“represent”, a significant amount variation has been observed in their representational styles. 
The  intension properties of this variation have been characterized by two aspects:   i) from 
whom  representatives take instruction on policy issues (Eulau & Wahlke 1978: 17), and ii) 
where they place their representational focus while serving their term.  Legislators can take 
instruction from different sources – e.g. their political parties, party whips and party leaders, 
interest  groups,  citizens  or  they  can  follow  their  own  judgment  and  focus  on  different 
activities  such  as  their  legislative  work,  party  relate  activities,  policy  advocacy,  media 
relations or constituency outreach. 
 
 
In the aggregate, the types of tradeoffs representatives make between different activities and 
whom  they are willing to ‘listen’ to are known to compose their representational styles or 
what Fenno has called their ‘homestyle’.  Theoretically, four classic role orientation typologies - 
the trustee, partisan,  politico, delegate (Burke 1774; Wahlke et al. 1962; Pitkin 1967) have 
been identified. 
 
 
The  trustee  type  relates  representatives  who  act  independently  and  rely  on  their  own 
judgment and experience. A trustee hence seeks minimal instruction and cues from outside 
sources  to  informing  his/her  policy  choices.  A  trustee  also  tends  to  be  inclined  toward 
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promoting  collective  –  i.e.  national  rather  than  (constituents’)  individual  interests5 when 
taking  policy   positions. Under  the  assumption  that  a  trustee  ‘knows’  what  his/her 
constituencies  need  and  want,  harmony  of  mutual  (representative-voter)  interests  us 
presumed (Eulau et al. 1978: 118). 
 
 
The delegate type is opposite to that of a trustee.   Unlike a trustee, a delegate is open to 
“purposively reflect” and incorporate constituents’ preferences on salient issues in his/her 
legislative  work  (McCrone  &  Kuklinski  1979)  hence  are likely  to  be  more  constituency 
oriented. Arguably, some studies observed that in policy congruency delegates also tend to be 
more  representative (Kuklinski & Elling 1977). This finding, however, has not been widely 
corroborated in other research.  
 
 
The third, partisan type, more distinct in Western European systems where parties have 
historically  played  a  dominant  role  as  intermediaries  between  the  electorate  and  the 
parliament, refers to representatives who are likely to be loyal and represent their party line 
on  substantive  issues  in  select  committees,  parliamentary  debates,  and  backbench  party 
meetings  (Norris 1999). In other words, partisans will be more inclined to take instruction 
from their party than anyone else (Mansbridge 2003:521)  
 
 
Unlike  the  previous  three  representational  types,  politico  is  a  mix  of  types.  A politico 
sometimes acts as a trustee and other times as a delegate and has a tendency to focus on 
representing organized rather than individual or national interests. 
 
 
Unlike the territorial, descriptive or congruency approaches, the study of role orientations 
offers a better understanding about what happens inside the ‘black box’ and how the latter 
affects the way legislators relate to those they represent (Eulau & Wahlke 1978: 15).  In the 
aggregate patterns in legislators’ role orientations hence shape how parliaments work (Katz 
1999: 83). At the same time, accurate generalizations about legislators’ role orientations and 
their representational styles are difficult to derive. 
 
 
Human behavior is complex. Moreover, legislators are requested to satisfy and respond to 
multitudes of demands and pressures throughout their mandate, delimiting their behavior to a 
single categorical typology is problematic.  Anyone who has spent time in Parliament or has 
                                                          
5 In his famous Bristol speech, Burke outlined a normative recipe for representatives’ loyalties to be  free of external 
instruction when serving their mandate but to be rather considerate of the “nation, with one interest, that of a whole, 
where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide but the general good, resulting from the general reason of 
the whole” (Burke 1774). This prescription later became  associated  with the trustee role orientation. 
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followed a day with a representative can attest to that.  The expectation that representatives 
will focus on a single dominant activity or focus in on a single group is therefore unrealistic. 
 
 
In practice, all four roles tend to co-exist instead and a fair deal of role-switching where 
representatives switch from one role to another in an ‘on and off’ reactive fashion (Eulau et 
al.1978: 114) in different contexts occurs (Andeweg 1997). While some delegates may overtly  
seek and “acknowledge their direct dependence on instructions and accept them as necessary 
or desirable premise for their decisions”, others may be more cautious about consulting their 
constituents for fear of a binding, or ‘mandatory effect’ on their behavior and what they can 
deliver (Eulau &  Wahlke 1978: 16-17). Similarly, a partisan may also partly share delegate 
characteristics if s/he is  reaches out more to party voters than to senior party officials and 
parliamentary  work.  As  a  result   defining  parameter  boundaries  for  each  typology  is 
analytically challenging.  Where does a delegate or a trustee typology ‘begin’ and where does it 
‘end’? 
 
Moreover,  the  conceptual  duality  of  role  orientations  being  both  a  characteristic  and  a 
determinant  of  legislator’s  behavior  –  i.e.  potentially  acting  as  both  the  dependent  or 
independent variable - renders them challenging to use.  Role orientations also do not reveal 
much about the degree of representativeness of different role typologies. Is a delegate more  
or less representative than a trustee, partisan or politico? 
 
 
In  view   of   their   merits   and   limitations,   role   orientations   serve   as   mere   behavioral 
approximations   that   require   wider  considerations   including  scales   of  propensity  and 
potential conditions rather than indiscriminately categories.   It is therefore no surprise that 
the four types have been subject to numerous interpretations, revisions, misunderstandings, 
extensions and critical debates. 
 
 
The importance representatives attach to constituency work 
 
In addition to what representatives think about their constituencies and how they perceive 
their own roles, the amount of resources they allocate and the types of constituency activities 
they  pursue  between  elections  has  been  another important  factor comprising legislators’ 
constituency orientations. 
 
 
 
Given that legislators have limited administrative budgets and time, the amount of resources 
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legislators  allocate  to  different  activities  in  fulfilling  their  mandate  is  telling  about  the 
importance they attach  to  specific activities. The more resources legislators allocate to a 
particular activity – e.g. parliamentary work, public advocacy, media outreach, constituency 
work - the more importance they are likely to attach to it.  Or in the words of Fenno, “how a 
Congressman divides up his time, he in effect decides what kind of a representative he will be” 
(Fenno 1977: 891). 
 
 
With respect to the directional magnitude of representatives’ constituency orientations – the 
extent to which MEPs are pro-constituency oriented or not, three indicators have been most 
frequently used for measuring  the  allocation  of  resources  dimension:    i)  whether  a  
representative  has  a permanent  constituency office in his/her district; ii) the time spent 
(usually quantified as number of trips or days spent per week/ month) on constituency work 
and iii) the amount and seniority of staff employed in the constituency office (Ibid., Johannes 
1983).  Effectively, the more time and staff a  representative allocates to work in their 
constituency would be indicative of his/her pro-constituency orientation. 
 
 
 
  2.2.2 Constituency Outreach Dimensions 
 
 
There are two types of activities that representatives typically pursue in their constituency 
work: i) they take on and respond to casework; and ii) they explain their work in the capital 
and communicate (in various forms) with their constituencies (Mayhew 1974, Fiorina 1974; 
Fenno 1978; Wilson and Gronke 2000). 
 
 
 
Casework 
 
Unlike   self-presentation   tactics   and   explanation   of   legislative   work   which   serve   as 
communicative  functions,  casework  is  the  most  concrete  form  of  responsiveness  and 
constituency linkage between elections.  Cases can be initiated by constituents (individuals or 
groups)  as well as representatives. The great majority tend to involve ‘light cases’ such as 
requests for information or light grievances. Light cases are relatively easy to respond to and 
can be delegated to staff.   ‘Harder cases’, however, involve more difficult and time consuming 
casework.  These may require representative’s personal attention, time and specific forms of 
assistance such as conducting  detailed research on regulatory stipulations for an SME or a 
constituent who runs his/her own business, intervening on behalf of citizens at higher levels 
of  government,  lobbying  for  public  funds   or  -  pork  -  public  works  projects  benefiting 
developments in a representative’s constituency, or  pushing forward petitions to influence 
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legislation or raising an issue which has not yet been considered by Parliament (Fenno 
1978:101). 
 
 
 
Though casework is known to be time consuming, representatives take it on in response to 
constituents prompting but also to ingratiate themselves to score ‘credit’ and political (re- 
election) support among constituents (Johannes 1983).  Representatives’ inclination toward 
being  casework  oriented  can  be  assessed  by  the number  of  cases  they  receive  and 
subsequently take on or respond to. 
 
 
 
Explaining their political work  
 
 
In  addition  to  casework,  legislators  tend  to  consider  ‘explaining  their  political  work’  – 
especially  parliamentary and legislative work, in other words, the work that they do when 
they are not in their constituencies - as an important part of their jobs.  As a result, they tend 
to explain their  positions and the work they do in salient policy areas, the parliamentary 
committees that they are active in, any proposals or motions for legislation that they author, 
the speeches they make during parliamentary proceedings and so on (Bianco 1994; Sellers 
1998). The ‘explaining work’ function therefore principally serves as a form of transparency 
and   top-down  feedback  in  order  for  constituents  to  keep  an  eye  out  on  what  their 
representatives  do in the capital and the extent to which they are on track in maintaining 
their electoral promises. 
 
 
Conventional (offline) explaining work activities include accepting invitations to make public 
speeches  at  local  organizations  (i,e.  schools,  civic  associations,  private  sector)  or  during 
community or  local  events (ribbon-cutting ceremonies),   through local media, or attending 
and public events. Representatives explain their work in order to provide transparency and 
accountability over their work as well as to establish a personal link with their constituents 
through which they aim to be  understood during their office term.   Constituency outreach, 
also  serves  as  a  means  for  representatives  to  maintain  public  visibility,  seek  credit  and 
advertise themselves in order to continuously reinforce a positive image in the eyes of their 
constituencies   (Mayhew 1974;   Wilson   &   Gronke   2000).   Overall,   the   extent   to   which 
representatives  invest  -  time  and  the  number  of  events  they  attend  -  into  constituency 
outreach is telling about their general orientations as it is an aspect of constituency work that 
cannot be delegated to staff. 
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2.3  Determinants of Constituency Orientations and Outreach 
 
 
Because most parliamentary systems are vague as to how representatives should conduct their 
constituency work (i.e. no institutional penalties hence socialisation) and as constituency 
activities are known to be time consuming then why do representatives invest into constituency 
work?    
Rational choice theories have been the most dominant in explaining the motives behind 
representatives’ constituency outreach.  They posit that representatives are driven by electoral 
incentives manifested in vote-seeking behavior hence pursue constituency work to gain 
incumbency advantages (Mayhew 1974; Wilson & Gronke 2000). In fear of losing in the next 
election, representatives perpetually protect or expand established bases of political support in 
their constituencies. Therefore, the intensity with which they reach out to and offer 
constituency services tends to correlate with their desire to be re-elected next time around. 
Rational choice perspectives hence attribute the pursuit of constituency outreach to 
representatives’ manipulative motives. Whether it is through manipulative credit seeking by 
which representatives attempt to craft a favourable public image and strategically position 
themselves to gain trust in eyes of their constituencies or by ingratiating themselves through 
casework - representatives pursue constituency work to win credibility and constituency 
favours in return for political support (Fenno 1977; Bianco 1994; Sellers 1998; Mayhew 2004). 
Maintaining a good reputation and constituency support has in turn shown to yield greater 
legitimization of representatives’ political positions (Langer 2007) and gains in representatives’ 
legislative freedom even if the vote is at odds with sentiment in the district (Wilson & Gronke 
2000).   
Mansbridge (2003) also notes anticipatory and prudential forms of political representation. For 
the study of constituency orientations, Mansbridge’s concept of anticipatory representation is 
interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it recognises representatives ↔ electorate communicative/ 
deliberative interactions that occur between elections. Unlike most representation theories, 
anticipatory representation does not see the inter-election period as static when it comes to 
citizen-representative interactions and their mutual influences. The inter-election period is 
considered to be continuous and alive comprising multiple properties, influences and processes 
(Franceze & Noorudin 2002: 2) subsequently pointing to a relational continuity between 
representatives and the represented.  Therefore, constituency outreach in this sense is 
considered as a space and medium for sending and receiving of political cues among 
representatives and their constituents.  
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The second reason why Mansbridge’s anticipatory representation typology is interesting for the 
study of constituency orientations is that it presumes a shift to delegate-like characteristics 
among representatives. It indirectly alludes to the role of inputs and feedback dynamics. In the 
proposition that representatives actively solicit constituents’ political cues through public 
opinion polls and outreach to anticipate their voters’ preferences, anticipatory representation 
implies that politicians are prompted to continuously ‘listen’ to those they represent more than 
is conventionally assumed. Implicitly they seek electorate’s feedback.  
The role of ‘feedback’ - reciprocated intra-system deliberative acts - is an important micro-
process and normative constituent of political representation (Barber 1984; Dryzek 1990; 
Habermas 1984; Fishkin 1991). In theory, the feedback function is a catalyst for transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy. However, the feedback function is often neglected by the 
dominant congruency and responsiveness theories where over reliance on outputs (policy 
congruency) and automatic state of representatives’ and voters’ preferences are assumed.  As 
Muller has pointed out: 
 “in contrast to legitimacy sentiments, which are independent of immediate outputs 
 from political authorities, citizens’ perceptions of representational linkages between 
themselves and the authorities depend on their affective responses to outputs,        
encompassing not only instrumental performance satisfactions, but (and most commonly   
among the membership in general) symbolic performance satisfactions  
as well” (1970: 1149). 
 
At the individual or micro-level of political representation, feedback mechanisms furnish 
interpretations of stimuli, perform acts of recognition, activate memory and the ability to learn, 
enable making decisions between conflicting alternatives, follow operating rules and use the 
latter to derive preference formations (Deutsch 1966: 81).  Combined, they constitute responses 
to new inputs of information that offers opportunities for corrective behaviour, convergence on 
mutual goals hence continuity of pseudo rewards.  If the feedback mechanism functions 
effectively, it prompts learning hence possibilities for behavioural modification and the 
reduction of intra-systemic mistakes. On the contrary, if the feedback mechanism is 
dysfunctional, the mistakes pertinent to the functioning of the system may increase (Ibid: 88-
90).   
Through the deliberative feedback important civic experiences of role-taking, practical-moral 
evaluation of rational arguments, reflexivity, sincerity, discursive inclusion and equality are 
exchanged (Habermas 1984: 22-42). Associational ties between actors have also been observed 
to strengthen (Pitkin 1981) while basis for distributive justice is formed and participants tend 
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to make better decisions. In the aggregate, micro-feedback acts become the ether that enables 
political entities to think and problem solve together, to see together, to act together. 
Sceptics would argue however, that all of the above, though theoretically valid do not reflect 
representatives behavior in practice. Rather than being interested in their constituents’ 
preferences, sceptics argue that motives for representatives’ outreach are mostly functional or 
tokenistic.  Representatives are more interested in acquiring general knowledge rather than 
engaging in intricate learning opportunities about their constituents’ preferences (Stimson et 
al., 1995: 545).  
A more recent study on the demand-side that examined changes in public opinion in response 
to varied sequencing of political cues found that the exchange of political cues between political 
entities and citizens is more intricate.   For example, time lag between receiving competing 
political messages matters in citizens or voters’ policy preference formation (Chong & 
Druckman 2010).  The more time that elapses between competing messages, the more 
individuals tend to give disproportionate weight to the most recent communication while 
previous effects decay over time.  However, people engaging in deliberate processing of 
information display attitude stability and give disproportionate weight to previous messages 
hence showing that people typically form significantly different opinions when they receive 
competing messages over time than when they receive the same messages simultaneously 
(Ibid.).  
The inquiry in this thesis examines the dynamics observed in MEPs’ constituency outreach.  By 
focusing on the constituency dimension specifically, it aims to complement congruency theories 
that often (Chong & Druckman 2010) fail to demonstrate how representatives receive, 
determine & incorporate cues from their constituencies to establish their own positions, using 
the constituency level as a space for representative-constituency ‘linkage’.  
 
While the above sections outlined how the constituency linkage is perceived in political 
representation theory  and  what  defines  constituency  orientations and constituency 
outreach,  the  following  discussion reviews   existing   hypotheses   about   the   determinants   
of   variation   in   representatives’ constituency orientations.  In other words, what  factors 
prompt some representatives to be more constituency oriented than others? 
 
Previous research has acknowledged that structural and contextual limitations influence the 
margin of choices open to a representative (Kavanagh 1983: 131).  These in turn affect their 
actions.   At the  national-level most commonly recognized determinants for representatives’ 
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constituency    orientations    include:   i)   the   electoral   system,   ii)   representatives’   role 
orientations, and iii) incumbency. 
 
The  electoral  systems  theory  proposes  that  electoral  system’s  properties,  such  as  ballot 
structure and district magnitude, influence the representational style that elected politicians 
adopt (Cain et al.  1979; Scholl 1986; Wessels 1996; Farrell & Scully 2007).   Majoritarian 
electoral systems with single member districts are known to yield more pro-active cultivation 
of  constituency  relations  (Cain  et  al.  1983; Farrell  &  Scully  2005).  While,  PR  systems 
characteristics  of  most  European  polities  with  multi-member  districts  and  closed  ballot 
structures show to provide weaker incentives for  the maintenance of active constituency 
relations.  In  PR  systems  representatives  are  expected  to  behave  more  like  trustees  than 
delegates. Legislators from multi-member districts also tend to place organized groups such 
as lobby and special interest groups as the primary focus of their representation (Lowenberg & 
Kim 1978:45). 
 
 
Role orientations are the second set of strong determinants. Role orientations express how 
representatives relate to those they represent. ‘Whom representatives take instruction’ from 
and  ‘where they place their representational focus are two indicators used to better define 
representatives’  representational  style.  A  representative  who  takes  instruction  from  and 
places his/ her focus on ‘citizens’ would be expected to be more constituency oriented than a 
representative that bases his/her decisions on his/her own judgment or who focuses large 
proportion of their time on parliamentary activities. 
 
At the same time, the link between the constituency dimension and role orientations (as an 
independent  variable)  has  been  insufficiently  researched  and  remains  inconclusive.  Role 
orientations’ predictive power for determining representatives-voter policy congruency has 
been  low.   Research has shown that delegate oriented representatives who are proactively 
engaged in their constituencies do not necessarily know their constituency opinion any more 
accurately than  trustees nor are their constituencies’ preferences better reflected in their 
votes (Miller & Stokes 1963; Friesema & Hedlund 1974: 417).   At the same time, Kuklinski and 
Elling (1977) argued that  though this may be true, issue saliency serves as an important 
intervening precondition for  the  formation  of  perceptual  accuracy  and  policy  agreement. 
They found that delegates are more representative in terms of policy congruency when policy 
issues under study are salient. 
 
Role  orientations  in  this  sense  only  “estimate  probabilities  of  behavior  germane  to  the 
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particular relationship; that is, the person’s actions and doings that are in performance of a 
given role and that derive their meaning and significance from the relationship expressed in 
the roles of player and counterplayer” (Eulau & Wahlke 1978: 16−17). Therefore rather than 
being robust determinants, role orientations are mere approximations of certain behavioral 
outcomes. 
 
Incumbency   has   been   known   as   the   third   predictor   of   representatives’   constituency 
orientations.   In previous research, incumbency and members’ level of seniority (number of 
office  terms) has shown to be negatively correlated with representatives’ pro-constituency 
orientation  (Cox  & Katz 1996; Erikson 1971; Gelman & King 1990)  According to rational 
choice   vote-seeking   theories,   incumbents   are   more   “safe”   and   established   in   their 
constituencies  hence  less   needy  to  chase  votes. Moreover,  throughout  their  term,  as 
incumbents  gain  more  experience  in  legislative  skills  they  turn  to  devote  more  time  on 
parliamentary work as oppose to constituency duties. To the contrary, because rookies or 
junior representatives enjoy lower visibility, are less established in their constituencies and 
inexperienced in  legislating, they tend to spend more time on stabilizing their constituency 
support base hence on constituency outreach than on legislative work in the capital (Mayhew 
1974; Fiorina 1977; Fenno 1978). 
 
 
In addition to the electoral system, role orientations, and incumbency, intra-district dynamics 
are another factor known to influence representatives’ propensity for being pro-constituency 
oriented.  Heavier  investment  into  constituency  outreach  has  been  particularly  observed 
among  representatives from districts where constituents’ policy preferences were not fully 
formed   (Mansbridge  2003),  where  the  predecessor  has  left  a  strong  legacy  or  where 
representatives’ re-election was heavily contested (Fenno 1977: 889). 
 
 
 
 
2.4 The Constituency Dimension in the EU Context 
 
 
 
While   the   above   pieced   existing   theories   and   conclusions   on   the   conceptualization, 
measurement  and  determinants  of  the  constituency  dimension,  most  of  the  observations 
derive from national level experiences.  The relevance of national level theories for the study 
of  MEP’s   constituency  orientations  in  the  transnational  European  context,  however,  is 
questionable.  Can we assume that MEPs’ representational styles are similar to those of their 
national   counterparts?  
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Moreover,   is   there   a   large   variation   in   MEPs   constituency orientations?   Are   some   
MEPs   more   constituency   oriented,   than   others? And,   what determines the types of 
activities and the direction of MEPs’ constituency orientations?  Are the classical determinants 
– role orientations, incumbency and electoral system significant10? Or do the particularities of 
‘representing’ in the European context – MEPs being remote from their constituencies, the 
high MEP-constituent ratios, MEPs’ general low public visibility and political salience - affect 
the way MEPs think about and act in their constituencies? 
 
 
As established earlier, the  EU is a relatively young, complex, multilayered polity with no 
historical precedent.  Though literature on the subject has been growing, our understanding 
about  the  way  its  representation  mechanisms  function  at  different  levels  is  still  limited. 
Though normative and macro-institutional discussions on political representation in the EU 
have received a fair amount of attention (Marsh 1997; Schmitt & Thomassen 1999; Katz 1999; 
Farrell & Scully 2007; Mair & Thomassen 2010), MEPs’ individual-level behavior has been 
underexplored (Katz 1999; Hix 2002; Farrell & Scully 2005, 2007, 2010). Even more limited is 
our knowledge about how MEPs relate to and cultivate ties with their home constituencies.  By 
framing the constituency dimension as a form of linkage, this thesis aims to precisely look at 
these missing links – individual level behavior of MEPs - in existing literature. 
 
 
 
Territorial Constituency in the EU context 
 
 
In  several  ways  European  constituencies  differ  from  the  national  level  constituencies. 
Arguably,  these  differences have  implications  for  political  representation  in  the  EU 
context. Some of the key particularities will now be discussed. 
 
The first concerns territorial representation. Though territorial borders intra-Europe have 
ceased to exist in economic terms, they have not ceased to  exist politically.   Political 
representation in the EU remains   to   be   territorially   bound   where   official   European   
political constituencies and electoral  contest for EP elections are confined to national borders.   
With the exception of Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Poland and UK’s regionally bound EU 
constituencies (see Table 2.1 below), majority of European constituencies are national.  In 
other words, at the EU level, an electoral district for the majority of EU members states 
comprises the entire country.  Transnational electoral contest, where European citizens could 
vote for trans-national EU parties and/or representatives  outside  of  their  national  electoral  
districts  has  so  far  not  been possible. 
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The fact that most EU constituencies are national means that MEPs oversee much larger 
constituencies with higher MEP-constituent  ratios  than  their  national  counterparts.   For 
example, on average an MEP represents a constituency of 448 000 people (see Table 2.1), 
while a British MNP represents a constituency of 89 000; a Spanish MNP a constituency of 
115 000; 136 000 in Germany; 102 000 in France.  Consequently, the larger constituencies 
and higher MEP-constituent ratios imply higher  intra-constituency heterogeneity hence the 
likelihood of higher volumes of constituency demands - lobbying, casework requests and 
outreach, thus possible foci of representation. 
 
Adding to the representation of a larger national constituency is also the question of how 
European   representatives   factor   in   the   added   layer   of   representing pan-European 
constituencies and their interests?  In other words, do MEPs take on cases and do they reach 
out to ‘constituencies’ outside of their respective national or regional territorially bound 
electoral districts? And in reverse, do citizens contact MEPs from ‘constituencies’ other than 
their own?  In other words, is it conceivable that a Swedish constituent would contact a 
Polish MEP with a request for assistance? If so, how do MEPs deal with requests coming 
outside of their national constituencies?  
 
As noted earlier, little is known about MEPs’ attitudes about their constituencies, the kinds of 
constituency work they take on, and what determines the variation in MEPs’ constituency 
orientations.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  large  constituency  and  the 
superimposed pan-European constituency dimension affect MEP’s workload (e.g. increased 
number of demands, casework and requests) and the range of foci of representation. 
 
  
EP‘s institutional expectations of MEPs’ role orientations 
 
Some clues about MEPs’ expected conduct are expressed in the European Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure.  At the same time, apart from ethical considerations about restraints from illegal 
activities and second mandates the Rules of Procedure stipulate very few expectations about 
the way MEPs should conduct their constituency duties.  The only interpretable reference to 
MEPs’ expected role orientations is made in Rule 2 ‘the Independent mandate’.   Rule 2 
stipulates that MEPs are expected to act in a way as “not to be bound by any instructions 
regarding their mandate in order to preserve their independence  and  trustworthiness” 
(www.europarl.europa.eu).  
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  Table 2.1 European constituency characteristics 
 
 
 
Country NO 
MEPs 
Constituency 
(millions) 
size MEP: Constituent 
ratio 
Type of 
Constituency 
Electoral 
system 
 
 
Greece 
 
 
24 
 
 
11 
  
 
828,000 
 
 
National 
 
 
PR 
Spain 54 44  815,000 National PR 
Germany 99 82  803,000 National PR 
Poland 54 59  731,000 National(x13) PR 
Romania 35 22  628,000 National PR 
Netherlands 27 16  593,000 National PR 
Sweden 19 9  473,000 National PR 
Hungary 24 10  458,000 National PR 
Austria 18 8.3  455,000 National PR 
UK 78 60  442,000 Regional (x12) PR 
Portugal 24 10.6  442,000 National PR 
Czech Republic 24 10.3  430,000 National PR 
Bulgaria 18 7.7  428,000 National PR 
Belgium 24 10.5  401,000 Regional (x3) PR 
Slovakia 14 5.5  393,000 National PR 
Denmark 14 5.4  386,000 National PR 
Finland 14 5.3  370,000 National PR 
Ireland 13 4.2  300,000 Regional (x4) STV 
Slovenia 7 2  285,000 National PR 
Lithuania 13 3.4  277,000 National PR 
Latvia 9 2.3  255,000 National PR 
Estonia 6 1.8  216,000 National PR 
Cyprus 6 0.8  133,000 National PR 
Italy 78 59  108,000 Regional (x5) PR 
France 78 8  102,000 Regional (x8) PR 
Luxembourg 6 0.5  83,000 National PR 
Malta 5 0.4  80,000 National STV 
 
 
Source: www.europarl.europa.eu, Farrell & Scully 2007 
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Interestingly, Rule No. 2 prescribes MEPs to adopt a trustee-like representational style by 
upholding   independent  judgment,  to  rely  on  their  individual  competences  and  to  act 
unrestricted from external influences when carrying out their duties as MEPs. From this it can 
be deduced that the according to the EP, MEPs’ are not expected to act as delegates, in other  
words to actively seek instruction from their constituents, nor to act as partisans by being loyal 
to their parties.  They are to act as ‘independent’ representatives.  Moreover, Rule No.2 remains 
mum about any normative references pertaining to MEPs’ accountability or responsibility to 
cultivate active relations with their constituencies.  
 
In practice, however, similarly as in the case of national MPs, research has shown that MEPs’ role 
orientations tend to vary.  A comparative study on MEPs’ and national MPs’ (MNPs) role 
orientations confirmed Rule No. 2 where most MEPs exhibited a trustee role orientation.  The same 
study also observed that MEPs tended to emulate representational styles those of their national 
(MP) counterparts (Katz 1999).  When asked whom they take instruction from, 75 per cent 
MEPs  compared to 72 per cent of MNPs, ranked their own judgment in the first place while 
taking instruction from party voters came in second - 37 per cent MEPs claimed to do so6  (Ibid.: 
63-65).   Thomassen & Schmitt’s results (1997) also confirmed the partisan proclivities among 
MEPs.  
 
Other studies, however, suggest that partisan role orientation at the European level though to be  
expected  –  i.e.  predominance  of  PR  systems  and  Maastricht  treaty’s  (Article  138)7 is unlikely  
in  practice  due  to  EP  party  groups’  instability, incohesion  and  low  salience (Anderweg 1995; 
Hix & Lord 1997; Hix et al. 20058) hence providing few incentives for MEPs to be EP party group 
oriented.   Additional research on the role of national parties also show MEPs to be less loyal to 
their national parties’ instructions than expected and their inclination to act as independent 
trustees instead (Scully 2000; Poguntke et al. 2007). 
 
When looking at MEPs’ foci of representation, however, Katz’ (1999) earlier study also found that 
MEPs tend to place their representative focus more on interest groups than on any other group 
                                                          
6  The survey question read: “In many cases people have different views concerning matters that the  (European Parliament/ 
National Parliament) must decide upon. On which one of the following would  you base your decision in such 
cases?” The choices offered were: “your own judgment,”   “the view  of the voters of your party,” and “the view of your 
national party;” while MEPs were also given the choice of “the view of your EP group” (Katz 1999: 63). 
7
  Article 138 stipulates the expectation that EP party groups are to play an important intermediary role  in the‘ expression 
of peoples’ political will’ in the European polity. 
 8  Hix et.al (2005) posited that though EP party group cohesion remains low, it has risen over time, thus the study of EP 
continually being in a state in flux. 
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such as ordinary citizens, public opinion in general and the media; MNPs tend to spend more time 
on the latter (Katz 1999: 66).  Katz attributes this finding to the their remoteness and   the   multi-
layered   complexity   of   the   EU   polity  which   prompt   “MEPs   to   require intermediaries  
between  their  (distant)  constituents  and  themselves,  whereas  MNPs,  can interact with their 
constituents more directly” (Ibid.: 68). 
 
 
 
 
MEP’s expected allocation of resources to constituency work 
 
 
Another official reference by the EP to MEPs’ constituency conduct is made in the European 
Parliament’s annual calendar.  The EP calendar structures MEPs’ annual work schedule into 
twelve  four-day sessions in Strasbourg (i.e. one 4-day week per month) and six additional two-
day sessions in Brussels.  Within those, the Calendar expects MEPs to spend two weeks per 
month on parliamentary committee meetings and inter-parliamentary delegation work, as well as 
one week for political group meetings. According to the Calendar, in total, MEPs are expected to 
spend only four weeks on constituency work and delegation trips combined per year 
(www.euparl.europa.eu).  
 
In other words, the four week slot is shared time between MEPs’ constituency service and their 
delegation work (most of which includes trips to other countries). Then if calculated on the basis 
of a 45-48 work week year, the expected 28 days (4 weeks based on a full calendar week, or 
nearly six weeks if working week is considered – the EP doesn’t specify), on average, the EP expects 
MEPs to spend less than half a day per week in their constituencies. This is even more reduced 
when delegation commitments are counted in this time slot9.  The Calendar also does not specify 
whether the half day per week spent on constituency work is a minimal standard or a satisfactory 
standard expectation. 
 
Based on the above discussion, three observations can be inferred: a) that the EP provides wide  
discretionary power as to how much time MEPs spend on constituency activities; b) 
                                                          
9 As part of their mandate, MEPs are allowed to select to sit/ serve on one committee and up to one delegation. The latter 
includes work on the promotion of parliamentary ties with parliaments in the international community that are not members 
of the EU. In total there are 34 delegations divided into four categories, each made up of about 15 MEPs: i) inter-
parliamentary delegations; ii) joint parliamentary committees; iii) EP’s delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly focusing on relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States; iv) the European Parliament delegation to the 
Euro-Mediterranean. 
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proportional   to   other  activities,  the  expected  0.5  days  spent  on  constituency  work  is 
significantly lower hence revealing the low priority attached to constituency work by the EP; and 
c) the implicit  institutional expectation derived from the former is that the EP expects MEPs to 
focus more on their Brussels/ Strasbourg based activities than on their constituency work. 
 
 
When  it  comes  to  the  allocation  of  financial  resources  to  constituency  activities,  the  EP 
remains  equally vague.   While MEPs receive a general administrative budget for expenses 
related to their office management costs - 4202 EUR per month10; and for personal staff (a flat 
rate of 17540 EUR per month)  whom they may recruit and allocate freely 11 
(www.euparl.europa.eu),  In theory, an MEP can have a minimum of three offices – one in 
Brussels, one in Strasbourg and one in their constituency.   However, because no empirical 
research  has  been  done  on  this  topic,  how  MEPs  distribute  financial  and  staff  resources 
among different offices in practice is unknown. 
 
 
Because MEPs have set budgets and finite time for their activities, it is possible to examine how 
MEPs allocate and trade off time and staff between duties and offices.  In determining the amount 
of  staff and time MEPs allocate to constituency should ultimately enable us also to determine 
MEPs’  propensity to be pro-constituency oriented (or not).   In view of previous research and the 
lack of clear (EP) institutional guidelines, it is expected that MEPs’ allocation choices will vary. 
 
 
 
 What MEPs do in their constituencies? 
 
 
The types of activities that European Parliamentarians pursue as part of their constituency work 
is once again sparsely documented. Previous findings suggest, though that MEPs do take  on 
casework such as petitions12 to influence legislation or raise issues which have not been   
considered  by  the  EP  (Scholl  1986).  Because MEPs serve large, heterogeneous constituencies,  
they  conceivably  receive  a  wider  range  and  greater  amount  of  casework requests   than   their   
national   counterparts.   In addition   to   individual   citizens,  MEPs’ constituencies comprise much 
                                                          
10
These include phone, postal charges, the purchase and maintenance of computers and travel costs. 
11
 Travelling  expenses,  social  security  contributions  and  tax  paid  on  behalf  of  the  assistant(s)  may  also  be reimbursed 
directly to the Member upon presentation of duly receipted invoices (www. europarl.europa.eu). 
12
 An example of a petition involved UK fishermen and lifeboat crews lobbying their MEPs about the effects of new EU 
emission rules on the machinery they use to launch their boats. Respective MEPs took on the petition and were successful 
in amending the legislation which made the specific machines exempt. 
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larger array of different groups or sub-constituencies (e.g. the national   government, regional  
authorities,  national  associations  and  organized  interest groups) that may approach MEPs with 
casework.  At the same time, given that MEPs work remotely from their constituencies and given 
that the policies over which EU presides and would be of concern to an ordinary citizen are limited, 
it is equally conceivable that MEPs’ casework loads may be low as citizens likely find few reasons to 
turn to MEPs for potential remedies.  
 
 
A more recent study also observed that MEPs do spend considerable amount of time in their 
constituencies and consider maintaining contacts with individual constituents important. 80 per 
cent MEPs respondents indicated that they spend at ‘least some time’ or ‘weekends’ in their 
constituencies every week and maintain most regular contact – “at least once a week” - with 
ordinary citizens, national party members and journalists (2006 MEP Survey, European 
Parliamentary Research Group). Ordinary citizens topped the list of whom MEPs are likely to 
reach out to while personal consultations via a permanently staffed office featured as the most 
preferred form and place of contact. 
 
 
Determinants of MEPs’ constituency orientations 
 
 
As indicated earlier, the electoral system is considered to be one of the strongest determinants of 
representatives’ role orientations. At the EU level, the electoral systems theory is expected to 
hold as well as to play a significant socializing role13  (Farrell & Scully 2007, 2010). As EU 
elections are conducted under the PR system in all member states (since 2002), it would be 
expected that MEPs develop either a trustee or partisan orientation (Bowler & Farrell 1993).  As 
a  result,  MEPs  are  expected  to  be  more  Brussels  or  party  rather  than  constituency 
oriented. 
 
At the same time, because no two national PR systems are identical and as MEPs undergo 
primary  political socialization at national level, it is also possible that MEPs’ constituency 
                                                          
13 Until 1999, MEPs were elected through a mixed method – PR and majoritarian systems. The Uniform Electoral Procedures 
(UEPs) legislation, caving in to calls for uniformity, in 1999, the EU standardized the electoral method for EU 
elections in all member states into PR-system of al. As of the 2004 elections, all MEPs were elected through the PR 
model.  In 2002, the formerly pluralistic a electoral systems approach where each country could choose its own electoral 
systems formula for EU elections was abolished and a universal electoral - PR system – rule was introduced for all 
members states was introduced. 
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orientations will  be strongly shaped by their national political culture.   The intermeshing 
strong  social  cleavages  in  Belgian  and  Dutch  multiparty  systems  (MacMullen  1985),  for 
example, the influential role of interest groups and mixed-member PR system in Germany and 
Austria (Burkett 1985), different  candidate selection processes across the EU, the role of 
patronage and clientelist networks in Italy,  the unique (authoritarian) communist legacy of EU’s 
new member states where participatory roles of citizens and ties to political elites were non-
existent – are some examples of different political culture specificities that may intervene and 
distort certain electoral system effects. 
 
Extant research confirms this where in spite the introduction of an uniform electoral system, 
MEPs  from Ireland and UK have shown to continue spending comparatively more time in their  
constituencies than the rest of their MEP peers (Farrell & Scully 2007).   It therefore remains to 
be seen whether Irish and British MEPs will be socialized by the EU party-oriented system or 
whether they will stay true to the national political and electoral cultures. 
 
 
When it comes to incumbency, because the turnover of MEPs from session to session in the EP is 
known  to be high - ranging between 40-50 per cent (Corbett, Jacobs et al. 2003: 40), following 
the incumbency theory, at least 40 per cent MEPs should spend significant amount of time in their 
constituencies.  The incumbency logic, however, makes one assumption - that MEPs are motivated 
by the same electoral incentives and career paths as their national counterparts. As it turns out, it 
may not be the case. 
 
Due   to   European   polity’s   complexity   and   because   representatives’   pro-constituency 
propensities tend to be highly individualized and dependent on myriad of contributing factors 
(Fenno 1978: 5; Johannes 1983: 538), it is conceivable that in addition to the usual suspects – 
electoral systems, role orientation and incumbency – other factors will impinge and influence the 
direction of MEPs’ constituency orientations. 
 
 
MEPs’ geographic remoteness (i.e. distance to constituency), high MEP-constituent ratios, low 
public visibility and perceived low political salience of MEPs are likely to negatively influence 
MEPs’ constituency orientations. On the one hand, MEPs’ remoteness, low public visibility and 
voters’ general disinterest in MEPs’ work could prompt MEPs to sink into their trustee roles and 
to invest little time and resources into constituency outreach between elections.  At the same 
time, the opposite could also be true.  Precisely because MEPs enjoy significantly lower media 
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exposure than their national  counterparts, they may try to compensate by seeking alternative 
opportunities to gain exposure  and  to invest more time into outreach activities. Moreover,  the  
shifting  extraneous  paradigms  such  as  the  rise  of  the  “common  citizen”, shrinking party 
support base(s) and the personalization of politics (Hallin & Mancini 2004) may be additional 
external factors influencing MEPs be more pro-constituency oriented that would be popularly 
assumed. 
 
 
Without a doubt, the study of political representation at the EU level is complex. Conclusions on 
the direction of MEPs’ constituency orientations are very limited and mixed. The relevance of   
national-level   theories and  conceptual  constructs  is  also  at  question  here.  Are  the 
characteristics and mechanics of political representation in the EU true to its hypothesized sui 
generic uniqueness or do they follow very similar patterns to those at national level? 
 
 
 
 
2.5   Chapter Summary  
 
 
 
In summary, Chapter 2 situated the concept of constituency dimension in existing literature on  
political representation.   It examined a series of theoretical considerations – territorial, 
normative,  behavioral – in order to  frame the offline constituency dimension as a micro-
parliamentary linkage mechanism between elected representatives and their constituents. 
 
The  chapter’s  conclusive  reflections  suggest  that  the  constituency  dimension  has  been 
understudied at the national but even more so in the EU context.  Fenno’s (1978) work on US 
Congressmen and various approaches to the study of representatives’ role orientations come 
perhaps the closest to putting the constituency dimension on the map. 
 
 
In  the  EU  context,  empirical  evidence  on  the  intension-extension  properties  of  MEPs’ 
constituency orientations - how they think about, the importance they attach, the types of 
activities  they  pursue  as  well  as  what  determines  some  MEPs  to  be  more  constituency 
oriented than others - is negligible and patchy. The few studies that do steer in this direction 
observed that trustee or partisan rather than delegate representational style prevail among 
MEPs with a representational focus on interest groups and citizens.  However, as noted, the body 
of research is too sparse to draw robust conclusions, hence the need for more extensive research 
on this topic. 
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The chapter also observed that the trustee or mixed representational typologies among MEPs 
should come as no surprise given that the EP’s rules of conduct tend to be vague on how MEPs 
should  relate   to   their  constituencies  between  elections.  There  is  no  e x p l i c i t  mention  
of  the constituency linkage in  EP’s Rules  of  Conduct.   The vague allusions that are made expect 
MEPs to assume the trustee role orientation and to allocate proportionally less time to their 
constituency activities than to their parliamentary and committee priorities in Brussels. 
 
At the same time, it is also a fair to ask, should MEPs be pro-constituency oriented? And if so, in what 
proportion to their other representative duties?  Is there a normatively ‘right’ recipe for how   
much   constituency   work   and   outreach   is   ‘enough’   to   satisfy   the   principles   of 
representative accountability and legitimacy?  Though this thesis aims to primarily address 
empirical  questions,  these  questions  run  as  an  undercurrent  and  in  parallel  with  future 
intentions to implement the Lisbon treaty.  
 
Moreover, several implicit risks and limitations to this inquiry have also been listed.  The first 
involves the inexistent  theoretical  and  empirical  paradigm  linked  to  the  constituency 
dimension at the EU level which prompts theoretical over-reliance on national level literature. It is 
not certain, however, the extent to which the latter is relevant for the EU context.  If not relevant,  
the  use  of  theories  derived  from  national  level  experiences  could  lead  to  the 
misspecification of conceptual constructs and measures of the constituency dimension at the EU 
level. 
 
 
The second risk is the multi-layered complexity of the EU polity which renders the teasing out of  
intricacies difficult.   At the EU level, the range of possible institutional and contextual 
influences  is  potentially  doubled.  Insert  also  individual  level  behavioral  dynamics  that 
comprise a medley of cognitive predispositions, institutional and contextual influences – e.g. being  
members of their EP party groups, EP committees, but also being nationals of their countries, 
members of national parties, some with previous political careers, activist or strong leadership 
abilities, and the study of MEPs’ behavior and their determinants becomes more challenging. 
 
 
Thirdly, largely due to time and operational constraints, this thesis’ predominantly focuses on the  
top-down  MEP    represented  and  less  on  the  citizen    MEP  vector.  Because  the 
constituency dimension   is   in   principle   a   two-way   street   constituting   a   relational 
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representative represented   reciprocity,   the   approach   provides   a   ‘supply’   focused 
perspective while perspectives from the ‘demand’ side are not empirically explored.   The 
danger in the one-sided approach, is that it may over assume and simplify the symmetry of 
motives (interest) among  representatives and those they represent hence subject citizens’ 
preferences to those of MEPs. 
 
 
One thing on the demand side is known, and that is that not all citizens are equally interested in  
maintaining  an  active  relationship  with  their representatives.    Though Eurobarometer surveys  
confirm  that  voters  across  the  EU  show  reasonably  clear  and  broadly  common preferences 
as to what they want from their European representatives, the linkage with MEPs is not necessarily 
a high  priority for EU citizens (Farrell & Scully 2007: 18). This has to be taken into account  as  
not  to  overestimate the  importance of  the constituency  dimension  under study here. 
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3.      POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ONLINE  
 
 
When observing the Internet induced mass protests  in the  Middle  East  in  the  spring  of  2011, 
Obama’s high-tech and highly successful online Presidential campaign in 2008,  politicians’ use of 
websites and ever increasing presence on social  networking  sites,   political institutions’ use of 
online tools  or  e-voting  mechanisms  in national elections, it is hard to ignore the ubiquitous 
application of the Internet in the political sphere of our lives.   However, while e-enthusiasts are 
quick to ascribe positive effects of Internet on political behavior, the more skeptical question 
whether the Internet has in reality enabled political actors to do anything differently?  In other 
words, they ask, does Internet usage contribute to new forms of political behavior or do political 
actors merely use the Internet to replicate (online) that which they already do offline?  
 
 
While Chapter 2  focused  on  the  theoretical  aspects  of  what  representatives  do  in  their 
constituencies offline, Chapter 3 looks at the online dimensions of constituency outreach.  The core 
questions it asks: i) do MEPs use the Internet (e.g. email, websites, blogs, social networking sites, 
and live podcasts) in their constituency outreach functions, and ii) is the Internet platform, if used, 
enabling them to do anything new or different when connecting with their constituencies between 
elections?  For example, due to its expediency, distance reducing and one-to-many communication 
capacity, could the Internet platform prompt MEPs to shift some of their offline constituency 
activities online and thereby to use the online platform as a quasi virtual constituency office?  Or is 
MEPs’ use of the Internet merely symbolic or as some (Coleman 2001) have claimed it - tokenistic?  
 
The Chapter is divided into two parts.  The first part evaluates leading concepts and existing 
literature  on  ICTs  and  o n l i n e  political  communication.  What are Internet’s presumed utility 
benefits and caveats as a political communication tool, how different is it from other forms of 
communication and what are some of the expected theoretical implications of Internet’s use in the 
European Parliament context. The Chapter’s second part zeroes in how we can effectively measure 
and operationalize online constituency outreach.  
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3.1       Anticipated Benefits of the Use of the Internet in Political Settings 
 
 
Internet’s anticipated utility benefits for political communication can be grouped into three 
categories: i) its contribution to the quality   of   political communication,   (ii)   innovative   
functional/   technical   applications   and   (iii)   political participation. Before discussing the three 
categories, however, the pervasiveness and political uses   of   ICTs   need   to   be   placed   in   the   
wider   context   of   developments   in   political communication14.    
 
 
Entry of the Internet as a channel of political communication was greeted by an already 
mediatized environment heavily reliant   on    popular   ‘catchallism’   and   pursuit of   powerful   
techniques   of   visual representation  and audience creation. These trends emerged in the 1980s 
and 1990s,  prompted by the commercialization of the media and subsequent mediatization of 
the political domain (Hallin & Mancini 2004).  To navigate and  prevail  in  this  new  environment,  
political  actors  responded by adopting more mediatized and personalized political strategies of 
self-presentation  (Langer  2007)  by placing a greater emphasis on their personal attributes t o  
gain  greater personal  publicity,  to legitimize their political positions but also to reinforce their 
power capital in dealings with the party  and  the cabinet (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 268, 278, 
Ibid.: 2007). Consequently politicians spending less time in neighborhood canvassing, rallies, and 
other direct contact activities in lieu of devoting more of their attention to  media oriented public 
outreach were observed (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000: 11-12). In this sense, the Internet and new 
use of ICTs became new additions to the arsenal of politicians’ tools for self-promotion, wider, more 
sophisticated and customized public outreach (Sunstein 2001).  
 
 
Quality of Communication 
 
 
Unlike   traditional   print   and   television   media   which   act   as   intermediaries   in   mass 
communication, ICTs were also considered to facilitate more direct forms of interactivity and 
enhanced  mutuality (Margolis & Resnick 2000). Because online individuals simultaneously 
become authors, dispatchers, receivers and controllers of their communicative interactions, 
                                                          
14 See  Blumler  and  Kavanagh  (1999)  for  a  more  elaborate  contextual  analysis  of  developments  in  political 
communication in the postwar period.   Briefly, they argue that trends in political  communication need to be viewed 
as responses to a wider socio-economic context which they are a part of. Among such factors include modernization, 
individualization, secularization, economization, anesthetization, rationalization and mediatization processes in post-
industrial societies (1999: 210). 
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proponents argue, the Internet is seen to reduce or altogether remove the storyteller or the 
middleman hence contribute to  the disintermediation of communication (Bentivegna 2002). 
 
Unlike  the  mass  media  that  resort  to  powerful  framing  (and  mainstreaming)  techniques, 
personalized  use  of  ICTs  enables  political  actors  to  present  themselves  to  their  publics 
directly,  uncensored. Via  their  websites  or  blogs,  representatives  can  personalize  their 
outreach, craft their own public image, tell their own stories, claim credit for the things they have 
done, target more specific constituencies and introduce the issues/ policies they stand for, or 
provide more personalized accounts of their ‘days on the job’. The German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, for  example, not only has her own blog but also a specialized political sub- website  for  
children  while  Hillary  Clinton  and  Barack  Obama  in  the  bid  for  the  2008 democratic   
Presidential   election   used   highly   personalized   websites   for   diversity   of constituency  
outreach  activities  such  as   campaigning,  fundraising  and  reaching  out  to potential voters. 
 
 
Where the conventional media are limited to one-to-many public outreach from a centralized 
source,  the  Internet  provides  more  flexible  and  pluralized  forms  of  communication  by 
enabling multi-level one-to-one,  one-to-many,  many-to-on and many-to-many 
communicative interactions. 
 
 
Additional attributes of the Internet, some argue, also include the faceless interface in online 
communication  (prior  to  YouTube  and  podcasting)  that  allows  for  the  elimination  and 
reliance  of visual social cues present in face-to-face settings.   Online, one is predominantly 
judged on the content value of one’s written presentation which reduces participants’ reading of 
social context clues and thereby reduces the potential for various forms of inter-personal 
discrimination which are seen to negatively affect the quality of communication (Gastil 2000). 
Online communication is further seen to reduce the ‘inhibiting effect’ of awkwardness 
andshyness that otherwise prevents some people from speaking in public (Wallace 1999; Dutton  
1996).  These   aspects,   proponents   argue,   increase   the   quality  of   communication  and 
potentially include people to politically participate that otherwise would not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
Functional and innovative communication applications 
 
 
Perhaps the most concrete benefit of ICTs is their transactional expediency, cost effectiveness and 
time  flexibility. Though an email or websites fulfill similar communicative function as a letter, for 
example, emails’ and websites’ instant and potential 24/7 access reduce the send- response lag 
time, lower transaction costs and enable one-to-many and higher frequency or volume of 
interactions. The  choice  of 24/7 synchronous – in real time (e.g. chat rooms or discussion 
forums) or asynchronous (e-mail, websites, blogs etc.) access also provides users the  
convenience  to  virtually  ‘visit’   government  departments,  seek  information,  reflect, respond 
and directly communicate on their own time. 
 
 
In addition to the convenience, speed and facility of communication, the advent of the Internet 
platform enabled various entrepreneurial (Tolbert & Mossberger 2006) or functional (Löfgren et al., 
1999:137) applications. Provision of faster, 24/7 access to government information, e- services15, 
and the  creation of   ‘one-stop shops’ based on efficiency, expediency and cost effectiveness  
(Tolbert  &  Mossberger  2006)  has  enabled  government  administrations  to provide improved 
public services and interface with the public hence more transparency and accountability. 
 
In other words, the 24/7 Internet platforms provide free and open access to government 
information and services where citizens no longer have to wait or physically search archives and 
libraries for information, stand in line for administrative forms and applications, or wait months  
to  get  their  tax  returns  filed  or  driving  licenses  renewed.  Online,  public  service delivery is 
intended to be a matter of a click of a mouse. Same level and convenience of access to information 
would be more cumbersome or impossible to obtain through offline channels (e.g. travel/visits to 
the local government office, making appointments, waiting, spending time etc.). The extent to which 
online ‘convenience’ affects citizens’ attitudes and ‘linkage’ with the government, however, has 
been less obvious. 
                                                          
15 With the intention to adopt a private sector – client/ customer service mentality, the entrepreneurial approach dates back and 
has gradually evolved from early intra-governmental administrative uses of  ICTs in the 1970s (Coleman 1999).  E-
government and e-democracy, though often used  interchangeably  as single concept, are different from each other. E-
government places focus on achieving intra-government operational expediency, efficiency (i.e. sharing of databases, 
files etc.) and  the provision of online public services (i.e. facilitating the filing of tax returns, license renewals and 
access to information).  E-democracy refers to the use of ICTs and strategies  by  democratic  actors  (governments,  
elected  officials,  media,  citizens,  NGOs  etc.)  to  increase opportunities for citizen participation and involvement in 
public decision-making processes (Coleman and Gotze,2001). But also, through the use of different techniques ─ i.e. 
increasing the transparency of the political process, improving the quality of opinion formation by opening new spaces of 
information and deliberation ─  to enable citizens to hold politicians accountable for their actions (Trechsel et al., 2003:3). 
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Direct Participation and Civic Empowerment 
 
 
In addition to the many functional benefits, the advent of the Internet has been also linked with 
a strong “civic engagement” agenda. Proponents of participatory democracy have been perhaps 
the most vocal linking political benefits to the Internet.  As democratic governments have 
increasingly  come under pressure (e.g. decreases in political participation, low voter turnout, 
decreasing party memberships and citizens’ rising distrust in political institutions - Wattenberg 
2001) to adopt new  ways of engaging citizens in political processes, ICTs have been  seen  as  
potential  new  tools  for  increasing  both  vertical (top-down/ bottom up) and horizontal (peer-to-
peer) civic participation. 
 
 
Where logistical challenges stood in the way of maximizing citizens’ political involvement, 
advantages of modern technologies provide the means of removing such obstacles and make 
direct civic involvement in political processes possible (Budge 1996: 7). Government hosted 
public  policy  e-consultations,  live  podcasting  of  parliamentary  sessions,  political  actors’ 
personalized websites, blogs and direct e-mail access to government representatives, online 
public opinion polls and  interactive feedback features on government websites are some 
examples   of   new   forms   of   vertical  political  outreach   and   participatory  opportunities 
facilitated by ICTs.  
 
In this context, the German Bundestag, for example, has used synchronous Diskussionforen – 
where a select group of MPs in real time interact online and answer questions posted by the 
public  (www.bundestag.de/forum/index.htm). Since 2006, the UK’s Prime Minister’s office hosts  
an  e-petitions  website  with  over  29000  petitions  and  over  5.8  million  signatures registered 
(www.pm.gov.uk), while series of public e-consultations (e.g. in Canada – Canadian Foreign Policy 
Dialogue 2003; EU Commission – Your Voice portal; European Parliament – Agora,  the  Ideal-EU  
project  (2008-2009); the 2004  Madrid Participa project  launched  by Madrid municipality16) are 
new ways of engaging citizens in decision-making processes. 
 
                                                          
16 The Ideal-EU project comprised a synchronous, in real time three-region (Tuscany – Italy, Poitou Charentes – France, 
Catalunya – Spain) Virtual Town Meeting with implications for EU policies on climate change, while the Madrid Participa 
project creatively combined different ICT applications – onsite  e-voting and mobile phone technologies enabling the 
Madrid City Council to carry out more user-friendly citizen consultations on various local issues while avoiding the 
costs of traditional  voting;  to date 22 such citizen consultations were held involving more than 3.5 million citizens 
(www.madridparticipa.es). 
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In addition to new vertical engagement with politicians, the online platform, especially with the  
onset  of Web 2.0 applications such as social media, blogs and platforms for co-creation has  
prompted  an expansion in horizontal, many-to-many communication leading to political 
mobilization and social activism (Kahn & Kellner 2004; Ferguson & Griffiths 2006; Lilleker & 
Jackson 2008;  Chadwick 2009). Providing attractive spaces for the establishment of virtual 
communities  and  networks  across  geographic  borders  and  based  on  common  interests, 
particular visions of the world and specific political projects, the Internet has enabled citizens to  
become  active  in   collectively   interacting,  gathering  and  processing  of  information, 
organizing forms  of  pressure,  or  protesting  against  decisions  deemed  unjust  or  harmful” 
(Bentivegna 2002: 54). 
 
Through such activities, citizens not only exercise their political right to wield influence, act as 
checks and balances to the system and ensure that their preferences are heard and met, but their   
participatory   experience   can   contribute   to   civic   education.   Increased   political 
attentiveness – learning about public issues and social capital (Putnam 2000), and deliberation on 
public issues (Habermas 1984; Gutmann & Thomson 2004; Dryzek 1990; Fishkin 1991) has 
been known to contribute to the accumulation of civic knowledge and skills that   spur   further   
forms   of   participation.   Such social   networking  interactions  further contribute to a sense of 
involvement and empowerment which transforms participants into de  Tocqueville’s  better 
citizens  and  thereby  forming  prerequisites  of  associational  fabric necessary for healthy 
democracies (Mansbridge 1991: 360; Putnam 2000). 
   
   
  Use of Internet platforms in the constituency context 
 
 
In the  constituency  outreach  context,  the  Internet  also  offers  various  potential  benefits, 
though  empirical evidence supporting the latter is short in supply.   Online politicians can 
provide access to their speeches and votes taken in Parliament, they can explain the issues they 
work on, hold online consultation  hours  and  send  out  en  masse  e-newsletters  a n d  updates 
issues related to their constituencies.  Online consultation forums or networking via social 
networking sites (SNS) have further widened the possibilities for a customized one-to-many but 
also one-on-one constituency outreach and interactions previously less possible.  In a sense, via a 
personalized website, a representative’s door is open 24/7 to his or her constituents. 
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As one MEP put it, being online: 
 
“…is an effective method of communicating with constituents and informing them of my 
activities. With such a vast constituency it is impossible to see as many constituents as I would 
like but the website and blog attracts over 900 unique visitors a week. There is obviously no 
substitute for meeting people in person but I am able to communicate  with far more people in the 
region through my website than I possible could only with visits, talks and meetings.” 
 
 
By enabling citizens to gain 24/7 access to government information, to their representatives,  to an 
increasing range of online public services as well as enabling them to engage in public policy 
making,  the Internet and the  online platform  thus provide new forms of political   
accountability, responsiveness and greater  transparency hence a new channel for 
strengthening democratic legitimacy (Barber 1984; OECD 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2  General Trends:  Internet Usage in Political Settings 
 
 
Though studies and different perspectives on the political uses and benefits of the Internet have 
mushroomed in the past decade, empirically substantiated impact of Internet usage on political  
behavior has been more difficult to trace; results on its magnitude have also been mixed  so  far,  
ranging  from  the  skeptics  (Boulianne  2009;  Chadwick  2006;  Chadwick  & Howard 2009; 
Coleman  & Gotze 2001; Dahlgren 2005; Hindman 2008; Margolis & Resnick 2001) to its 
proponents (Coleman & Blumler 2009; Ferguson & Griffiths 2006). 
 
 
The skeptical perspective: Functional vs. participatory uses 
 
On the one hand, while e-enthusiasts maintain that the Internet has revolutionized the way we 
do politics, skeptics argue that Internet has brought nothing new to politics.  The virtual space, 
they say,  has not become the locus of revitalized citizenship and democracy that its proponents 
had hoped for.   Instead the skeptics argue that political tokenism (Margolis & Resnick  2000:19; 
Coleman & Gøtze 2001; Coleman 2004) or normalisation theory are the likely  explanations  for  
Internet’s  (non)impact  on  political  behavior  where  instead  of  the Internet  revolutionizing the 
status quo, ordinary politics in all their complexity and vitality colonize the  virtual  reality by 
making it “resemble the real world” and perpetuate the top- down  politics  as  usual (Margolis  &  
Resnick  2000;  Lusoli  et.  al  2006; Hindman 2008). According to this view, politicians’ behavior 
online simply emulates their already existing behavior offline, hence the Internet not contributing 
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behaviorally to too much  novelty. 
 
 
Politicians’ adoption of all kinds but merely tokenistic e-initiatives are based on observations that 
though political institutions’ online presence has become more sophisticated over time17, the 
quality of  meaningful government citizens interactions and social learning online has remained 
low (Löfgren  et al. 1999; Coleman & Gøtze 2001).   Entrepreneurial and ‘visual, showcase 
presentations’ rather than the interactive and participatory uses tend to dominate online 
applications in the political context. 
 
 
The latter has been also confirmed by Trechsel et al. (2003) and Tolbert & Mossberger (2006) 
whose research found that online applications promoting government/ political actors-citizen 
interactivity (e.g. e-consultation, e-forums) were disproportionately lagging when compared to 
those promoting efficiency and ‘doing more for less’.  Other studies show that though the 
functional  benefits  of  online  interactions  contributed  to  improved  transaction  efficiency, 
information sharing and  cost-effectiveness by enabling policy makers to analyze responses 
faster  (when  compared  to  mail-in  replies)  (Defra  UK:  2004), officials’  participation  in 
interactive, e–policy consultations was poor (Coleman & Ross 2002). Moreover, civic inputs 
generated during consultations showed to be vaguely (if at all) integrated into policies they 
intended to inform (Hurrell 2005: 644-645). 
 
 
As a result, the above observations have lead some to hypothesize that politicians’ motive for 
going online is merely a status symbol and an indicator of modernity (Bentivegna 2002:58) or 
attempts at ‘political correctness’ (Tomkova 2009) rather than a genuine interest to change the 
way politics is done. Or as Jenkins and Thornburn (2003) have insightfully pointed out though  
the  volume  and  diversity  of  communication  since  the  advent  of  the  Internet  has increased 
and the world is increasingly “watching”, the question remains - who is effectively listening? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 A 2003 UN survey has shown that only 14 percent of UN member states offered on-line consultation facilities on their 
official websites but only 13 countries (8%) of those with web presence had a clear policy statement on their website 
encouraging citizens to participate in the process of decision-making (UN, 2003: 20). 
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The incremental and soft impact hypothesis 
 
 
 
Another   impact   variation   of   Internet   on   political   behavior   is   the   more   transitional, 
incremental  and  soft  impact   rather   than   the   revolutionary   impact   hypothesis. The 
incremental impact hypothesis suggests that as availability, skills and familiarity with new 
technologies will increase over time so will arguably the gradual distribution of their impact 
(Bimber 1999).  In other words, it proposes that the Internet’s impact on political behavior is likely  
to  vary  over  time  as  a  cumulative  aggregation  of  small  or  mutative  effects  than manifesting 
in immediate, revolutionary - ‘big bang’ behavioral changes. 
 
 
The  onset  of  e-government  applications,  for  example,  initially  lacked  the  widespread 
availability of required skills among their primary users (administrators, politicians, citizens). The  
latter  were  in  the  hands  of  few  technocrats  and  computer  specialists.  
 
The  rapid technological advances in the ICT industry and insatiable consumers’ taste drove the 
diffusion of ICTs much faster than the politicians who were responding belatedly to these 
autonomous trends (Trechsel  et al. 2003: 10). At the same time, even if an MP would be 
interested in interacting with his/her constituents online at the time, they would be unable to as 
such tools may not have been available at the time nor did they possess the adequate skills to use 
them. 
 
 
Over time, however, pervasiveness of Internet penetration, increasing user-friendliness of 
Internet applications caught up with users’ ICT skills.  ICT usage hence became more 
mainstreamed and diversified also in political settings. Politicians increased use of social 
networking sites – namely Facebook and Twitter (Vergeer, et al. 2013, Towner 2013), e-voting 
(Alvarez & Hall 2004) and voter advice applications (VAA) such as the EU Profiler used in 2009 
European elections or Kiescompass (Fivaz & Nadig 2010, Ladner A. & Pianzola J. 2010, Trechsel & 
Mair 2011) are gradually changing the voting experience. 
 
Evidence also shows that online consultations are enabling to integrate civil societal groups with 
bureaucracies  and  legislatures,  while  Web  2.0  applications  are  contributing  to  the internal 
democratization of the public sector itself, to the involvement of users in the design and delivery 
of public services and to open-source collaboration within public organizations (Chadwick 2003).   
The use of blogs (Ferguson & Griffiths 2006) and social media such as Facebook  and Twitter  
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has   also   become  easier,   inexpensive  hence  more   popularized. Moreover, where earlier 
studies evidenced a gender gap in ICT usage – a prototypical ICT user being white, higher educated, 
younger male - (Norris 1999) over time, greater PC and Internet penetration and reduction  in  PC 
costs have dispelled some of the digital divide based on gender and access to resources 
concerns. 
 
The mentioned developments provide examples of the evolutionary nature of ICTs over time 
which  due  to  their  availability  may  prompt  new  forms  of  communication  and  political 
behavior that  did not exist before.   A good example is the emerging use of Voting Advice 
Applications (VAA)  such  as the Swiss VAA Smartvote and the novel EU Profiler (2009) that 
enabled  both  270  political  parties  in  Europe  to  self-position  themselves  on  thirty  policy 
dimensions  but  it  also  provided  an  opportunity  to  citizens  to  assess  their  own  political 
positioning   and   self-matching   with   existing   political   parties   prior   to   the   European 
Parliamentary elections in 2009 (Trechsel & Mair 2011; Fivaz & Nadig 2010; Ladner, Felder & 
Fivaz 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Relative novelty of research field 
 
 
The relative novelty of the research field contributes to the lack of established theories and 
methodological inadequacies that in turn has affected researchers’ ability to effectively pin 
down   Internet’s  impact(s)  on  political  behavior.  As  technological  innovation  constantly 
evolves, longitudinal data collection and research on Internet related behavioral phenomena are 
rendered difficult as a result (Chadwick 2009).  In other words, validity of Internet related 
behavior yesterday, may not be tomorrow.  It is therefore no surprise that Internet research has 
been compared to chasing a moving target (Trechsel et al. 2003). 
 
Development of systematic and reliable conceptual tools with which to navigate in this new 
research  field  has  also  lagged  behind  the  speed  of  public  and  academic  debates  about 
Internet’s  potential  benefits (Whyte & MacIntosh 2002).   This has resulted in the prolific 
production of  descriptive research  with empirical work grossly lagging behind.   The few 
empirical attempts that do exist tend to be mutually unrelated and patchy which provide poor 
foundations for the discipline’s theory building; reliable longitudinal analyses are rare. Overall,  
these dynamics have so far been detrimental to making Internet impact studies an inchoate 
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connect-the-dots game. 
 
 
 
 
Users’ perspectives on the utility value of ICTs 
 
 
While  the  above  sketched  out  existing  hypothesis  on  the  impact  of  Internet  in  political 
settings, when the above are matched to actual practice, the results show to be equally mixed. 
 
 
When looking at the demand citizen side, two paradoxical trends emerge. On the one hand, 
public opinion surveys have shown that citizens expect political representatives to use online 
tools ‘more’, on the other, citizens show to be rather passive users of government websites – 
using them mostly for  information seeking and e-services but least so for interacting with their 
MPs or the government.  A UK Politics Study (2005), for example, showed that 45 per cent 
respondents thought that their MPs  did not reach out via the Internet enough (BBC, March 
2005) while a US study on citizens’ Internet  usage revealed that out of 78 per cent Americans 
using government websites, 63 per cent used them to access information and 23 per cent for e-
services.   Other earlier studies confirmed citizens  preferences for using e- government  
websites  for  personal  development  and  civic  education  purposes  the  most (Mambrey  et  al.  
1999).  However,  a  German  public  opinion  poll  found  that   use  of  e- government services 
by citizens has risen sharply over the years (Tolbert &  Mossberger 2006). 
 
 
At the same time, the extent to which government’s e-initiatives positively affect citizens’ 
perceptions  about the government show to be mixed.   Several studies show that though 
respondents positively equate e-government initiatives with government’s improved capacity to 
solve problems and their satisfaction with the government in doing so, such initiatives did not 
necessarily increase respondents’ trust in government (West 2004; Tolbert & Mossberger 2006). 
Trust in government showed to be more significantly linked to other factors such as age, 
partisanship, gender and ethnicity.  Increases in trust, were also observed at local rather than state 
level. The studies then contend that government’s online accessibility is an issue of perceived  
utility   than  it  affecting  citizens’  attitudes  about  the  government  (Tolbert  & Mossberger 
2006: 365-366).    Another study however, did find positive correlation between government’s 
provision of online information via websites, citizens’ satisfaction with the new initiative  but  also  
greater  trust  in  government.  However, the  study  also  found  citizens’ dissatisfaction with the 
facility of transactions and interactivity of websites (Welch & Hinnat 2005). 
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The foreseen benefit of using the Internet to stimulate inclusiveness and greater equality was also  
shown  to  be  unsubstantiated  as  perceptions  of  (socio-economic)  status  tend  to  be reinforced 
when participants reveal their offline identities while interacting online (Dahlberg 2001:15).  
Effects on political participation are also mixed. While some studies observed no significant 
effects of ICT usage on the increases in political participation as those politically engaged offline 
tended to similarly engaged online (Bentivegna 2002: 59, Vassil 2009), a UK study that   explored  
the  relationship  between  Internet  use  and  online-offline  political participation  among  UK  
voters  found  that  controlling  for  political  interest  and  previous political engagement, for  
groups that received e-stimuli did lead to higher online political engagement. At the same time, 
the effect failed to affect offline engagement (Gibson, Lusoli & Ward 2005). 
 
 
More recently though attention has been pointing to the significant use of social media on 
election campaigning and collective political mobilization and social movements (Van Laer 2010, 
Vissers et al. 2012, Bennett & Segerberg 2012). The phenomenon is largely attributed  to  the  cost-
benefit  ratio  (low  transactional  costs  versus  proportionally  larger benefits – e.g. gaining 
additional contacts at marginal costs) of using social media being more favorable for online than 
face-to-face social mobilization (Ibid.) 
 
 
On the supply – elected representatives’ side, empirical mapping of legislators’ use of ICTs for 
constituency outreach at the national level have been scarce, and at the European – MEP level even  
more  so. The  few  studies  that  do  exist  have  tended  to  focus  on  two  dimensions. Recognizing 
the Internet as a new platform for politicians to present and promote themselves, the first set study 
patterns in MPs’ online self-presentation and self-promotion. Gulati (2004), for example, looked at 
the extent to which US Congressmen (and women) present themselves as (Washington – Capitol 
Hill) ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’, while Andre et. al (2008) examined Belgian and Dutch legislators’ 
online self-presentation in terms of five typologies: ingratiation, self-promotion, exemplification, 
supplication and intimidation but conclusively categorizing them as either ‘committed to local 
issues’ or as ‘policy specialists’.  
 
The   second   set   of   studies   assesses   the   functional   value   that   the   Internet   mediated 
communication  tends  to  bring  to  both  MPs  and  citizens.  Here  observations  show  mixed 
results of  online communication bringing both advantages and detriments to constituency 
outreach. Internet’s expediency seems to act as a double edge sword.  On the one hand, ICTs 
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increase  politicians’  accessibility  and  transparency  over  their  work  (Löfgren  et  al  1999; 
Tolbert & Mossberger 2006).   On the other, the speed and volume of online communication has 
shown to increase demands for instant responsiveness (Welch & Hinnant 2005) but lower the 
quality of communication by producing more frequent and less reflective and “chatty” 
communication patterns (Carter 1999, Dahlgren 2005). 
 
 
When it comes to functionality, e-mail tends to be the most commonly used channel for 
constituency outreach by both MPs and citizens.  From the demand-citizens’ side email offers 
direct access and one-on-one contact with a representative. For a representative it enables one-
to-many interactions when sending personalized e-newsletters or messages. At the same time, 
constituents’ tendency to e-mail several times a day “whenever some idea hit them”, often with 
time-consuming requests or  anonymous  spamming  pose  new  challenges  and responsibilities 
for representatives.  The necessity to manage the increased volume of emails but at the expense 
of constructive content and ‘real’ issues being raised make legislators hesitant in taking 
advantages of ICTs without being overwhelmed by them (Carter 1999: 113-114).  Though a 
slightly outdated quote, but still very much relevant today, one Danish MP explained: 
 
“my working day is not adjusted for me to go and check all different electronic conferences and 
newsgroups that are up and running…there is currently electronic discussions going on both 
within my own party’s debate fora, as well as debate-fora on the national constitution […] I 
cannot follow everything”   (Löfgren et al. 1999:139). 
 
 
 
Some  observers  have  therefore  argued  that  the  exponential  increases  in  the  volume, 
diversification   and   fragmentation   of   communicative   origins   brought   about   by   online 
communication has lead to dispersed polyvocality which may endanger political effectiveness 
(Dahlgren 2005: 51).  But due to lack of empirical evidence, strong causal links between the use of  
Internet and changes in political behavior be it on the side of political institutions, 
representatives  or citizens have been slow to emerge (Margolis & Resnick 2000; Schuler 2003). 
 
 
 
MEPs and Internet Usage 
 
 
While the EP has an elaborate general website, in the EP Rules of Conduct, no stipulation on 
MEPs’  expected ICT usage for constituency purposes is listed.   Each MEP, however, does 
receive a personalized e-mail address and a generic space to upload personal profiles (with basic  
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information  such  as  domestic/  EP  political  affiliation,  committee/  delegation  work, education, 
age, previous political work etc.) and desirable links on EP’s general website upon his/ her arrival 
to the EP.  In the 6th EP (2004-2009) on EP’s official website18  that should have in principle 
listed all 785 serving MEPs’ websites, only 76 per cent MEPs showed to be online at least via an 
email, 57 per cent included an additional link to their personal website, while 9 per cent had a 
blog. 
 
The few existing studies suggest that MEPs mostly use the Internet for intra institutional and 
research purposes related to their work while their primary reason for establishing a website has 
been to communicate with and receive feedback from their constituents (Scholl 1986; Dai 2006).  
But the extent to which MEPs’ Internet usage varies and is distributed, the determinants that 
influence this variation and the extent to which ICTs affect their existing offline constituency work 
is currently unmapped. 
 
This missing link forms an opportune point of departure for the investigation in this thesis. Due 
to the lack of established theories and data on ICT usage by MEPs, the analysis in this thesis is 
pioneering and to a great  extent  exploratory.  The comparative offline-online approach used 
introduces a more comprehensive  empirical  approach  to  the  study  of Internet’s impact on 
political behavior and MEPs’ constituency orientations.  Whereas other approaches tend to  be 
descriptive and merely capturing the online dimensions of political actors’ behavior, the offline-
online approach used here aims to take the analysis further. 
The offline-online  approach  is  novel  in  that  it  defines  Internet’s  impact  as  the  observed 
behavioral19  differences between the way MEPs’ behave - conduct their constituency outreach 
offline and the way they do so online.  In other words, the offline-online approach uses a 
comparative method of the two levels to derive impact dynamics. 
 
 
Moreover, the thesis departs with the assumption that the expediency, cost-effectiveness and 
interactive communication facilities offered by the Internet platform are likely to affect MEPs’ 
constituency   outreach. The   impact   hypothesis   will   investigate   whether   the   various 
anticipated  utilities  of  the  Internet  listed  in  this  chapter  prompt  MEPs  to  shift  some  or 
                                                          
18  The EP website lists a complete set of MEP’s standardized profiles which include personal information such as age, 
(domestic and EP) party affiliation, key EP activities (committee and delegation membership), overview of speeches, voting 
record and forms of contact. 
19
  Behavior has been defined as the action, response or reaction of something/ someone to another something/ someone 
under specified circumstance. 
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majority of their constituency activities online or alternatively lead new forms of constituency 
outreach. In other words, with Internet’s increasing pervasiveness, is it conceivable that MEPs use 
the online platform as  a  quasi virtual constituency office?   Or is Margolis and Resnick’s (2000) 
politics as usual hypothesis  confirmed – does MEPs’ online constituency outreach merely 
emulate their existing constituency  behavior offline - therefore contributing to no behavioral 
changes hence no impact? 
 
 
Chapter  Summary 
 
 
 
In  summary,  Chapter  3  concludes  that  Internet  mediated  communication  brings  both 
opportunities and potentially new challenges to political communication.   For both citizens and   
their   representatives,  the  online  platform  offers  a  more  cost-efficient  channel  of 
communication and 24/7 asynchronous access.  For citizens this has reduced waiting times in 
waiting   for  various   applications   or  having  their  grievances  heard  while  for  political 
representatives  the Internet offers  a new space for disintermediated self-presentation, to 
become more transparent as well as to reach out to their constituents en masse but also on an 
individual basis more efficiently. 
 
 
At the same time, managing the high volume, frequency of communication and expectations of  
‘instant responsiveness’ that come with it has become somewhat of a challenge for political 
representatives. The negative effects  on  the  quality  of  communication  are  also  being 
questioned.  Moreover,  the  jury  is  still  outstanding  as  whether  the  Internet  with  all  its 
facilities  contributes  (behaviorally)  to  anything  new  when  it  comes  to  the  citizen  – 
representative rapprochement? Both e-optimists and e-pessimists have been making their 
cases  though seemingly without a consensus.   Empirical research on Internet’s impact on 
political behavior, and particularly related to MEPs’ constituency outreach has been scarce and 
under explored. In this sense, this thesis is an opportune endeavor providing a new 
opportunity to empirically contribute to the evolving study of MEPs’ online (as well as offline)  
behavior at the individual level. 
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4.          RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
In order to contribute to a more nuanced analysis about the micro-dynamics of representation 
between MEPs and their constituents, this thesis places a magnifying glass on four specific 
dimensions of the constituency linkage. These will be examined in the form of four analytical steps:  
 
Step 1:     MEPs’ constituency orientations and constituency outreach OFFLINE 
Step 2:        MEPs’ constituency orientations and constituency outreach ONLINE  
  Step 3:  The variation and determinants MEPs’ constituency orientations and
 constituency outreach both on and offline; and   
Step 4:     In an explorative way, the comparison of intensity with which MEPs conduct       
their offline versus their online constituency outreach. 
 
This Chapter 4 proceeds to introduce the research design and operationalization of key variables 
for the four steps of the empirical analysis.  As a result it will be structured in four main parts 
followed by a brief conclusion that discusses the value of the approach for future research and 
some of its main limitations. The first part will begin by elaborating the operationalization of MEP’s 
offline constituency orientations and outreach: introducing operational definitions and indicators 
for the main concepts, key hypotheses, data collection and sources and methodology while the 
second part will do the same but for MEPs’ online constituency orientations and outreach. The 
methodological contribution of this second part is potentially significant as it attempts to 
conceptualize ‘constituency outreach’ in a relatively new space, previously non-existent hence 
behaviorally unexplored.  Given the novelty of the Internet studies as a research field and lack of 
consequent theoretical grounding, this means, that analytical proxies for how to measure 
constituency outreach online needed to be conceptualized and created in a way from scratch.    
 
This Chapter’s third part, linked to Step 3 of the analysis, seeks to identify variation patterns in 
MEPs’ both off and online constituency outreach as well as what determines those patterns. In 
other words, answering the question, whether MEPs’ constituency orientations vary and why are 
some MEPs more predisposed than others to be more constituency oriented than others; this 
means outlining the parameters of the dependent and independent variables and explaining the 
objectives of the multivariate regression analysis to be used.  The last, Step 4 then proceeds to 
detail the methodological underpinnings of the offline-online comparative approach and to reflect 
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on the merits, challenges and limitations of the triangulation approach chosen. The following 
sections will elaborate each of these analytical steps in some more details. 
 
 
4.1   Step 1:   Determining MEPs’ Constituency Orientations & Outreach OFFLINE 
 
Overall, the thesis concerns itself with determining the quality of linkage between MEPs and their 
constituencies.  Though the linkage mechanism is in principle two-directional MEP(s)  citizen(s)/ 
constituent(s)/ voter(s), and citizen(s)  MEP(s), this thesis limits its analysis only to the former, to 
the linkage prompted by MEP(s)  citizen(s).   Another specification particular to this thesis is 
that it examines the MEP(s)  citizen(s) linkage in the every day context between two election 
points. 
 
The first step of the analytical process empirically aims to observe two descriptive aspects of 
the constituency linkage: MEPs’ constituency orientations and their constituency outreach 
OFFLINE.  Both form constitutive parts of the MEP(s)  citizen(s) representational linkage 
mechanism. While the former refers to the attitudinal elements and the importance MEP attach to 
constituency work, the second examines different types of activities pursued with respect to 
constituency outreach. 
 
 
4.1.1  Definitions & Operationalization of  OFFLINE Constituency Dimensions 
 
Before proceeding to define and operationalize the two (offline) dimensions, it is perhaps useful to 
define first how the concept ‘constituency’ is being used here.  A constituency is understood here as 
a heterogeneous geographical unit or electoral district that an individual MEP represents.  It is 
heterogeneous in the sense that in addition to classical geographic delimitations, the term can also 
refer to a group of people that an MEP perceives to represent or which may seek MEP’s 
representation or assistance. Such groups can include civic or organized interest groups, o r  sub-
national political entities such as local, regional administration bodies that would typically come 
from the MEP’s geographic district. 
 
Moreover, because MEPs serve as representatives in a transnational, pan-European Parliament, this 
contextual specificity was also factored into the survey question that explored how MEPs 
conceptualize and perceive their constituencies. Because extant research on EU representation and 
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corresponding surveys (e.g. EPRG) typically or by default confine the  ‘constituency’ to a territorial 
unit, the rather open definition adopted in this thesis goes beyond this prescriptive measure and 
allowed MEPs more choices.  And as it will be explained in Chapter 4, this openness proved to be 
insightful as MEPs tend to have fairly heterogeneous ideas about whom they conceive their 
constituencies to be with the transnational – European dimension playing a strong role.  
 
Offline.  As the first level of analysis concerns the mapping of MEPs’ constituency orientations and 
constituency outreach offline, offline is defined here as MEPs’ use of non-Internet mediated 
communication channels including face-to-face contact during office consultations or public events, 
telephone, mailed newsletters, or the use of traditional media such as radio, TV and printed press.  
 
Constituency Orientations Offline. Because it has been observed that how representatives think 
about their constituencies tends to influence how they represent them (Fenno 1977, 1978), 
constituency orientation provides insights about their attitudinal predispositions as to:  (i) what or 
whom (MEPs) consider their constituencies to be, and (ii) the importance they attach to constituency 
work.  While the first dimension describes more cognitive aspects the second dimension measures 
the direction or intensity of MEPs’ constituency propensities, in other words, enabling us to 
determine the degree to which MEPs are pro-constituency oriented or not.  Both are considered as 
composite parts of what is referred to in this thesis as constituency orientations. 
 
To address this dimension in the form of survey questions, MEPs were asked what or whom they 
considered their constituency to be (Question #1 on the survey, please see Appendix).  As part of 
their answer, MEPs could select the electoral geographic unit they represent (either national or 
regional), their personal or party voters, a specific (interest or civic) group, but also given that they 
work in a pan-European context, the choice of representing wider a  ‘European constituency’ and its 
people was also provided.  
 
To measure the importance that MEPs attach to constituency work four resource allocation proxies 
were used (please see the Codebook in Appendix 2): 
(i) whether MEP(s) have a constituency office      (var.  ConstOffice) 
(ii) the amount of time (no. of days/ week) MEP(s) spends in the constituency     (var. DaysConst) 
(iii) the amount of staff they allocate to constituency work     (var. Staffhome)  
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(iv) the proportion of time they spend on constituency work compared to other responsibilities (e.g. 
parliamentary, committee work, maintaining media relations etc.) (var.  Timecasework) 
The key reason why several proxies were chosen is because little is known how MEP conceptualize 
their constituency work.   Hence the question was asked from several different angles before 
correlations between the different variables were drawn. 
 
Constituency Outreach.  While the constituency orientation provides insights on how MEPs think, 
MEPs’ constituency outreach determines what MEPs actually do as part of their constituency work 
and outreach.  In this sense, it is argued here, that it is through constituency outreach t h a t  t h e  
linkage mechanism and inter-election relational continuity  between  the EP  and  European 
citizens  is  maintained (or  not).  
In theory, representatives are known to pursue two types of constituency outreach or constituency 
work.  They explain their own political work to their constituents and they take on casework.  For 
the purposes of this thesis, an interactivity dimension was added to see the extent to which MEP 
pro-actively solicit or invest time into two-way interactivity with their constituents. 
The three sub-dimensions of MEPs’ constituency outreach were operationalized in the following 
way: 
 
Casework OFFLINE.  Very little is known about the types and the amount of casework that MEPs 
receive. Typically, representatives’ pro-constituency orientation is measured in terms of their 
responsiveness to casework (Fenno 1978; Johannes 1983).  However, MEPs’ responsiveness to 
casework tells only half of the story. Because casework involves a two-directional relationship, 
MEPs’:  
(i) Proportion of time spent on case work (in comparison to other activities)  (Timecwrk)  
(ii) Casework responsiveness - percentage of cases that MEP responds t o  (Cwrkrespond) 
(iii) Casework received - average number of cases MEP receives per week    (var. Cwrkreceive) 
were examined and serve to describe both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ dynamics, or representative-
constituent reciprocity in the casework dimension. The casework responsiveness further specified 
and was subdivided into different groups (e.g. interest groups, civic organizations, individual citizens, 
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regional governments etc.)20.   When it came to determining MEPs’ constituency orientations, MEPs 
that devote more time to casework than to other activities would be considered to be more pro-
constituency oriented. 
 
Explaining work OFFLINE refers to unidirectional and top-down (MEP(s)  constituency) modes 
of communication or outreach that MEP(s) pursue as part of their outreach.  It is uni-directional 
because conventional means of outreach such as communication via radio, TV, newspapers, mailed 
newsletters do not necessitate feedback or (two-way) deliberative interactivity. They merely involve 
MEPs speaking or informing their constituencies without soliciting a response.  Consequently, MEPs’ 
preference and frequency - how often MEPs use telephone, office consultations and public meetings, 
to communicate with citizens outside of the election campaign (Survey Question #12) were used as 
an offline indicator for this dimension.  A dummy variable for respondents who use these channels 
‘often’ or ‘most often’ was considered as a proxy for identifying MEPs with pro-constituency 
orientations.  
 
 
Interactivity OFFLINE.  The third interactivity dimension was added to capture the extent to which 
MEPs pro-actively and directly interact with those whom they represent.  Unlike in the explaining 
work dimension, the interactivity measures two-way interactions, feedback and solicitation of 
deliberative exchanges of political cues with their constituents between elections.  Greater 
interactivity would be expected to reinforce the delegate orientation while non-interactivity is 
likely linked to the trustee role.  The offline interactivity v a r i a b l e  is an added dimension of 
MEPs’ constituency outreach.  Unlike the explaining work which depicts a one-way, top-down form 
of outreach and provides n o  o r  v e r y  limited opportunities for reciprocity, the o f f l i n e  
interactivity refers to forms of constituency outreach that solicit two-way dialogue, feedback and 
deliberative exchange of political cues.   
 
 
4.1.2   Step 1:  Hypotheses  linked to MEPs’ OFFLINE constituency orientations, outreach 
In addition to determining basic characteristics of MEPs’ constituency orientations and 
constituency outreach, the objective of this first analytical step is to also determine any aggregate 
patterns in MEPs’ pro-constituency orientations.  As explained in Chapter 1, due to the EP providing 
                                                          
20 Please see Survey questions # 6, #9 and #11, also please see Codebook in the Appendix 2: Vars - Respondnatig, 
Respondzitizen, Respondcivassoc, Respondreggov, Respondig (Appendix 4 – copy of the survey questionnaire). 
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low institutional incentives and the PR system not being favorable for MEPs developing pro-
constituency orientations - the null hypothesis expects that:   
 
(H0):  Majority of MEPs have low pro-constituency orientations and prefer to use one-directional 
constituency outreach. 
 
A low pro-constituency orientation is defined as MEPs attaching proportionally less importance to 
constituency related activities than to others by:  
(H0a) not having a constituency office 
(H0b)    spending 0.5 days or less in the constituency (as expected by the EP Calendar)    
(H0c)    allocating less staff to his/her constituency office than to their Brussels office, and  
 (H0d)    spending proportionally less time on constituency work than on their other duties (e.g. 
parliamentary, committee work, media relations etc.). 
 
While for H0a – 0c a predetermined value determined a pro-constituency orientation (e.g. a score of 
‘1’ on constituency office dummy variable, >0.5 days for H1b), for H1d – H1f a standard value that 
determined whether MEP is pro-constituency oriented or not was created - and based on MEP 
scoring above his/her respondents’ cohort mean value (for that variable).  If an MEP responded 
above average only two out of the three indicators, s/he would receive a score of 2 and so on. 
 
After assessing results for each of the four hypotheses separately, an aggregate ‘pro-constituency’ 
ordinal variable (Proconst) measuring all four aspects was also constructed by first creating four 
dummies where a score of ‘1’ was given for each indicator favoring pro-constituency orientation.  
Using additive scoring, the four values - with maximum possible score for a pro-constituency 
orientation being ‘4’, and the lowest ‘0’ for minimum/ non pro-constituency orientation (please 
see Codebook in the Appendix 2).  
 
While the above established the attitudinal dimensions of the importance that MEPs attach to 
constituency work, when it comes to constituency outreach and the expected low pro-
constituency orientation, MEPs were expected to spend:  
(H1e)    Proportionally less time on casework in comparison to other activities; and to 
(H1f)    Prefer to use uni-directional rather than two-directional, interactive modes of 
communications. 
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An alternative to the null hypothesis, it was also expected that MEPs’ constituency orientations and 
outreach will be more heterogeneous and vary (H1) – with some MEPs being more pro-constituency 
oriented than others without a dominant pattern. 
 
 
4.1.3   Data collection for OFFLINE Constituency orientations and outreach 
 
 
For the offline constituency orientations and outreach, a combination of the author’s self-
administered, online 2009 MEP survey (n=159) and 31 semi-structured face-to-face interviews 
with MEPs served as the two key data sources. Online surveys were sent to all 785 (at the time) 
MEPs in the form of an email with an embedded direct link to the survey.  MEPs from 2007 
accession countries - Romania and Bulgaria - were included in the survey sample.  Please see more 
details concerning the set up and administration of the survey in the Appendix. 
 
Content-wise, altogether the survey included 16 survey questions, split into 4 modules or sections.  
Questions relating to MEPs’ offline constituency orientations were included in Module 1 (Questions 
1-3) that targeted MEPs’ perceptions, attitudes and role orientations toward their constituencies 
while Module 2 targeted questions (4-7) on the importance that MEPs’ attach to constituency work, 
while Module 3 - questions (8-13) focused on different aspects of the constituency outreach. The 
remaining Module 4 and three questions focused on the online dimensions of MEPs’ outreach. 
 
 
 
4.2    Step 2:  Constituency Orientations and Outreach ONLINE 
 
The objective of Step 2 in the analysis is to examine how MEPs use ICT and the Internet platform to 
conduct their constituency work. 
 
In order to determine MEPs’ online constituency orientations and outreach, ‘online’ refers to the use 
of ICT and Web 1.0 Internet-mediated forms of communication such as email, personal website, 
blog (and the various features that the latter contain) and Web 2.0 interactive social networking 
sites such as Facebook or Twitter. ‘Not being online’ therefore means not having a personal 
website/ blog or an e-mail address.  To facilitate the comparison between MEPs’ constituency 
outreach offline and online in Section 4 below and Chapter 6, the analysis of MEPs’ online 
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constituency orientations and outreach will follow a similar sequence that was introduced for 
measuring MEPs’ offline constituency orientations and outreach, first introducing the indicators 
used for online constituency orientations and then followed by the operationalization of online 
outreach.  For nearly all the online variables, a combination of responses to dedicated survey 
questions related to the online dimension as well as website analytics – the coding of MEPs’ 
websites - were used as the primary data sources. 
 
 
 
4.2.1     Definitions and Operationalization of ONLINE Constituency Orientations 
 
Constituency Orientations ONLINE. The offline indicators for constituency orientations included 
several measures about how MEPs identify their constituencies, how much time they spend in 
their constituencies and how much time they devote to constituency work.  To the extent possible, 
the online indicators tried to align with these.  While it was assumed that the online constituencies 
were not necessarily different than the offline ones, for online constituency orientations the main 
proxies included first whether an MEP is online or not and a set of online attitudinal indicators – 
operationalized as dummy variables – that related to MEPs’ motives for creating a website.  The 
assumption here was that MEPs’ motives indicated their intended use of their websites.  MEPs’ 
motives were derived from their responses to question #14 in the survey – please see below.  
(i) whether MEP is online or not – by  having a personal website, a blog or neither (Online) 
(ii) Reasons for creating MEP website – having direct contact with constituents (Webcitizens) 
(iii) Reasons for creating MEP website – receiving feedback from constituents   (Webfeedback) 
(iv) Reasons for creating MEP website – offer educational information aboutEU   (WebinofEU)  
(v) Proportion of time spent on website management versus other activities (Timewebsite) 
 
 
4.2.2   Constituency Outreach ONLINE 
  
For the online constituency outreach, corresponding proxies for the three types of activities 
typically pursued by MEPs - casework, explaining work and interactivity were operationalized in 
the following way.  
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Casework ONLINE.  Though actual casework likely cannot be conducted on-line as it in many 
cases may require offline interventions, the online casework dimension for MEPs’ constituency 
outreach comprised two variables: MEP’s listing ‘casework’ as a survey response to the ‘motive for 
creating his/her website’ (webcasework) question and secondly as MEPs soliciting or taking 
credit for casework on their websites.  To trace the latter, a dummy variable (casework) was 
created to track whether MEPs’ websites or blogs contained a feature t h a t  advertised 
‘casework’, ‘services’ or ‘assistance’ to constituents.  As no standard measure (to the author’s 
knowledge) for online  ‘casework’ exists, the measure introduced here is exploratory. Thus in 
addition to the coding criteria mentioned, other references to casework such as:  online forms for 
EU subsidies or listing of e-procurement opportunities for specific constituency groups (i.e. 
farmers, SMEs etc.), online invitations to workshops conducted by MEPs on various EU policies, or 
links to practicums and other EU institutions were also included. 
 
Explaining political work ONLINE.  While the offline indicators for explaining work referred 
to MEPs’ preference for the use of one-directional conventional offline media, the online 
indicators for explaining work included MEPs’ preference to use one-directional online 
features.  One-directional refers to modes of communication that do not facilitate feedback and 
interaction, but enable the MEP to control the communication flow and typically entail ‘sending 
out information’ that the MEP deems important for his/her constituents to know.  The three 
indicators for this dimension therefore included:  
 
i) Reason for creating a website  -  providing transparency over work    (webstransparent) 
 
ii) Preference for using one-directional online features - e-newsletters    (mepnewsltr) 
iii) Presence of  ‘explaining work’ website feature   (explainingwork)  
 
 
Interactivity ONLINE.  Unlike the online explaining work dimension, online interactivity enables 
two-way interactions: the solicitation of feedback (opinion poll, comment box, SNS) 
asynchronously (not in real time) but also synchronously (in real time) such as e-forums or 
consultation hours21.   Therefore, the two proxies for this online dimension included an attitudinal 
measure of: 
 
i) MEP’s  preference for using two-directional online features - e-mail.    (mepnewsltr) 
                                                          
21 Because the primary interest is to map out representative-constituency interactivity, interactive horizontal communication 
features – e.g. online post-it boards providing thematic interactive spaces among citizens to network – that sometimes 
politicians tend to provide were omitted from analysis. 
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ii) MEP’s cumulative score on the presence of website features:  website, email, e-petition, feedback 
form, e-forum, Facebook, Twitter.    (interactiveonline) 
 
 
The more of these features appeared on MEPs’ website, the more pro-constituency inclined 
online s/he online was considered to be.  The cumulative scoring was also weighted where an 
added weight  (score of  ‘2’) was also attached to the two highly interactive features – email, SNS 
and e-forums22. Therefore a minimum score of ‘0’ (those not online or without a single interactive 
feature) or a maximum score of ‘11’ was possible – please refer to codebook.   
 
One of the key caveats with measuring online interactivity is that website’s level of ‘interactivity’ 
depends not only on whether MEPs have certain  features  or  not  but  also  how actively  they and 
the  end-users  –  constituents – actually use them.   My survey measured only MEPs’ usage and 
their estimates of constituents’ reciprocity.  Ideally, however, a  constituent survey and website 
traffic (via RSS feed statistics) would be also assessed in order to obtain a measure of the 
reverse constituent  MEP vector.  Though potentially cumbersome and costly to operationalize, 
this dimension of interactivity would significantly enrich the analysis and should be explored in 
future  research.  
 
 
4.2.3  Hypotheses  related to MEP’s ONLINE constituency orientations  
Because relatively very little is known about how MEPs behave online, most of the expected 
hypotheses in Step 2 of the analysis are exploratory and deductive.  In general, as elaborated earlier 
with distance, time cost reducing, and one-to-many outreach attributes of ICT and the Internet, the 
online platform appears to be a potentially attractive tool for MEP’s constituency outreach.  
Therefore the null hypothesis for the online dimension expects that: 
 
(H2null):  Great majority of MEPs will be online – have a website or a blog. 
 
Due to the effect of various factors such as demographics, personal predisposition to use ICT and the 
role of Internet penetration, the alternative hypothesis (H2) suggests that MEPs’ online constituency 
outreach will vary.  With respect to the three dimensions of online constituency outreach – MEPs’ 
                                                          
22 Though email would be considered as highly interactive as well, unlike email, e-forums are typically held in real time 
and are an explicit invitation for two-way interaction by an MEP, whereas email may also be a response to a citizen 
initiated communicative act.  
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propensity for soliciting and taking on casework, for explaining his work and promoting interactive 
outreach online, it is expected that out of the three dimensions, MEPs are most likely to use their 
websites for top-down, one-directional and non-interactive communication. In other words, 
according to the skeptics (Coleman & Gotze 2001; Bentivegna 2005), MEPs will likely: 
 
 (H2a):  use their websites for self-promotional activities, for explaining their work or 
disseminating information about the EU; and  
 
  (H2b):   will downplay the solicitation of casework and interactive two-way engagement on their 
websites.   
 
 
 
4.2.4  Data Collection for ONLINE Constituency Outreach  
 
 
Two sources were used to collect data for determining MEPs’ online constituency orientations and 
outreach.  The first was the author-administered 2009 MEP survey and the second was the coding 
and analysis of MEPs’ websites.   
 
The survey responses were mostly used to derive MEPs’ orientations and attitudes toward ICT 
usage, their perceptions about the impact that ICT and Internet have on their work and estimates of 
how citizens or constituents use their websites.  Hence, as noted earlier, the picture about MEPs’ 
online constituency orientations and outreach provided is biased in favor of MEPs’ perspectives. A 
more balanced perspective would have been received if citizens were also surveyed but which was 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
To determine the basic question, whether MEPs were online or not, all 785 MEPs’ profiles on the 
EP official website were screened. For the more detailed website analytics, however, only survey 
respondents’ websites were examined.  As indicated in Appendix 1, among those who answered 
the survey, 76% had a website or a blog while 24% did not.  In the actual MEP population, 
however, only 57 per cent provided a link to ‘their’ website (bloggers excluded) hence survey 
respondents showed a slight bias in favor of Internet users.  In addition to determining MEPs’ 
online status, the detailed website analysis then screened and coded for the different constituency 
outreach features that MEPs’ websites contained.  In total, twenty website/ blog features (please 
see Appendix 1) were explored where ten were specifically related to the  three constituency 
 72 
outreach dimensions.  Please see Appendix 1 for full survey administration and website coding 
modalities.  
 
 
4.3    Step 3:  Explaining Variation in MEPs’ OFFLINE – ONLINE Constituency    
   Orientations and Outreach 
 
Because the thesis concerns itself with the quality of the constituency linkage between MEPs and 
their constituents, once the primary characteristics of MEPs’ constituency orientations and 
outreach were determined, the core question to be answered in Step 3 is what factors prompt some 
MEPs to be more pro-constituency oriented than others? 
 
 
4.3.1  Determinants for OFFLINE Pro-Constituency Orientations and Outreach 
 
Using multivariate OLS regression analysis, the dependent variable for the third Step of the 
analysis referred to MEPs’ pro-constituency orientation which was operationalized as a 
constructed additive variable (Proconstituency) of three dimensions/ original variables: 
 
i) Above (MEP respondent cohort) average no. of days spent in constituency  (Daysinconstituency) 
ii) Spends above average time on casework in proportion to other duties (Timecasework) 
iii) Preference for using ‘constituency office hours’ as a means for reaching out to constituency 
(Mepoffice) 
 
For each of the original variables, a mean tendency for the respondent group was calculated 
following which a dummy variable was created with value ‘1’ for MEPs who scored above the mean.  
The three variables were then recoded into a new additive variable  (Proconstituency) where the 
maximum possible value was ‘3’ and the minimum ‘0’ for MEPs who scored below average on all of 
the variables. 
Controlling for MEPs’ age, gender and level education, four different sets or models of independent 
variables were tested to determine the existing variation in MEPs’ offline pro-constituency 
orientations.   
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4.3.2 OFFLINE Pro-constituency determinants 
 
OFFLINE Model 1: Electoral systems  
Based on rational choice theories which contend that formal rules shape incentives to which 
politicians respond to (Norris 2003), the electoral systems theory is among the most researched 
determinants of legislators’ orientations, even in the case of MEPs (Bowler & Farrell 1993; Powell 
2000; Farrell & Scully 2007, 2010). District magnitude and openness of ballot structure are 
considered to be strong predictors of representatives’ constituency orientations where legislators 
from PR-systems with multi-member and closed ballot systems have been observed to be less 
constituency oriented than those from first-past-the-post, single member systems (SMD) with 
open ballot structure. Therefore:  
(H3a) MEPs from electoral systems with closed ballot structure will be negatively correlated 
with pro-constituency orientations while MEPs from systems with open, STV, and 
ordered ballot structures35 are more likely.  
          
 
       Table 4.1   Ballot structure 
Ballot Structure EU Member States 
Closed  Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain 
Ordered  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden  
Single Transfer Vote Ireland and Malta 
Open or open inclined Denmark, Estonia, Finland
23
, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg 
          Source: Farrell & Scully (2007:130), which exclude new EU members Bulgaria & Romania. 
 
 
As to the second variable - district magnitude which is typically defined in terms single member or 
multi-member constituencies and depicting the ‘level at which seats are allocated to the parties 
and candidates’, Farrell and Scully (2007:127) refine the distinction in the case of MEPs by 
considering and merging both district magnitude and ballot structure as part of a single measure.  
However, for the purposes of this thesis district magnitude is operationalized as two dummy 
variables - ‘regional’ and ‘national’ district magnitude (M).  ‘Regional’ or ‘national’ M here refers to 
any regional considerations that factor into the electoral recipe, in the way EU primaries (e.g. in 
                                                          
23 Though in Finland was originally in Farrell & Scully’s ‘Quasi list’ intra-party dimension category, it was included in the  
‘open or open inclined’ category (Farrell & Scully 2007:127-130). 
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Germany) are run; or the way party votes are aggregated (on a regional basis) but party seats are 
nationally allocated in the combined complex Italian system; or the regionally drawn (but running 
on closed list) constituencies in France and Belgium.  Consequently, it is expected that due to the 
‘proximity to voters’: 
 (H3b)  MEPs from constituencies with regional M would be expected be more pro-constituency 
orientated than MEPs from constituencies with national M. Countries falling into the 
‘regional’ category include Germany, Poland, Belgium, France and Ireland.  
 
 
OFFLINE Model 2:  MEP’s role orientations  
The second model to be tested incorporates MEPs’ role orientations.  Representatives’ cognitive 
self-perceptions -  how they interpret their own roles as representatives has been observed to 
influence how they represent  (Wahlke 1967; Eulau et al. 1978).  Consequently, it is conjectured 
that MEPs’  role orientations have a “significant impact on the way in which the EP works 
internally“ (Katz 999: 83).   
 
Role orientations are typically measured in terms of: representatives’ representational focus (e.g. 
citizens, interest groups, national party, EP party group etc.), and whom they admit to take 
instruction from when voting in Parliament.  Though empirical results have not been overly robust, 
it is generally hypothesized that representatives who prioritize taking instructions from, and place 
their focus on ‘citizens’ are more likely to be pro-constituency oriented than those who take 
instructions from and focus on their party or on their own judgment. 
 
 
Due to the lack of guidance in the EP’s Rules of Procedure, institutionally, MEPs are provided 
wide discretion as to where they place their representational focus and whom they take 
instruction from - be it their parties, individual citizens, organized interest groups or civil 
society organizations.  Prior research, however, shows two tendencies in MEPs’ role orientations: a 
proclivity to act as trustees – in other words, to act ‘independently’ and basing their decisions on 
their own judgment rather than on other sources (Katz 1999; Scully & Farrell 2005); and, 
secondly, the prevalence of party orientation as MEPs depend on their national parties’ apparatus 
to gain favorable position on the ballot.  As to the focus of representation, according to Katz 
(1999), MEPs show to predominantly focus their representation on interest groups. However, 
more longitudinal and consistent validation needs to confirm this past research which provides an 
opening for this thesis. 
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In the context of this thesis using the existing theoretical grounds - whom MEPs take instruction 
from was used as a proxy for measuring MEPs’ role orientations.  This role orientation was 
operationalized in the form of a survey question, where MEPs were asked on a 5-point scale 
(ranging from 1-never to 5 – on almost every vote): 
(H3c)   How often do they rely on recommendations from the following sources  - national 
party leaders; EP party group; national party delegation of MEPs; EP committee 
leaders;  national government; your country's regional authorities; Interest  groups;  
policy  experts;  citizens;  your  own  independent opinion - on which way you vote in the 
EP? 
MEPs’ answers were then coded as individual continuous variables for different ‘sources of 
instruction’.  MEPs who listed citizens as their source of instruction were expected to be most pro-
constituency oriented. 
 
 
OFFLINE Model 3:  Party affiliation, political responsibility, incumbency and former political 
career 
The third model combined what could be considered as ‘political set’ of variables that included: 
MEP’s party affiliation in the EP; level of political responsibility in Brussels, incumbency and 
whether MEP held public office in his/her own country.  
 
Party affiliation.  Because there are no formal hypotheses established about party affiliation 
and constituency orientations, the party affiliation variable is exploratory and open-ended – as 
no party is theoretically known to promote MEPs constituency orientations than other.  
The political responsibility ( in Brussels) variable such as committee chairmanship, holding a 
senior position within party group or simply belonging to more than one committee/ 
delegation all suggest that the MEP taking on such responsibilities would have less time for 
constituency outreach as his/her related work would take up more of his/her time. As a result the, 
political responsibility (measured as a dummy variable ‘holding chairmanship or vice-
chairmanship in EP committees, delegations, or party groups) is foreseen to be negatively 
correlated with MEPs’ pro-constituency orientations (H3c).   
 
Two   considerations   should   be   noted, however, when   using   the   political   responsibility 
determinant.  The first is that though an MEP may personally spend more time in Brussels, s/he 
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can still be constituency oriented if s/he allocates resources and delegate constituency related 
duties to constituency based staff; and secondly, the political responsibility variable may be also 
correlated with incumbency.  As MEPs spend more time (are re-elected) in the EP, gain more 
experience and become intra-institutional savvy, they are more likely to be selected or bid for 
leadership positions. Therefore the incumbency variable will also be added into this category. 
 
Incumbency or representatives’ seniority (number of office terms served) is known to be 
negative correlated with representatives’ constituency service.  Because first-timer or rookie 
MPs are inexperienced in legislative matters, enjoy lower name recognition and visibility hence 
a less stable electoral position among voters (Mann & Wolfinger 1980) they tend to spend more 
time securing their popularity by reaching out to constituents  and  accepting casework  (Mayhew 
1974; Fiorina 1977; Fenno 1977; Franklin & Scarrow 1999). Conversely, incumbent and senior 
legislators, after   becoming   more   skilled   in   legislating, tend   to   devote   more   time   on 
parliamentary work and less on constituency service36.  As a result, the incumbency hypothesis 
suggests that first time MEPs rather than incumbents will spend more time, resources and maintain 
closer ties on their constituencies  (H3d).   
The role of previous political career or public visibility (e.g. domestic political careers, national   
sports   personalities, actors, news   anchormen/ women, astronauts   etc.)   is   an exploratory 
v a r i a b l e  a nd  a n insight  gained from conducting interviews with MEPs.  MEPs who 
previously held domestic political office or were frontline national public figures explained that 
they are contacted and/ or receive more casework from people due to their visibility as previous 
public persona at the domestic/ national level.  As a result, those previously active on anti-
abortion, aerospace industry or human rights issues at the national level tend to continually 
receive casework on related topics. Given this possibility,  
(H3e):  MEPs with a previous political career or MEPs with a previously high domestic   
visibility would be expected to be more pro-constituency oriented.  
 
Data for this dimension was found on MEP’s official profiles on EP’s website where ‘past 
experience and political career’ are a standard feature and was coded as a basic dummy variable 
with the value  ‘1’ ascribed to MEPs who held prior political office (at any level) in their own 
countries. 
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OFFLINE Model 4:  Constituency characteristics - MEP-constituent ratio, distance to 
constituency, political culture  
 
The fourth set of variables has been adapted from existing (national level) theories related to 
district heterogeneity and intra-district electoral dynamics (Fenno 1974; Mayhew 1974;  
Kuklinski  &  Elling  1977).  Constituency characteristics therefore simplified here to mean: the   
size of the constituency in terms of the MEP-constituent ratio; distance to constituency; and 
political culture - being from East, West, South, and Northern Europe, though admittedly a ‘gross’ 
categorization.  
 
MEP-constituent ratio. Majority of MEPs represents constituencies that are very large in size 
with a high citizen - MEP ratio. For example, the German speaking community of Belgium is the 
most represented with one seat for its population of 71 000 while the people of Sardinia and 
Sicily are the least represented, with only one seat per 943 000 people. With respect to the MEP-
constituent ratio, it is expected that higher the ratio the more difficult it will be for MEPs to 
attend to individual constituents. Instead, MEPs might opt for focusing on interest groups or on 
parliamentary activities in order to wield influence on a wider or macro rather than micro  
(individual) representational   scale.   
(H3f): therefore expects MEP-constituent ratio – coded as a continuous variable  ranging from 
0 to 99 million – to be negatively correlated with MEP from constituencies with higher 
constituent-MEP ratio. 
 
 
Distance to constituency   is another possibly negatively correlated factor preventing MEPs 
from developing pro-constituency orientations.  This reality was emphasized by a Cypriot MEP 
who explained that during a regular working week he sees more security gates at airports than he 
does my constituents. The postulated expectation here is that: 
  (H3g): the longer the distance between Brussels and the constituency (e.g. compare Belgian or 
Dutch constituencies versus Romanian, Estonian or Finnish) the less constituency 
oriented MEPs may be expected to be.  
 
Political culture. This insight and subsequently variable was conceived during interviews with 
MEPs where MEPs from new member states – the 2003 and 2007 wave (most from Central and 
Eastern European countries) tended to have more pro-active attitude toward their constituency 
outreach and work than members from the older, more establish member states. Some explained 
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that it was their role to ensure that their constituents benefit from EU accession, the resources and 
opportunities that it offers.  This sense of urgency or duty was experienced in a more ad hoc 
manner among MEPs from ‘older EU member states’.  Therefore, in order to capture this 
dimension, four dummy variables were created dividing the EU member states into four groups 1st 
group - ‘old members’, 2nd wave (1980s Greece, Spain, Portugal), 3rd wave (Finland, Sweden, 
Austria) and latest, CEE new members (from 2004 and 2007 enlargement). 
 
For a summary overview of all the independent variables and their corresponding indicators for 
offline constituency orientations are listed in Table 4.2 below. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Determinants for OFFLINE – ONLINE Constituency Orientations and Outreach 
Dimension OFFLINE  
Pro-constituency orientation  
ONLINE 
 
Model 1: Electoral system  Ballot Structure: Closed, Open, 
Ordered 
 District Magnitude – regional vs. 
national 
Same as for offline. 
Model 2: Role Orientations 
 
 Whom MEP takes instruction from  To ‘increase direct contact with 
citizens’ as a motive for creating 
a website. 
Model 3: Political   Political Responsibility  
 EP Party Group Affiliation 
 Incumbency 
 Previous political career  
Same as for offline. 
Model 4: Constituency  
Characteristics 
 MEP-Constituent ratio 
 Distance to constituency 
Same as for offline 
Model 5 N/A  Demographic factors 
 Internet penetration 
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4.3.3 ONLINE Pro-constituency determinants 
 
With respect to what defines the dependent variable - MEPs’ pro-constituency orientation -  online, 
three composite factors were considered: 
i) Cumulative online score on interactivity (onlineinteractive) 
 
Theoretical underpinnings specific to MEPs’ online constituency orientations and outreach are in 
short supply.  However, popular earlier works posited that access to the Internet and its benefits 
are conditioned by socio-economic and demographic factors (Bimber 2000; Norris 2001). A 
prototypical Internet user at the time (be they politician or otherwise) was considered to be an 
adult male, higher educated and younger (Norris 2001).  Though validity of this typology has 
eroded over time, Internet penetration and age continually show to be a significant determinant 
of Internet and ICT usage where younger cohorts are much more likely to use the latter than 
older cohorts (ONS Internet Access Quarterly Update 2011)24. Hence, demographic factors 
continue to matter when it comes to Internet usage.  
 
Therefore, in addition to the determinants used for offline constituency outreach, the three sets 
used for determining MEPs’ constituency outreach online included:  i) an attitudinal variable - to 
‘increase direct contact with citizens’ as a motive for creating a website  (Webcitizen) - which is in 
effect an attitudinal proxy for MEPs’ constituency orientation online, ii) the second set of variables - 
demographic factors as already mentioned – age, gender and educational attainment; and lastly iii) 
Internet penetration (ITpenetration) – defined as citizens’ access to and usage of the Internet (in 
country that an MEP represents) and measured as per country percentage – hence with a minimum 
value of ‘0’ and maximum value of ‘100’.   While in the Western European countries Internet 
penetration has to a large extent equalized hence with low variation between countries, among 
new entrants and Southern countries some variation in Internet penetration still remains. 
 
The basic set of hypotheses for MEPs’ online pro-constituency outreach therefore suggest that pro-
constituency oriented MEPs online will be younger (40 years old and younger), higher educated males 
with propensity to have created their websites to increase their contact with citizens (H3f).  A 
negative relationship between MEPs’ online pro-constituency orientations and low Internet 
penetration is also expected (H3i). 
                                                          
24 For 2010, the ONS Internet Access Quarterly Update shows that in the UK 16-24 age group form 98.8% of Internet users 
(www.ons.gov.uk). 
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4.4    Step 4:  Towards a Virtual Constituency Office?:  Comparing MEPs’ ONLINE and 
OFFLINE Constituency Outreach 
 
 
In addition to finding out the key characteristics and trends in MEPs’ constituency outreach both on 
and offline, and what determines them, the last research question posed was whether it is 
plausible to expect that the increasing use of ICT and the Internet in our society is prompting 
MEPs to adapt to this new reality by increasingly enticing them to use the online platform as a 
virtual constituency office.  If so, it would be expected that MEPs increasingly attach more 
importance to their online constituency outreach and transfer some (partial effects hypothesis - 
H4a) or all of their constituency outreach functions (full effects or virtual office) from the offline 
(face-to-face and use of traditional media) to online (to their websites).   
 
Unlike the partial effects and the full effect hypotheses, the null hypothesis (H4null) would expect 
that MEPs maintain their constituency outreach offline, in its conventional forms or what Margolis 
& Resnick (2001) refer to as politics as usual.  In other words, the null hypothesis expects MEPs to 
emulate similar types of constituency outreach behavior online that they pursue conventionally 
offline.  Therefore MEPs’ outreach online would be as a means to replicate or reinforce that which 
MEPs do already offline.  
 
Table 4.3. Indicators use for OFFLINE – ONLINE comparison 
Dimension  OFFLINE ONLINE  
Constituency 
Orientations 
 Has constituency Office  
 Considers ‘communicating with 
citizens’ as very/ important 
 Proportion of time spent on  
        Casework 
 No. of staff in constituency office 
 Has website, blog or SNS   
 ‘To communicate with citizens’ 
as reason for creating website  
 Proportion of time spent on 
website management 
 N/A 
Constituency 
Outreach 
 Casework  
 Explaining Work  
 Interactivity 
 Casework website/ blog feature 
 Explaining work web/ blog 
feature 
 Cumulative interactivity variable 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows the set of proxies that were used to operationalize the three comparative 
dimensions of MEPs’ offline and online constituency outreach.  In the case of the null hypothesis 
MEPs would have both a website and a constituency office (or neither); s/he would spend similar 
amount of time on his/her offline constituency outreach offline as they would online and would 
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have similar preference for both or even more so for offline constituency outreach activities.  For 
the validation of the alternative virtual office hypothesis (H4a), MEPs would be expected to:    
 
 have a website or blog instead of a constituency office  
 
 spent proportionally more time on website management than on other duties  
 
 showed preference for using online (website, email, blog etc.) rather than offline modes of 
communication for constituency outreach (radio, TV, phone, letters).  
 
While for the virtual office MEPs were expected to satisfy all of the above conditions, it was also 
conceivable that MEPs would satisfy one or two out of the three conditions and for the partial 
effects hypothesis  (H4b) MEPs to hold true.   
 
 
4.5 Strengths and Limitations of the Research Approach 
 
 
In its research design, the thesis makes series of contributions to the existing research agenda on 
political representation in the European Parliament but also to the emerging studies on political 
communication with a focus on the role of Internet mediated communication. 
 
Firstly, it provides a more narrow conceptualization of the constituency linkage dimension in the 
EU context and has collected original data on it.  In other words, it has built on but further 
elaborated the on the constituency aspect of the EPRG MEP Surveys.  Therefore, the added concepts 
could enrich existing empirical research on MEPs, the constituency linkage dimension and political 
representation.  
 
The second unique contribution made by this thesis is that it provides ways of conceptualizing 
the constituency dimension in the online context.  Internet and its rapidly expanding applications 
are likely going to be a continuous constant in the future of politics. Yet though Internet research 
has mushroomed over the last decade, empirical studies on its various applications and effects in 
the political domain are still limited; at the EU level even more particularly. This fact that this 
thesis focus on this dimension is hence fills an existing missing link in political representation 
literature in the EU. 
 
Thirdly, the online-offline comparative approach is methodologically novel.  In order for it to 
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become methodologically a more powerful tool, further conceptual refinement and testing will be 
required in the future. Nonetheless the online-offline comparison used in this thesis did take the 
earlier and many of the existing Internet studies approaches a step forward.  It went past the 
techno-deterministic tendencies that not only tend to over focus on the online dimension without 
its proper contextualization, but they also potentially tended to all to rapidly adopt and over-
exaggerate conclusions about Internet’s effects.  This was largely due to the novelty of the research 
field but also due to the lagging attempts to properly theorize on and operationalize concepts and 
then by empirically testing them. The offline-online approach introduced in this thesis tried to 
attend to these prior methodological gaps by attempting to:  i) conceptualize and operationalize 
the applied concepts - constituency linkage - for online political behavior, ii) to ground them or 
compare them against existing offline behavior by using the latter as a behavioral baseline; and 
lastly iii) to test them among a real population of MEPs.  
 
This being said, there are several limitations of the proposed research design that should be taken 
into consideration and could be improved in future research. 
 
 
Cross-sectional versus time series approach.  The research design would have been 
significantly more robust, especially with regards to the comparative dimension of MEPs’ uses of 
Internet, by using a time-series as opposed to the cross-sectional approach.  The latter merely 
provides a snapshot of the 2006-2009 MEP cohort rather than trends in the evolution of MEPs’ 
Internet usage over time.  However, this limitation was unavoidable given the non-availability of 
specific data on MEPs’ constituency orientation and outreach at different time points.  While data 
from some of the EPRG questions could have been used, they were only available for a limited 
number of questions and time points as different and new questions were added to the surveys 
over time.   Data on the complete set of questions for the scope of analysis on constituency linkage 
introduced in this thesis were simply not available; hence the dependence on a cross-sectional 
approach. 
 
One sided – MEPs’ – perception of constituency linkage.  As noted earlier, the concept of a 
constituency linkage is a priori two-directional. It comprises both the MEP  citizen vector of 
linkage as well as the reverse citizens  MEP vector.  Both parties through different ways in effect 
maintain the linkage alive.  In order to gain a holistic account of the linkage mechanism, one would 
need to understand the motivations, actions and contextual limitations of both MEPs and citizens 
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alike.  However, due to the time and human resource limitations, this thesis places a magnifying glass 
only on the former, the MEP  citizen vector.   Moreover, the survey targets MEPs’ perceptions and 
estimates which carry with them a one-sided bias and views of the constituency linkage 
(relationship).  By surveying both the constituents or citizens and the MEPs at the same 
time, would provide a more balanced perspective.  Documenting these bi-directional accounts 
would be highly useful to gain in future research on this topic.   
 
Survey response rate.  Though 19-20% representative response rate (N = 159 or the 147 fully 
used responses), for a self-administered survey by a PhD student on a limited budget and human 
resources was respectable, in the future, the robustness of the survey results presented here would 
require validation in future research.  
 
Conceptualization of comparative offline-online concepts/ variables – potential sources of 
measurement error.  Because the online dimension is empirically fairly novel and the offline-
online comparison even more so, there was a limited existing theoretical framework – both in the 
case of MEPs’ offline but more so for the online constituency dimensions against which the 
research design but also the validation of its findings could lean on.  As a result, several of the 
online (and some offline) variables were exploratory in nature while others were potentially 
difficult for respondents to quantify hence resulting in potential measurement errors.  
 
For example, it was likely difficult for MEPs to quantify with precision, the time or staff they allocate 
to online activities.    Though some formal division of duties among MEPs and staff members exists, 
in reality, during interviews MEPs revealed that with their staff t h e y  share doing different 
duties and often in an ad hoc manner.  In a typical MEP office most staff are ‘jacks of all trade’ 
doing MEPs’ scheduling, website management and preparatory work for press releases in addition 
to managing constituency relations. At the same time, MEPs can also take on various roles in 
micro-managing their daily duties.  While some may delegate the design of their websites to a 
website designer and the daily maintenance to their office staff, most MEPs felt very strongly 
about directing and providing written inputs for the website content and ‘staying on top of what 
is happening on their websites’.  
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As a result, to tease out the exact staff numbers responsible for website versus offline constituency 
work was less possible and therefore not included as a comparative indicator25.  Similarly, for 
‘time’ spent, though number of days spent in the constituency (for the offline indication) was fairly 
easily quantified,  an online proxy was more challenging to find as the number of days devoted 
per week to website management is difficult to estimate. A challenge faced in the 
conceptualization of the casework dimension was again in disassociating the off and online effects 
given their interdependence – though an MEP may receive a casework request though his/her 
website, s/he may likely have to resort to offline means to solve it.  Though it was not possible to 
disentangle this dynamic in this thesis, readers and future research should be aware of this and 
potentially, through more empirical inquiry, refine these measures. 
 
 
Capturing (and disentangling) the complexity of the online and offline dimensions in a 
multilevel EU polity.   Because the thesis adopts a multidisciplinary approach that combines two 
research fields – political representation and political communication offline as well as online – 
already opens doors to complex conceptual and methodological intersections. Yet studying these 
two dimensions in the complex multi-level EU context where a wide-range of factors potentially 
influences MEPs’ constituency orientations and outreach further humbles the possible explanatory 
power that this thesis can provide.  On a note of self-reflection, there is always a tradeoff for a 
researcher to cast the conceptual net wide with the hopes of proportionally wide explanatory returns, 
or to focus on a more delimited set of concepts and covering them in depth rather than in breadth.  
Trying to fit the multi-layered and multi-dimensional puzzle pieces of political representation of the 
EU polity – national political cultures, the particular EP institutional modality, MEPs’ personal 
idiosyncracies, citizens’ perceptions among others – is complex and this thesis recognizes its 
limitations in containing them to series of insights rather than theoretical contributions on the 
constituency linkage in between MEPs and their constituents. 
 
In spite of the limitations mentioned, this study is pioneering and the approach introduced 
novel.  To sum up, its core objective is to test the various hypotheses set out in the proposed 
research design, to fill in missing links in existing literature on MEPs’ constituency behavior both 
off and online and to serve as an exploratory stepping stone for future similar studies.  While 
                                                          
25 Survey responses confirmed this dilemma as on the question “How many staff do you have in you in constituency or 
Brussels office?” wh ere  several MEPs provided ‘half (a staff)’ values; this potentially meant that 50 per cent or 
potentially ‘part’ of (one of their) staff’s time was allocated to the Brussels or the constituency office. 
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contributing to a better understanding of MEPs’ constituency outreach, the inquiry also attempts 
to identify factors that affect behavioral variations in the latter.  In doing so, the patterns in MEPs’ 
constituency behavior observed will tell us  more  about  the  types  of  homestyles  that  MEPs  
adopt  and indirectly  the extent to which established theories on constituency behavior - largely 
derived from national level  – resemble those at national level and whether they can be used 
in the European parliamentary context.  
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5.     MEPs’ CONSTITUENCY ORIENTATIONS  AND OUTREACH OFFLINE 
 
As noted in an earlier chapter Fenno  (1978) has  argued  that how representatives think, the 
intensity with which, and  the  types  of  constituency  activities  they  pursue  not  only  determine  
representatives’ homestyle  but  they  shape   how  relations  between  representatives  and  
constituents  are “created,  nurtured  and  changed”  (Fenno  1997:  883). Hence the constituency 
outreach function forms the ether of representative-constituent linkage or electoral connection. 
 
Given that little is known about how MEPs create and nurture linkages with their constituencies 
during the inter-election period, Chapter 5 contributes to fill this missing link in literature.  Using 
responses from the original MEP survey (2009), Chapter 5 first identifies MEPs’ offline 
constituency orientations and constituency outreach.  While the former explores MEPs’ attitudinal 
dimensions of how they think about, whom they perceive their constituencies to be and the 
importance they attach to their constituency work, the constituency outreach looks at what MEPs 
actually do and the types of activities they pursue with respect to constituency work.  Moreover, as 
the thesis generally aims to gain a better understanding about the quality of linkage between MEPs 
and citizens, the extent to which MEPs are pro-constituency oriented (or not) and what influences 
some MEPs to be more pro-constituency oriented than others is of particular interest.   
Based on existing studies and given the low electoral and institutional incentives outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 4, the null hypothesis expects that MEPs’ offline constituency orientations and 
outreach will be low.  In other words, MEPs are expected to attach more importance attitudinally 
and through allocation of resources – time and staff – to their parliamentary and party duties than 
to their constituency duties.   With respect to their constituency outreach, it is also expected that 
MEPs will prefer to engage in low intensity one-directional forms of constituency outreach rather 
than the more interactive, two-directional forms of constituency outreach.  
A competing hypothesis (H1) argues that MEPs’ constituency orientations and outreach will vary.   
Therefore, after establishing the offline characteristics of MEPs’ constituency orientations and 
outreach, the second part of the Chapter explores the existing variation as well as the determinants 
of that variation. For this purpose, using multi-variate OLS regression analysis, while controlling 
for demographic variables – age, gender and education, four explanatory models are tested – the 
electoral systems – Model 1; the attitudinal or role orientations –  Model 2, political variables such 
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as party affiliation, political responsibility, incumbency and former political career – Model 3; and 
constituency characteristics as the fourth explanatory model.   
By explaining the chief characteristics of MEPs’ constituency orientations, the types of 
constituency outreach they pursue and what determines the variation in Chapter 5 intends is to 
contribute to a better understanding about how MEPs incorporate,  cultivate and keep  the 
constituency linkage  in  their  representative  mandate alive between two election points. 
Findings in Chapter 5 also serve as the offline baseline for the comparison between MEPs’ offline - 
online constituency orientations to be elaborated in Chapter 7. 
 
  5.1    MEPs’ Constituency Orientations OFFLINE 
  5.1.1  How do MEPs think about and whom do they perceive their constituencies to be? 
Typically, role orientations in political representation are addressed in two ways: i) what role 
orientation (e.g. delegate, trustee, partisan etc. – Table 5.3) representatives themselves perceive 
to fulfill and ii) whom they take instruction from (Table 5.2).  Before these two classical questions 
were asked in the author’s MEP survey, a more experimental formulation of a question targeting 
whom MEPs conceived their constituencies to be was asked first (see Table 5.1. for its exact 
formulation). Though very similar to the classical ‘focus of representation’, this first question 
differed slightly in that it sought to better understand whether MEPs perceive their 
constituencies in the classic territorial-electoral sense  (as they are almost by default expected to) 
or whether other aspects factor into their perceptions of a constituency.  By enabling MEPs to 
select more than one response also steered away from a uni-dimensional concept and allowed 
room for more heterogeneous accounts, an observation that was made during interviews. 
                              Table 5.1 MEPs’ constituency perceptions  (N=147) 
As a member of the European Parliament, when you think of ‘your 
constituency or district’ it is composed of:  (tick all that apply) 
European Union and all its people 51% 
The national territory and all people of your member state 44% 
A sub-region in your member state 38% 
People who voted for your party 12% 
People who voted for you 9% 
Others please specify 4% 
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The results in Table 5.1 reveal several insights.  First, they confirm that MEPs perceive their 
constituencies as  heterogeneous and dynamic rather than uni-dimensional  entities where their 
notion of a constituency comprises several different ‘constituencies’.  This particularly observed 
when examining the frequencies of MEPs’ responses (not pictured), where 68 per cent MEPs chose 
one categorical response but one-third considered ‘their constituency’ to be composed of two or 
more sub-constituencies.  The most common combination, among 26 per cent MEPs, was Europe 
and their national territory, region or their party’s voters.  The tendency to represent multiple 
sub-constituencies is logical given that in comparison to national MPs, for MEPs the number of 
possible sub-constituencies multiplies.  In principle, MEPs may be approached by national as well 
as European interests groups, by regional as well as national governments, national party or their 
EP party group, by their nationals but also non-national ‘constituents’ from other European 
countries. 
Secondly, the findings reveal that the pan-European constituency - ‘European union and its people’ 
features strongly in whom MEPs perceive their constituencies to be. 51 per cent MEPs list Europe 
in combination with other constituency categories while one in every four MEPs lists the EU 
exclusively as ‘their constituency’. ‘My nation and its people’ and ‘region’ ranks second and 
third respectively while party and personal voters ranks the lowest. The less than 4 per cent of 
respondents who choose t o  specify their constituencies as part of an open ended response either 
specify the names of their constituencies26 or specific sub-groups such as “citizens of Luxembourg 
and foreigners”, “artists” or “vulnerable groups in society”. 
Observation made during interviews also confirmed MEPs’ strong representational loyalty to the 
pan-European constituency but also their multi-layered composition. The following illustrate 
examples of these reflections: 
“Officially, my constituency is the Spanish territory and its people, but also the Catalan people. 
On the other hand, I am a European legislator who was elected to look at Europe through the 
eyes of a Catalonian – but to work towards and act on behalf of a common project – the EU” 
(Spanish MEP). 
                                                          
26 Majority re-qualified their reference to the sub-region they represent either by stating its specific name ‘East midlands’, 
‘South West of England and Gibraltar – my constituency!’, ‘the four regions in my constituency’ or in the form of more 
abstract references ‘comme un découpage arbitraire du  territoire’ (trans. an arbitrary division/part of a territory). Other 
group of answers tended to included ‘people/ citizens’ in general or ‘people in and outside of Europe’ or ‘my local electoral 
constituency where I am also a local representative’. 
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 “Though my official role is to represent the French speaking part of Belgium, I was also elected to 
strengthen EU integration and to represent European rather than national interests. The promotion of 
national interests and representation of Belgian people is the job of national Parliaments and [their] 
members, not mine” (Belgian MEP).” 
“German nation but mostly European interests, then party, then region. But I personally decided  to 
focus on European (and not on national/ local) issues since being an MEP is a full time job… (German 
MEP).” 
On the one hand, the dominance of Europe in MEPs’ constituency perceptions is on the one 
hand to be expected.  After all, MEPs function in a ‘European’ environment, the core of their 
work concerns EU issues which explains their pronounced loyalty to the pan-European 
constituency.   From the rational electoral perspective, however, it is less sensical.  Because MEPs 
are nominated by their domestic parties and are elected to represent national or regional 
(Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and the UK) constituencies, their loyalty to the pan-European 
electorate does not bring them electoral rewards. Instead it would be expected that MEPs 
conceive their party’s voters or their respective electoral districts as the dominant logical 
constituency. 
Interestingly, however, when answers to this first question – which simply asked whom MEPs 
think their constituencies are – were compared to MEPs’ survey responses concerning 
questions about their  ‘representational focus’  and ‘whom they take instruction from’, the role of 
Europe became less dominant. Its importance was slightly demoted – see Table 5.3.   This seems 
to suggest that though at the cognitive or ideological level Europe features strongly in MEPs’ 
perceptions about whom they represent, at a more functional level, perhaps where concrete 
interests are at stake MEPs represent their sub-national and national – or classic electoral 
constituencies.  Yet, at the same time, when voting in the EP, MEPs report to rely mostly on their 
‘own opinion’ but also on their national MEP delegation and EP party group. 
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Represents in the EP Mean N 
Region 4.4 138 
National state 4.3 142 
National party voter 4.1 138 
Europe 3.9 142 
National party 3.9 137 
European party group 3.7 137 
Specific social group 2.9 105 
 
Table 5.2  Whom MEPs take instruction from             5.3 MEPs’ Representational focus 
          
 
 
 
These various observations imply that MEPs’ ‘own judgment’ is the gate keeper when they make 
decisions.  In other words, MEPs consider themselves as free agents, relatively free from the 
pressures of their national parties. In this aspect they differ from their national counterparts from 
Western democracies with PR systems, where strong  party pressure is a pronounced feature.  At 
the same time, in practice, it is more likely that a complex web of factors ends up influencing and 
informing MEPs’ decisions as well as to prompt them to represent diverse ‘constituencies’.  In 
MEPs’ day-to-day realities, their acts of representation are conditioned by various pressures, 
interests (EU, national, sub-national, societal sub-groups) and personal idiosyncracies. These 
dynamically interact, advance and recede from MEPs’ foreground of internal decision making.  
 
The multi-dimensionality and dynamic interplay of factors that influence MEPs’ acts of 
representation confirm past studies (Pitkin  1967, Norris 1999, Mansbridge 2003) as well as 
Fenno’s (1978) work who observed that representatives strategically sub-divide their 
constituencies into ‘concentric circles of influence’.  Similarly, MEPs’ interview testimonies 
revealed that MEPs consciously drew distinctions between and sub-divided the ‘official’ - classic 
electoral and more workable constituencies ‘in practice’.  
 
                                                          
27 The values expressed in both tables refer to mean scores per response category when using a 1-5 Likert scale with (1) 
never, (2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) often, (5) very often - values. 
 
Takes Instruction from27 Mean N 
Own opinion 4.2 134 
National MEP delegation 3.9 141 
European party group 3.6 142 
Citizens 3.5 136 
EP committee 3.1 139 
National party 3.1 140 
Political experts 2.9 113 
National government 2.8 141 
Interest group(s) 2.6 139 
Regional government 2.5 137 
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When in an interview MEPs were asked when you think of your constituency who do you think of? 
– an interesting pattern in the answers emerged.  MEPs commonly distinguished between their 
‘official’ constituencies and those they represent  ‘in practice’.  Almost instinctively the ‘official’ 
constituency included geographic references  -  “well of course, people of Germany”,  “my national 
constituency”,  “in theory, every voter in Scotland”, “the whole of Spain”,  the  “10 million people, 9 
different counties in my Southeast region of England”. However, the initial ‘instinctive’ answers 
were usually followed by more refined specifications referred to as the ‘real’ constituency or ‘my 
constituency in practice’. 
The  ‘constituency in practice’ typically referred to combinations  of  smaller  sub-constituencies, 
targeted subgroups or foci of representation. These further tended to be ranked in some sense 
of a hierarchical order such as: “my region, national Dutch people but also all Dutch speaking 
people in Europe” (Dutch MEP); “my voters, women’s organizations, and given my own professional 
background as a medical doctor, doctors and health care practitioners also” (Slovak MEP); “Italy 
and Europe but most importantly the general public since I need public opinion to support the issues I 
advocate”  (Italian MEP); “National constituency – Estonia, my party and my very close district Tartu” 
(Estonian MEP), or the more abstract “my constituency is my national state but when I vote, I 
prioritize human values and the general interests of society as such, and then European citizens” 
(Slovak MEP).  Other more intricate explanations included: 
“People of Ireland, my Labour party and also Dublin. You see, we have only one Labour (party) MEP 
from that area, also in Ireland the urban-rural constituency cleavage is very important to 
represent…” (Irish MEP) 
 
“My constituency is the Labour party but also the trade union movement and my party voters, and 
those who voted for me. At the same time I am free of obligation in a representative sense since I 
was directly elected by my voters to best decide on issues of value to them” (UK MEP) 
“In a sense, what I do (as an MEP) is importantly influenced by the reality that I actually have three 
jobs: I am an MEP, I represent the Partito Radicale (of Italy) and I am also a Secretary General on the 
Ethical committee on Stem Cell research in my country. …however,  at some level I am also 
constituency-less since more than anything my duty is to bring awareness to the general public on 
issues …” (Italian MEP). 
 
These  testimonies  show that  though  the  classic territorial  considerations do  feature  in MEPs’ 
perceptions of their constituencies, in reality,  they are overshadowed by a medley of subsidiary 
and more defined foci of representation or constituencies. 
The selection process shows to be subject to pragmatic considerations, an attempt to simplify 
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MEPs’ complex realm of (possible) constituencies into more ‘workable constituencies’ and more 
narrow representational focus such as representation of select ‘flagship issues’ or issue-based 
interest groups.  This process, however, is not always simple for MEPs. As one German MEP 
explained ‘I don’t know how my colleagues do it, but it is not possible to represent and do everything 
satisfactorily with the complexity of the work we have”. Or as another UK MEP noted “it is difficult 
to represent these counties and people in them in terms of classical constituency ties because they 
were constructed rather then forming organic, cohesive units - their needs, preferences and 
themes are too diverse-heterogeneous and it is difficult to  find  what  is  specific  to  them  and  how  
to  bridge  them  to  Europe”.  
Observations about how MEPs think about their constituencies show that whom MEPs perceive 
their constituencies to be and whom they focus on in practice are not necessarily the same.  
MEPs’ foci of representation tend to be splintered rather than focused on a single uniform group. 
In practice, a complex web of dynamics factors into MEPs’ selection making process on which 
constituency they will focus on during their mandate, but relatively little is known about this 
process.   
When looking at the determinants of variation in MEPs’ constituency perceptions, being from a 
new EU member state, ballot structure and pro-constituency attitude played the strongest role. 
MEPs from open ballot systems and regional districts were more likely to consider their region 
rather than Europe as their constituency, while MEPs from ordered or closed systems were more 
inclined to consider their ‘country’ hence wider notion of a constituency.  All British MEPs (except 
one) exclusively perceived their region as  their  core  constituency while some countries showed 
some intra-country variation.  55 per cent Italian respondents, for example,  chose nation or 
region in combination with Europe while nearly two-thirds  of  French  MEPs  chose  Europe  
exclusively.  Among the six Belgian respondents, Europe rather than regional constituency was 
chosen as the main choice. 
Being from a new EU member state and MEPs’ pro-constituency role orientations also showed to 
influence the way MEPs think about their constituencies.  With the exception of all (four) 
Slovenian MEPs who chose Europe, MEPs from CEE member states were more prone to 
consider their ‘national territory and its peoples’ as their constituency. Also, MEPs who 
attached attitudinal importance to ‘being active in their constituencies’ were less likely to think 
of Europe as their constituency while those who valued ‘advancing EU policies in the world’ in 
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their work as European representatives were more likely. Incumbency usually associated pro-EU 
integration hence possibly favoring a pan-European constituency base (Franklin & Scarrow 1999) 
showed to be insignificant when it comes to MEPs’ perceptions. 
 
 
5.1.2   The importance that MEPs attach to Constituency Work OFFLINE 
In line with the null hypothesis that expected for the great majority MEPs to have low pro-
constituency orientations, MEPs were expected not to have a constituency office (H0a), or if they had 
one they would spend less than 0.5 days being present in their constituencies (H0b), would employ 
proportionally less staff in their constituency office than in their Brussels office (H0c) and would 
proportionally spend less time on constituency work than on other activities (H0d). In addition to 
the above four indicators, MEPs were also asked (Table 5.4) to what extent they attach importance 
to being active in their constituencies.   
With respect to (H0a) results, 94 per cent MEP survey respondents  stated that they have a physical 
office in their constituencies or home countries while only 6 per cent reported that they do no have 
one at all.  This leads to the conclusion that having a constituency office is a standard feature among 
the greatest majority of MEP respondents.  
Starting with the more general question, maintaining citizen relations and educating the public 
about EU issues top the charts as the perceived ‘most important’ activity in MEPs’ mandates. 
Moreover, 78 per cent MEP respondents considered maintaining an active presence in their 
countries as important or very important (Table 5.4).  All three activities comprise constituency 
outreach activities. At the same time, the results also show that MEPs still find parliamentary and 
committee work as more important while pursuing pork – advantages for their constituencies (also 
a constituency related activity) – scores the lowest in terms of importance. 
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Table 5.4 Attitudinal importance attached to various activities pursued by MEPs (%) 
Not Somewhat    Moderate    Important   Very Important 
(1) (2) (3)   (4)     (5)      Mean      N 
   
Parliamentary and committee work 1 1 9 25 64 4.5 140 
Public education about EU 0 1 6 32 60 4.5 139 
Active presence in home country 0 3 19 34 44 4.2 137 
Active media relations 0 10 21 40 29 3.9 126 
Advancing EU policies 6 6 19 40 29 3.8 139 
Porc-barrel politics 11 25 24 18  22  3.2 139 
 
 
 Time Allocated to Constituency Work 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, while EP’s Rules of Conduct do not stipulate any constituency obligations 
for MEPs, the EP’s official calendar formally assigns 28 days, or 0.5 days per week for constituency 
presence.   The (H0b) therefore expected that a great majority of MEPs will on average spend 0.5 
days per week in their constituencies.  While the results (Table 5.5) are consistent and confirm that 
on average MEPs spend more time on parliamentary work than on communicating with citizens, 
casework or media relations, 85 per cent of MEP respondents reported to spend between 1 to 3 
working days28,  an average of 2 days in their constituencies. Only 4 per cent MEPs admitted to 
spend less than one working day per week in their constituencies while 11 per cent showed to 
spend more than 3 days per week.   These indications thus suggest that MEPs are showing to be 
spending significantly more time in constituencies than expected. With the response rate being 
statistically significant, leads to the rejection of the H0b. 
                                 Table 5.5  Number of days spent in the constituency   
On average, as MEP how much time do you spend on political 
work in your home country?  (N=139) 
1 day per month or less   0% 
More than 1 day / month but less than 1 day / week  4% 
1 day per week 24%  
2 days per week 43% 
3 day per week 18% 
More than 3 days per week 11% 
                                                          
28  The ‘working days’ specification is important as most surveys (including the EPRG MEP survey) merely state ‘days’ which 
can include weekends (spent with family) hence inaccurately reflect ‘working time’. 
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In addition to the number of days spent in the constituency, another time related indicator asked 
MEPs to estimate on a scale 0-100 (%) how much time they allocate to different activities. This 
was a slightly different measure than the previous since it tries to establish the relative importance 
of constituency work vis-a-vis other activities that MEPs pursue in their mandate.  
Table 5.6 results show that when looking at single activities, MEPs spend most time (on average 
40%) on parliamentary work while citizen relations come closely second (at 30%). On other 
constituency outreach activities such as casework and media relations, MEPs show to spend  
approximately  20  per  cent  of  their  time while attending  to interest group activities and website 
management appear to be lowest on MEPs’ priority list. 
Given these results, at first glance, the null hypothesis (H0c) where MEPs were expected to spend 
more time on parliamentary and other activities than on constituency outreach,  was accepted.  At 
the same time, while the results show that parliamentary activities do dominate MEPs’ schedules 
and attention, in effect, when the different constituency work and outreach related activities (e.g. 
communication with citizens  + casework  +  media  relations)  are  added  together,  the  survey 
responses also show  that  MEPs  do  end  up spending, on average, 50 per cent or more time on 
these activities.  This would lead us to reject the H0c hypothesis.  While more refined analysis 
would be beneficial in teasing out the exact proportions and even when acknowledging potential 
sources of pro-constituency (survey) bias, this is an important finding as it reinforces the fact that 
unlike what was expected, MEPs do end up spending a significant proportion of their time on 
constituency and citizen outreach activities. 
Table 5.6  Time spent by MEPs on various activities 
In your overall workload, about what proportion of time do you personally dedicate to the following 
activities? (tick one box per line, the total value in boxes ticked should not exceed 100%) 
 
Type of activity 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% <70% Avg. N 
Parliamentary work 4.5 51 27 7 15 15 2 4.5 40% 135 
Website Management 3 52 8 15 4 15 1.5 1.5 10% 131 
Citizen relations 15 21 24 33 6 15 2 8 30% 135 
Media relations 4 51 27 7 1.5 1.5 2 6 20% 135 
Interest group relations 11 55 17 8.5 1.5 1 2 4 15% 130 
Casework 10 47 19 10 3 2 1.5 7 20% 131 
Values in the table represent % of total MEP respondents. 
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Constituency Office and Staff Allocations 
When it comes to constituency versus Brussels office allocations, all MEPs receive ‘general (office) 
expenditure allowance’ of EUR 4202 per month (2009 figure)29 and EUR 17 540 maximum for staff.  
But similarly as in the case of time allocation, there are no set rules as to how many assistants or 
offices MEP can have.  How MEPs spend allocate their office and staff allowance is therefore entirely 
up to them and has been a source of controversy in the past30.  Still, because MEPs receive the same 
amounts for office and staff, the distribution of staff between MEPs’ Brussels office versus their 
constituency office is a good proxy for the level of priority they attached to each.  In line with the 
low pro-constituency orientation and outreach (H0d) expected that the great majority of MEPs will 
allocate more staff to their Brussels offices than to their constituency office. 
The first observation with respect to this dimension is that majority of MEPs tends to hire more 
staff in Brussels than in their constituency office, yet the (survey sample) mean suggests that MEPs 
employ the same number of staff in Brussels as in their home constituencies; two in each office.  
Proportionality in hiring similar numbers of staff for both offices was also consistent among both, 
low and higher ends of the sample. MEPs employing below average number of employees in 
Brussels were also likely to employ below average number of staff in their (CO) while the same was 
true for those hiring staff above the sample’s mean.  This leads this thesis to conjecture that MEPs’ 
work at home in their constituencies as well as in Brussels occupies similar amount of staff time. 
At the same time, it was also observed that MEP respondents were less likely to have no staff in 
their Brussels office than in their constituency office, and more MEPs tend to employ an above 
average number – three or more staff - in their constituency office (see Graph 5.7) than those 
employing the same amount in Brussels, a trend present among one third of MEPs.  Assuming that 
MEPs hire staff in proportion to the degree of their political engagement and activities they pursue, 
it is conceivable that the one-third MEPs who have more staff in their constituencies will engage in 
more constituency outreach activities.  
     
                                                          
29  This allowance officially covers expenditure in the Member State of election, such as Members’ office management costs, 
phone and postal charges, the purchase and maintenance of computer and telematics equipment, and the cost of travel. The 
allowance is halved in the case of Members who, without due justification, do not attend half the number of plenary sittings in 
one parliamentary year (www. europarl.eu). 
30 ‘MEP expenses row taints Tory Election’ (April 30, 2004) www.timesonline.co.uk;  ‘How to make a million in five years  
   (become a Euro MP)’ 22 February 2009, www.timesonline.co.uk MEPs award themselves £91,000 tax free expenses a year’ (13 
December 2010).www.telegraph.co.uk. 
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 Graph 5.7  Staff Allocations: Brussels/ Constituency 
                     
 
Interviews with MEPs exposed another interesting and somewhat unexpected insight with respect 
to what determines MEPs’ staff allocation.   While the general assumption would be that 
constituency office staff size and MEPs’ pro-constituency outreach are strongly positively 
correlated, where MEPs with higher number of constituency staff would be expected to conduct 
more constituency outreach and take on more casework, MEPs explained that there maybe other 
factors at play that determine MEPs’ staff allocations. For MEPs from CEE, it is a question of cost 
advantage.  It is more affordable for MEPs from CEE to hire staff in their home countries than in 
Brussels where staff salary expectations are higher.  Given that all MEPs receive the same allowance 
budget, lower salary costs act as incentives for CEE MEPs to hire more staff in their constituencies.  
In contrast, MEPs from other EU countries even if they would want to hire more staff in their 
constituencies they are more disadvantaged to do so.   As it will be discussed in the next section, 
another explanation for CEE MEPs hiring more CO staff is that they pursue different types of 
constituency activities than their Western counterparts. Though they reach out to and solicit less 
casework from individual citizens, they take on more pork barrel cases.  
In brief summary, with respect to MEPs’ offline constituency orientations based on a set of four 
attitudinal indicators including personal perceptions, time and staff allocations, it can be concluded 
that MEPs attach a fair degree of importance to their constituency work and to maintaining their 
linkage with citizens between elections alive.  As summarized in Table 5.8, three out of the four 
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(null) sub-hypotheses that expected low pro-constituency orientations among MEPs were rejected 
where MEPs showed to be more pro-constituency oriented than originally anticipated. 
 
Table 5.8   Summary of Findings on MEPs’ OFFLINE Constituency Orientations  
Hypotheses OFFLINE Constituency Orientations  Findings 
(H0a)  Great majority MEPs do not to have a constituency office Rejected 
(H0b) Spend less than 0.5 days being present in their 
constituencies would 
Rejected 
(H0c) Proportionally spend less time on constituency work than 
on other activities 
Rejected/      
Accepted 
(H0d) Employ proportionally less staff in their constituency 
office than in their Brussels office 
Accepted 
            Accepted under qualification, see above. 
 
Regression analysis corroborated the descriptive results where pro-constituency attitudes were 
positively correlated with MEPs’ time spend in the constituency. MEPs who spend more time in 
their constituencies are also more likely schedule more appointments with individual citizens and 
use public events rather than TV or newspapers as a means of constituency outreach. This leads to 
suggest that those MEPs who spend more time in their constituencies engage in more direct, face-
to-face constituency activities. MEPs from regional constituencies, European Peoples’ Party and 
those who are younger (25 to 35 year olds cohort) was also positively correlated with the more 
time spent in the constituency. Ballot structure or other demographic factors such as gender or 
education did not play a role.  Incumbency, which theoretically should be negatively associated with 
pro-constituency orientations, more political responsibility (committee and delegation work in 
Brussels), distance to constituency and MEP-constituent ratio also showed to be insignificant.   
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5.2   Constituency Outreach OFFLINE 
As outlined in Chapter 1, representatives can pursue several different types of activities in their 
constituency work.  While leaving the question open ended for exploration during interviews, as 
part of its empirical analysis, this thesis focuses on how MEPs conduct two of the more commonly 
observed constituency activities  –  casework and explaining political work but also the extent to 
which they solicit and encourage two-way, interactive communication and opportunities for 
deliberation with their constituencies. With respect to these three dimensions and in line with the 
null low pro-constituency hypotheses, it was anticipated that MEPs will spend low amounts of time 
on casework hence receive and respond to a low amount of cases (H1e) while (H1f) conjectured 
that in their constituency outreach MEPs will likely use one-directional rather than two-directional, 
interactive offline communication channels. In other words, they would be expected to invest their 
time and energy onto explaining work activities via en masse newsletters, radio, press and TV than 
through interactive two-way channels such as face-to-face constituency consultations, being 
accessible via phone calls and public meetings.  
 
5.2.1      Constituency Outreach OFFLINE: Casework OFFLINE 
Given that casework is known to be one of the most time consuming constituency activities, it was 
surprising to find that MEPs receive and respond to substantial amount of casework.  On average, 
casework takes up 20 per cent of MEPs’ time while one out of four MEPs indicated that casework 
occupies more than one third of their time; one tenth reported it consumes more than a half of their 
time.   
MEPs report that most of their casework comes from individual citizens and European interest 
groups where on average, MEPs receive approximately 21-40 requests weekly from each group, 
amounting to about 3000 cases a year for both groups. National interest groups, regional 
authorities and civic associations show to contact MEPs for assistance the least.  Email is the most 
used channel through which MEPs receive casework, letters and phone calls are the second most 
common while national party office and websites show to be the least used by constituents when 
requesting MEPs for assistance with a case.  These observations suggest that constituents prefer to 
communicate directly with their MEPs when launching their cases.  
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Similarly as for other activities, there are no stipulations on how much and the types of casework 
MEPs should respond to; such decisions are entirely up to MEPs’ discretion.  Nonetheless, 60 per 
cent of the survey respondents reported that they respond to 80-100 per cent of incoming cases.  
Casework from MEPs’ their nationals - citizens, regional authorities and civic organizations are 
given highest priority while EU interest groups’ requests receive the lowest.   
During interviews, MEPs explained that they prioritize cases based on ‘need’ or on the cases’ link to 
the specific policy areas they work on. Interestingly, pork barrel types of cases – through which 
MEPs try to secure benefits (e.g. funds, projects) for their constituencies – which at national level 
are known to be politically and electorally rewarding, were only ‘moderately’ important to majority 
of MEPs.  As it will be shown in a later section, however, MEPs from some member states do take on 
more pork barrel cases than others. 
Be it from individuals or organized groups (civic groups, trade unions and business associations), 
MEPs’ casework can be grouped into three categories:  
i) The first category includes light casework. Light casework usually concerns citizens’ 
difficulties to “navigate in the sea of EU bureaucracy” and includes basic requests for 
information about EU institutions, MEP’s work, specific legislation, EU scholarships and 
internships. Light cases make up most of MEPs’ casework load and typically can be attended to 
by MEPs’ staff. 
ii)  The second group refers to harder or “real cases” that require more research and MEPs’ 
personal intervention.  Harder cases mostly involve: trans-border issues such as advice on 
trans-border healthcare services and legal implications (or reports of misconduct) in other EU 
countries; companies requesting legal counsel on permits, market regulations/ directives in 
other EU countries; immigration, asylum, cross-border child abductions by family members 
and illegal residency; ‘second residence’ and property/ real estate issues, or as mundane as 
requests for MEP’s intervention when nationals’ cars have been impounded in other 
countries31.  The second group relates to flagship or thematic issues that individual MEPs work 
on such as human rights, trade law, health care or animal rights. The third type of harder 
cases involve requests for MEPs’ personal interventions on behalf of citizens at higher level 
                                                          
31  Or as difficult as being requested to assist constituents (parents) receive proper legal resolve in a cross-border homicide 
investigation where a girl died in a neighbouring EU country but whose death certificate (issued in Austria) showed a different 
cause of death (suicide) than Slovak coroner’s report (who listed it as homicide). The MEP took on the case and had to 
intervene at the Ministry of the Interior as parents previously exhausted all other legal and official remedies without success.  
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institutions such as pending cases at the European Court of Justice or assistance concerning 
more technical issues and requiring access to the European Commission at a higher level.    
iii) Harder cases also can spillover into the third category and become more serious personalized, 
politicized ‘trophy’ or ‘flagship’ cases.  Trophy cases are usually handpicked by MEPs for 
further political action. They can be addressed in the form of Parliamentary Questions for the 
European Commission32 and other EU institutions or as lobbying, political advocacy or public 
awareness building campaigns that MEP may choose to spearhead. In the notorious case of 
‘missing Madeleine’, for example, parents (of Madeleine) requested MEP’s assistance, a case 
that eventually lead to the mobilization of a EU-wide campaign and a directive on the 
registration of missing children information in the Schengen register and its distribution in all 
EU border-crossings. Another example includes the standardization of EU ‘handicap car 
stickers’ – a wider initiative taken by an MEP after a handicapped constituent was fined in 
another EU country for parking in a handicapped spot using his/her national sticker which 
the foreign authorities failed to recognize.  MEPs’ collective advocacy of a real estate class 
action suit and an EU petition against the Spanish government by UK and German retirees 
who were unknowingly sold illegal property titles and EU-wide standardization of mobile 
phone chargers, are some other examples of trophy cases.      
 
In summary, though there are no benchmarks as to what constitutes low or high average number of 
cases that (MEPs) receive and take on, casework adds an important accountability and political 
legitimacy dimension to representation.  It constitutes concrete or tangible forms of service and 
linkage between citizens and European institution(s). In view of the observations made above, 
MEPs show to fulfill a similar role with respect to casework as do their national counterparts;  – 
citizens do contact them to ask for assistance and MEPs do respond by taking on cases.  However, 
the comparative frequency with which citizens contact MEPs and MPs would need to be further 
empirically verified. This was beyond the scope of this thesis.  Moreover, the role of casework and 
its implication for political representation at the EU level should not be over estimated as they may 
not be the first and only point of contact when their require assistance. As one MEP claimed “we are 
                                                          
32  Parliamentary questions are questions addressed by Members of the European Parliament to other EU Institutions and bodies. 
They are a direct form of parliamentary scrutiny of other EU institutions and bodies.   There are three categories of 
parliamentary question: i) Questions for oral answer dealt with during plenary sittings, and included in the day’s debates. They 
may be followed by a resolution (Rule 115); ii) Questions for Question Time asked during the period set aside for questions 
during plenary sittings (Rule 116); and iii) Written questions with a request for a written answer (Rule 117) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html. 
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usually the last ones to be contacted. Only when citizens exhaust all other forms of remedies, then they 
come to us. All too often we end up on citizens’ or NGOs’ catchall blanket campaigns as one of many 
institutional targets” (British MEP).  
 
5.2.2  One directional (explaining work) vs. Interactive Constituency Outreach OFFLINE  
While casework is a concrete form of constituency linkage through which constituents can request 
direct forms of assistance and to which MEPs can respond to, the explaining work dimension 
represents a one-directional, MEP → constituent, and one-to-many form of constituency outreach 
through which MEPs communicate and ‘educate’ the public about the EP and about what they do in 
Brussels.  Unlike with interactive forms of communication that stimulate two-way interactions 
between MEPs and constituents, the explaining work features such as newsletters, addressing the 
public through offline mass media channels such as TV, newspapers and radio, the MEP is seen to 
engage in one-directional contact without explicitly soliciting feedback and interaction from 
constituents.  According to (H0f) MEPs were expected to favor this form of constituency outreach 
over direct two-way interactivity.  
When looking at the MEP survey data, the findings suggest that this hypothesis cannot be fully 
accepted.  On the one hand, more than 90 per cent MEPs considered ‘explaining their work in the 
EU’, as an ‘important’ or ‘very important’ aspect of their job that scored slightly higher than 
importance of their committee and parliamentary work (see Table 5.4 above).  Moreover, MEPs’ 
responses in Table 5.9  also indicate that in terms of offline outreach, 66 per cent MEPs prefer to 
use newspapers for reaching out to their constituents the most where media relations show to take 
up 20 per cent of their time on media relations.    
During interviews, MEPs attested to feeling ‘responsible’ for explaining Europe Union and its 
institutions to the people.  They claimed that national media and governments provide little 
information to citizens about EU issues hence they felt that their role is to act as an alternative 
source of public information about the EU.  As one Slovak MEP explained “while we fight to get the 
right information to the public, the mass media commonly misrepresent our work. They prefer to write 
what sells rather than the substantive aspects of our work and far from a neutral perspective”.  By 
explaining their work and EU issues personally, MEPs feel they provide the public with more 
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objective information that the public would not have access to otherwise.   In this context MEPs act 
as communication bridges between Brussels and their constituencies.  
“To be an MEP is to be a tie between Estonian people and the EP. In this sense, I do  
a lot of explaining like for example why should Estonia be involved in and help people  
in Africa – for people in the new member states these are new topics that my people  
do not understand very well and our job as MEPs is to explain these things  
to them” (Estonian MEP).  
 
Another reason why MEPs explain their work is to foster transparency but also as a form of 
anticipatory self-defence mechanisms and projection of accountability. As citizens’ demands for 
political responsiveness and accountability have risen in the recent past (see Norris 1999 - ‘critical 
citizens’), ‘explaining work’ has become a “demand driven exercise – because if you don’t say 
anything on certain issues, people will complain” (Irish MEP).    
 
 
        Table 5.9:  Channels & frequency of MEP ↔ citizen interactivity 
 
                             Note: 1-5 scale range: (1) never, (2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) often, (5) most  
                                  often;  N = 129-133; both columns are based on MEPs’ estimates 
 
 
Though feeling responsible for explaining the EP and their work forms an important aspect of their 
jobs, at the same time, the findings also show that apart from newspapers, MEPs show a low 
preference for using other one-directional channels of communication such as radio, TV 
 
MEPs’ 
preference 
Constituent 
Preference 
Response category           Mean Score  
Newspapers 3.8 - 
Radio 3.2 - 
TV 3.2 - 
Party bulletins 3.1 - 
Mailed newsletters/ mail 3.0 - 
OFFLINE INTERACTIVITY   
Public meetings 3.6 3.5 
Telephone 3.5 3.6 
Office visits (Brussels) 3.4 4.0 
Office visits (Home) 3.4 3.1 
Mailed letters 3.0 3.4 
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newsletters, party bulletins and mailed newsletters.   Instead the second preferred channel of 
constituency outreach is a two-directional use of face-to-face public meetings (61%), telephones 
(58%) and office consultations.  Only 17 per cent MEP admitted that they never used them. 
Moreover, a strong positive correlation was also found between MEPs’ use of different interactive 
media.  MEPs who were above average phone users also attended more public meetings and used 
office consultations more frequently to interact with constituents.  But interactivity was also 
positively linked with one-way communication channels.  Overall, Table 5.9 shows that majority of 
MEPs use a mix of one-directional as well as interactive, two-directional communication channels 
to reach out to their constituencies and to the public at large, a finding that prompts the rejection of 
(H0f). 
 
When it comes to the reciprocal citizen/ constituents → MEP vector, MEPs contend that citizens 
prefer the highly interactive modes of communication when reaching out to them. Interestingly, the 
top two choices include office visits in Brussels, telephone as well as public meetings. Citizens, 
however, seem to show a low preference for constituency office consultations when reaching out to 
MEPs.  While this could have been a feasible expectation if majority MEPs did not have a 
constituency office, but as 94 per cent of MEP respondents report to have both an office in Brussels 
and a constituency office in their home country, this finding is somewhat puzzling.  Could it be that 
constituents venture out all the way to Brussels to speak and lobby their MEPs on specific issues? 
 
There are several possible explanations.  Rather than being visited in Brussels by single individuals, 
during interviews, MEPs referred to receiving ‘delegations of constituency visitors’ such as schools 
or professional organizations. In fact, for this purpose, MEPs receive an annual budget where they 
can invite up to 300 constituents to Brussels.  Hence, it is possible that in their survey responses, 
MEPs referred to these ‘groups of constituents’.   The second possibility is, because the interactivity 
measure is based on MEPs’ estimates, it may include a response bias where MEPs under or over 
estimate their levels of two-way interactivity especially where the constituent → MEP vector is 
concerned.  
 
In summary, in spite the rather low standard deviation in the different modes of interaction, MEPs 
rely on wide range of both one-way and two-way channels when reaching out to their 
constituencies. While they tend to prefer channels facilitating wider audience capture such as 
newspapers and public meetings, which makes sense given the size of their constituencies, majority 
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of MEP also frequently use interactive forms of constituency outreach. MEPs’ propensity to use 
variety of outreach channels underlines their interest to maximise their public visibility, a trend 
that is reinforced by MEPs having to compete with national MPs and more salient EU institutions 
for media exposure.  
 
5.3  Variation and Determinants of MEPs’ Constituency Orientations OFFLINE  
While the following sections outlined the descriptive characteristics of MEPs’ constituency 
orientations and outreach the following sections examine the extent to which MEPs’ constituency 
orientations and outreach vary as well as what explains that variation.  In other words, answering 
the question - are some MEPs more pro-constituency oriented than others with respect to case 
work, explaining work and interactivity dimensions? If so, what explains that variation?   
 
5.3.1   Determinants of casework  
Due to the low institutional expectations on MEPs’ constituency work by the EP, MEPs have high 
leverage in acting as gatekeepers as to the types and amount of cases they take on.  In order to 
determine which factors influence MEPs’ casework orientations, three dependent variables 
depicting MEPs’ casework propensities - i) time spent on casework; ii) responsiveness to casework, 
and iii) importance attached to pork barrel cases33  - were tested individually first (see Tables 5.1 – 
5.4 in Appendix 3).  While measures of the same dimension, each is slightly different from the other.  
With respect to variation in the casework dimension, there are three notable observations.   First, 
unlike what was expected, is that MEPs spend a fair proportion of their time on casework. On 
average casework consumes 20 per cent of MEP’s workload and comes comparatively second after 
parliamentary work and ‘communication with citizens’.  Moreover, 32 per cent MEPs reported that 
they spend more than 20 per cent on casework.  These could be considered as pro-constituency 
caseworkers. Assuming that citizens know and should in principle care little about the affairs of the 
EU, this is higher than was expected.  
                                                          
33  The variable’s values ranged from ‘0’ to a maximum of ‘3’. 
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As to the determinants, several observations were made across the three ‘casework’ proxies.  The 
first observation made is that with the exception of time spent of casework and higher propensity 
to make appointments with citizens where a positive correlation was found, the different casework 
proxies (see Table 5.1 in the Appendix) were not correlated. Time spent on casework, for example, 
though positively correlated with higher caseloads from civic associations and regional 
government, had no effect on MEPs’ level of responsiveness to casework and on their willingness to 
take on pork barrel cases. A possible explanation here is that casework from civic organizations or 
interest groups falls in the ‘harder cases’ category hence is more time consuming and requires 
tradeoffs.  The lack of a correlation with other casework variables, however could also be due to the 
sample size even though it was statistically significant  (17% response rate for most of the response 
categories). 
The second observation made is that there are different ‘casework styles’ among MEPs. The first 
observes a standard or catchall casework style where MEP responds to all types of ‘cases’ but 
prioritizes ‘individual cases’ from citizens while the second refers to the pork casework style where 
MEP does not necessarily take on cases from individuals but rather focuses on securing advantages 
by attracting funding, projects or political attention from the EU to his/her district. 
Both the data and qualitative insights gained during interviews confirmed that the pork casework 
style is particularly pronounced among MEPs from new member states.  While MEPs from CEE were 
interestingly less likely to take on cases from individual citizens, they took on more ‘pork cases’ 
(H3f) than MEPs from other member states (1.045 (.243), p<0.01, N =137, see Table 5.3 in 
Appendix 3).   During interviews, it was confirmed that MEPs from new member states feel 
‘responsible’ for promoting their countries and constituencies in different EU contexts as well as to 
help their various sub-constituencies (regional governments, interest groups, local businesses etc.) 
to gain more access to EU resources.  As a result, in typical pork cases MEPs assist their regional 
authorities or SMEs gaining access to EU networks, EU grants and other types of resources. In this 
sense, MEPs from CEE do fulfill their role as facilitators and live linkages between Brussels and 
‘home’. 
In addition to being from a new member state, Model 1 - electoral system, open ballot structure also 
proved to be, as was expected (H3a), positively correlated with responsiveness to casework 
orientation (.557 (.445), p<0.05, N=133 – Table 5.4).  Moreover, in Model 2 related to MEPs’ role 
orientations (H3b), ‘taking instruction from citizens’ was also positively correlated with the time 
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that MEPs spend on casework and pork and barrel cases (.633(.298), p<0.01, N=111 – Table 5.2 and 
.284(.298) p<0.1, N=122 – Table 5.3) even though the response sample for one of the dimensions 
was not statistically significant.   
While most of the political variables in Model 3, showed to be insignificantly correlated, number of 
delegations (H3c)34 to which individual MEPs belong were found to be negatively correlated with 
both the time spent on casework dimension (-.918 (.481), p<0.1, N=127 - Table 5.2) and pro-pork 
casework orientation (-.506 (.255), p <0.1, N=127).  Hence MEPs who served on more delegations 
were likely to spend less time on casework.   This is logical since belonging to an EP delegation 
typically requires additional traveling the already heavy travelling load that hence providing less 
time for constituency related activities.  Based on this finding has lead us to accept the H3c 
hypothesis related to ‘belonging to delegation’.  However, being a party or committee senior or 
incumbency (H3d), which were expected to be negatively associated with casework showed to be 
insignificant.  
MEPs’ previous national political career (H3e) also showed to be insignificant which is surprising as 
during interviews MEPs (who previously served as MPs, mayors, professionals or public 
personalities at national level) noted that citizens often contact them for assistance with ‘cases’ 
linked to their previous political or public role. For example, an Estonian MEP, a former Olympic 
athlete hence a popular sports personality claimed to receive requests related to the promotion of 
recreation and sports in the EU while another Irish MEP received: 
 “ fair bit of requests because I am a known personality in my region from my previous  
political activities as the only Labour MP.  Because people know and recognize me as a 
public figure, I receive a high number of individual requests but I am mostly contacted by 
trade unions, business organizations and companies who are affected by EU legislation and  
stem cell research.”  
 
 
Similarly, a Cypriot MEP noted: 
 “I was a doctor and later became an MP and people still knock on my door with health 
  related issues or political issues I was involved with back then.” 
 
 
                                                          
34 The European Parliament’s delegations maintain relations and exchange information with parliaments in non-EU countries. 
Through its delegations, the EP helps to represent the EU externally and to promote in third countries the values on which the 
European Union is founded. 
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The insignificance of ‘previous political national career’ could likely be due to the survey’s small 
sample size hence worthy of future research.  The only additional political variable that showed 
significance was political EP party group affiliation where ALDE MEPs were more responsive to 
casework than MEPs from any other political group (2.61 (1.08), N=133, p<0.1). However, for the 
other casework dimensions, political affiliation did not play a role. 
With respect to demographic variables, apart from age, which was negatively correlated with MEPs’ 
pro-casework orientation, other demographic variables – gender and education level showed to be 
insignificant predictors of MEPs’ casework orientations.   
In summary, as already noted, contrary to the initial expectation, majority of MEPs receive and take 
on substantial amounts of casework mostly pertaining to cross-border issues.  Insights gained from 
interviews also showed that MEPs are requested to cater to the interests and requests of multiple-
sub-constituencies but because “it is impossible to be everything to everyone” MEPs have to make 
pragmatic choices about the types of cases they take on.  With respect to the determinants, overall, 
open ballot structure and MEPs’ pro-citizen role orientations show to be the strongest predictors of 
MEPs’ casework orientations.  MEPs from CEE countries also show to be different types of case 
workers as they tend to focus more on pork barrel cases than their non-CEE peers.  MEPs’ previous 
political affiliation, political career and demographic predispositions, however, were found to be 
inconclusively linked. Still, these should not be discounted as possible determinants in future 
research that could isolate and testing more narrowly defined set of variables. 
 
 
5.3.2  Determinants for Explaining Work OFFLINE 
 
With 92 per cent of MEPs considering that explaining EU politics and their political work is 
‘important’ or ‘very important’ part of their job, variation with standard deviation 0.68 on a 5-point 
Likert scale for this dimensions of MEPs’ constituency outreach is low. Irrespective of MEPs’ 
background the explaining EU dimension is seemingly a standard feature of MEPs’ mandate.  It 
rates slightly higher than casework and ranks at par with MEP’s parliamentary work on a scale of 
importance. This dimension is also correlated (see Table 5.5 in the Appendix 3) with other pro-
constituency orientations such as higher staff allocation and preference for using in constituency 
office as a means of outreach. 
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In spite the low variation and controlling for demographic factors, results in Table 5.6 (Appendix 3) 
show that partisans – those with a party as their focus of representation - and incumbents are 
negatively associated with MEPs’ pro-active stance to explain EU and their work to the public.  This 
coincides with the original expectation that rookie MEPs will have vested interest to reach out more 
in order to gain public visibility and to establish themselves in the public’s eye.   The negative 
partisan correlation was less straight forward as there is no theoretical explanation for this trend, 
unless partisans get so absorbed in their party related work that their party rather than their 
constituency becomes their ‘public’ for outreach.     While preference for using the one-dimensional 
channel of newspapers as a means of reaching out to the public was considered as another proxy 
for this dimension, the response rate for that particular question was not statistically significant 
hence had to be dropped from analysis. 
  
 
5.3.3    Determinants of interactivity OFFLINE 
As noted in an earlier Chapter, the interactive dimension was added here as it is not explored in 
classical literature on political representation. However, because MEPs’ interactive propensity is 
assumed to correlate with a pro-constituency orientation, according to the incumbency hypothesis 
suggests that rookie MEPs are expected to be more interactive than incumbents. Moreover, MEPs 
from electoral systems with open ballot structure and regional constituencies was expected to be 
higher. MEPs with higher committee or delegation responsibilities are expected to focus more on 
their work in Brussels than to interact with their home constituencies that is known to be more 
time consuming. 
 
Overall, the regression results point to two types of MEPs who are prone to be interactive. The ones 
whose interactive outreach coincides with other pro-constituency orientations - more time spent in 
constituency and attachment of importance to communicating with constituents. In other words, 
these MEPs would most likely be the typical constituency workers.  This positive correlation is 
consistent with similar findings in the allocation of resources and casework dimensions.   
 
Interestingly, results for electoral systems, namely ‘open’ ballot structure showed to be insignificant 
in connection to the interactivity dimension.  In theory, MEPs from open systems were expected to 
be more ‘interactive’.  Though in interviews, as one Spanish MEP candidly stated: 
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 “We don’t really do it.  We have no direct contact with ordinary citizens. When I come 
back to Spain, I go to my party HQ, receive a printout of  what I am expected to do and  
I do it. …Citizens also just do not contact us.”  
 
“Doing ‘guest speaker circuits’ or making appearances at party functions, at local party  
 centers across the country is most expected of me by my party and what I do at  
home” (Estonian MEP).  
 
“I don’t necessarily have a constituency office, I go to my party’s office and mainly attend its                  
local functions.” (Belgian MEP)  
 
The anticipated incumbency, proximity to constituency and political responsibility hypotheses, 
however, showed to be insignificant. EP party group affiliation, staff size when controlling for age, 
gender and education level were also insignificant.   
In addition to the three dimensions, overall, respondents showed a low proclivity for reaching out 
to their party voters, irrespective of their country’s electoral system or other factors.  At the same 
time, insights gained from MEP interviews, suggest that MEPs do end up doing party related 
activities, some do so exclusively, in their constituencies.  
Spanish, Belgian and Estonian MEPs pointed to their service as ‘party parade horses’ when working 
on their home turf.  Their party secretariats request them to appear as guests speakers on cross-
country party tours, while UK MEPs acknowledged that since 2002 (post introduction of pan-EU PR 
system for EU elections) they are obliged to do significantly more party related activities than 
before.  Since MEPs in these cases came from mixed district types (regional and national) as well as 
ballot structures points to the potential heterogeneity in national political culture dynamics hence 
the need in future research to disaggregate results by national level and more intricate measures of 
political culture. 
Regression results show that MEPs’ pro-constituency orientations comprise a cluster of linked, 
mutually reinforcing behavioral tendencies.  In other words, MEPs’ pro-constituency orientations 
are correlated. For example, those who value ‘being active in their countries’, tend to spend more 
‘time in their constituency’, to prioritise ‘appearing at public events’ and tend to allocate more staff 
to their constituency office.  
The finding that strong ‘case work’ oriented MEPs come from CEE countries was also somewhat 
surprising.   By inference, it was expected that CEE MEPs will be less constituency oriented given 
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the communist legacy of a highly centralised, planned and party driven political system where 
representatives’ bottom up accountability to their constituencies was less likely to be the rule. 
 
MEPs’ casework load and responsiveness to casework which were expected to be positively 
correlated with higher numbers of constituency staff, showed to be insignificant.  A possible 
explanation is that though MEPs may receive casework locally, cases are worked out in Brussels 
hence would not be attended to by constituency based staff.  
 
 
Chapter  Summary   
Chapter 5 made several  observations about how MEPs think, the importance they attach and the 
activities they pursue with respect to their constituency outreach offline.  It also looked at what 
determines MEPs’ pro-constituency orientations.  
As to how MEPs’ think about their constituencies, two observations were made. First, it was 
observed that MEPs see their constituencies as composite and heterogeneous rather than uniform 
territorial or purely electoral entities. The complex, multi-level character of the EU polity shows to 
affect the way MEPs think about their constituencies.  While at first instance MEPs contend that 
they ‘officially’ represent their national or regional (electoral) constituencies, ‘in practice’ they 
conceive to be representing the pan-European electorate or various thematic groups that are not 
necessarily limited to nationals of their own countries.  This is quite interesting since catering their 
allegiance or representation to the pan-European constituency does not necessarily bring MEPs 
direct electoral rewards.  It further suggests that the ‘European context’ conditions MEPs and 
prompts them to adopt a sense of perceived duty to Europe and blurs their electoral allegiances.  
The second observation made attests to MEPs’ frequent struggle to navigate in the complex multi-
level EU environment. MEPs’ personal accounts explain that they often feel overwhelmed by the 
different layers of representational demands that are imposed on them.  As a result, they prompted 
to resort to pragmatic means and are forced splinter or reduce their representational universe into 
more ‘workable’ and ‘personalised’ sub-constituencies or foci of representation.  These usually 
correspond to more narrowly defined policy areas or flagship causes that MEPs work on, or 
comprise of reactive and punctuated mix of “sometime theme specific, some times regional, other 
times Europe or something in between” sub-constituencies.  Moreover, this way of thinking about 
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constituencies coincides with Fenno’s (1978) contentions that representatives tend to split and 
categorize their constituencies in terms of different concentric circles of importance.    
Results related to the degree of importance that MEPs attach to constituency work were also 
insightful.  H3a expected that MEPs will allocate proportionally less time, staff and office to 
constituency related activities than to parliamentary activities. Although on average, respondents 
did report to spend slightly more time on parliamentary activities than on constituency outreach, 
with respect to staff allocations, MEPs employed the same number of staff in their constituencies as 
they did in their Brussels offices.  Almost all MEPs also reported to have both a constituency and a 
Brussels office and spend significantly more days working in their constituencies than was 
expected.  
As to constituency outreach, in recognition that citizens are mis- and under-informed about the EU 
affairs, MEPs almost uniformly feel that educating the public about the EU and explaining their own 
work is one of the most important activities in their mandate.  For this purpose one-directional 
outreach – via printed press but also more interactive public meetings are the most common 
channels of MEPs’ constituency outreach.  Though MEPs end up doing a fair amount of casework, it 
consumes slightly less time than the educational and outreach activities they pursue.  In this sense, 
individual citizens and interest groups tend to contact MEPs the most which suggests that in spite 
the distance, the ‘constituency’ linkage at the European level is alive.    
With respect to variation on the different pro-constituency propensities, the results show MEPs’ 
constituency orientations vary on some pro-constituency dimensions more than on others. While 
nearly all MEPs regarded ‘communication with and education of citizens on EU matters’ as 
important aspects of their jobs, they began to vary in their pro-constituency orientations in the 
casework dimension.  Interestingly, while MEPs from new member states were less likely to 
interact directly with citizens, they were significantly more prone to take on pork types of 
casework.  As to other determinants of pro-constituency orientations, as it was expected, open 
ballot structure (Model 1) and MEPs who were prone to take instruction from citizens (Model 2) 
tended to be more pro-constituency oriented. Demographic and political determinants (Model 3) 
such as past political career and political affiliation, however, showed to be insignificant. 
‘Constituency characteristics’ such as distance to constituency and MEP-constituent ratio in Model 
4 also showed to be poor predictors.  
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In addition to their constituency orientations, when asking the question to what extent are MEPs 
unique in their offline representational style when compared to their national counterparts, it was 
observed that the particularity of the multi-level governance context conditions the 
representational demands and splintered EU-national loyalties.  The second is that MEPs also tend 
to be ‘reactive’ and ‘discretionary’ in their representational style. In this sense, they befit the trustee 
model of representation where 87 per cent of them claim to decide on policy issues based on their 
own judgement rather than by taking instruction from their parties, citizens or their national 
governments. These findings confirm past research on MEP role orientations (Katz 1999). This is 
largely due to the claimed greater degree of freedom where “nobody breathes down my neck’ and 
in being free from party politics, or the daily ‘political baggage and political games that are common 
at the national level’.  
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6.        MEPs’  CONSTITUENCY  ORIENTATIONS  AND  OUTREACH  ONLINE 
 
 
 
“My website is a point of reference about what I do and evidence of what I have done.” (UK MEP) 
 
 
 
ICTs’ appeal lies in the opportunities they offer for re-establishing direct relationships between 
citizens   and political exponents,  as  well  as  giving  life  to  new  forms  of  participation  in 
democratic processes (Bentivegna 2006: 334). However, given the empirical novelty of the field, 
empirically backed theories about what determines political actors’ online behavior are few in 
number. None exist specifically for determining MEPs’ online behavior. 
 
While Chapter 5 looked at how MEPs’ conduct their constituency relations offline, Chapter 6 
looks at how they do so online.   In this sense, MEPs’ constituency orientations online  comprise 
three  dimensions:  (i) the importance tha t  MEPs attach to Internet usage with respect to their 
constituency work,  (ii) the extent to which they use it for constituency related duties, and (iii) 
the variation in MEPs’ online constituency orientations and factors that determine it. 
 
The chapter is divided into three parts and uses data based on the triangulation of three 
sources:  i) responses from the author’s MEP survey  (N=159) about their Internet usage, i i)  
MEP’s websites’  content  analysis,  and  iii) qualitative  insights  from interviews.  The first 
part of this Chapter addresses the first question by looking at the key features appearing on 
MEPs’ websites, MEPs’ motives for creating their websites and the importance that MEPs attach 
to their online activities by the resources they allocate to them. The second part follows by 
providing an overview of MEPs’ actual usage of online platforms for constituency outreach in 
terms of the three constituency dimensions – casework, explaining work and interactivity. 
 
 
The chapter’s third part answers the third question by examining the variation in MEPs’ 
online constituency orientations. Similarly as in the previous Chapter 4, while online proxies 
for MEP’s online constituency orientations act as the dependent variable(s), OLS and logistic 
regression analysis is used  to test four  models of independent variables: the electoral system  
Model 1; t h e  focus of representation and role orientations – Model 2; political factors -  Model 
3;   and  constituency  characteristics  Model 4. In addition to the four models, several 
exploratory variables specific to the online dimension  such as internet penetration and tries to 
summarize and draw some general conclusions about MEP’s online constituency outreach.  
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6.1   Attitudinal Dimensions of MEPs’ Constituency Orientations ONLINE  
 
Before elaborating on MEPs’ constituency outreach online and the activities they pursue to this 
effect, the analysis first set out to find out more about MEPs’ attitudes toward Internet usage by 
asking them about: (i) their motives for creating (or not) their website; and ii) to estimate the 
‘proportion of time they spent on website management’.  While the former aimed at more 
general attitudes, the second question was a proxy for determining the level of importance that 
MEPs attach to the use of ICTs and the Internet for constituency work. 
 
With respect to the first attitudinal question on MEPs’ motives, Table 6.1 demonstrates that 
MEPs create websites mostly for interactive, information provision and transparency purposes.  
All of these motives, in principle, relate to the interactivity and explaining work dimensions.   
Personalization of self-presentation also featured highly while partisan motives show to play a 
very small role.  Thus this seems to suggest that either MEPs create their websites out of their 
own interest and for self promotional purposes, and, or, that national parties or EP party groups 
do not have explicit IT communication and outreach policies. Partly, these results coincide with 
past research which has found that representatives and political figures do indeed use online 
platforms predominantly for self-presentation and self-promotion.   
 
               Table 6.1 MEPs’ motives for creating a website  
What were the main reasons for creating your 
personal website as MEP? 
 
% 
Increase direct contact with citizens 82 
Provide educational information about the EU 82 
Offer public transparency over your work 79 
Personalize your public message and visibility 78 
Receive policy feedback from citizens 61 
Advertise types of assistance you offer 25 
 
Reduce office communication costs                12 
It is your national party’s policy 5 
It is your EP group’s policy 4 
N = 131 
 
With respect to the time spent on website management, as Table 6.2 below further indicates, 
MEPs on average spend an estimated 10% of their time on managing their websites while  30 
per cent of MEP respondents, however, reported to spend no or ‘zero’ time attending to online 
activities. Moreover, when compared to other activities such as parliamentary work, casework, 
media and interest   group   relations,  ‘website management’ shows to score the lowest. 
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Table 6.2 Proportion of time spent on website management 
 
MEP Activity Mean SD N 
Parliamentary and committee work 5.1 1.87 136 
Citizen relations 4.0 2.18 136 
Casework 3.1 2.08 132 
Media relations 3.0 1.96 136 
Interest group relations 2.7 1.71 131 
Website Management 2.2 1.54 132 
 
As   many political responsibilities vie for MEPs’ attention, it is understandable that MEPs 
personally devote little time to managing their websites and outsource the activity to website 
consultants or to their staff.  This being, MEPs’ interest and importance attached to the use of 
ICTs in their constituency outreach should not be underestimated.   
 
Most MEPs interviewed recognized the importance of online presence, but were also 
conscious about the resources and responsibilities that being online requires.  As one Irish MEP 
explained “I mostly use my website for receiving feedback but you  also have to consider that I 
need to feed it too, and this takes time and resources.” While  another UK MEP pointed to 
the responsiveness and accountability factors attached to being online where “due to the speed 
of communication and citizens’ expectations of instantaneous responses to their questions, 
maintaining a website is a responsibility…one has to respond to them (citizens) fast, otherwise they 
will complain”.  As a result, some MEPs and their staff have developed standard daily or weekly 
routines where they receive printouts of incoming messages and feedback coming through their 
websites while other use a more instantaneous approach where they carry laptops with them to 
events and request their assistants to immediately upload outcomes or photos from the events 
on their websites. 
 
 
Moreover, MEPs interviewed also showed that they do take a strong interest in controlling and 
contributing to what goes into their websites’ contents. In fact they were quite aware about and 
took pride in the traffic that their websites generate.   At the same time, they acknowledged 
that the day-to-day management of their online activities is predominantly delegated to their 
assistants. The latter act as the gatekeepers or filters of the multitudes of emails (“350 a day”) 
and requests that comes via the online channels.  In order to manage the large amounts of traffic 
and carpet lobbying campaigns by European and national interest groups, MEPs and their 
assistants have been forced to become fairly creative in developing various screening and sorting 
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mechanisms in order to carefully screen those requests that ‘matter’ and those that do not.  
 
6.2  MEPs’ Use of the Internet for Constituency Outreach   
 
In 2008-2009, on the official EP website35  that lists the online profiles of all 785 MEPs (the 
entire MEP population) serving in the 6th EP session, 76 per cent MEPs showed to be online at 
least via an email and 57 per cent included a link to ‘their’ website (bloggers excluded).  It  is 
to be noted,  however,  that MEP respondents in the author’s survey (n=159) showed a 
slight bias in favor of Internet usage where 84 percent stated that they had email, 63 per cent 
had a website, 9 per cent showed to be exclusively blog users while 14 per cent used both 
blogs and websites simultaneously.   Thus with the website users and bloggers combined, the 
total survey respondents online amounted to 72 per cent. This is higher than results found in 
the actual MEP population and should be taken into account when considering results 
presented in this chapter. 
When looking at the content analysis of MEPs’ websites or blogs, 70 per cent contained between 
6 – 10 out of the twenty website features originally identified for website coding (see Table 
6.3); 21 per cent had between 11-13 while only 3 per cent had the full amount of the twenty 
features that were coded for.  On average, MEPs’ websites contained six website standard 
features.  Sections below will elaborate on these in some more detail.   
 
Though a significant proportion of MEPs has expressed that they consider ‘Europe’ as their 
greater constituency (see Chapter 5), the ‘pan-European’ aspirations are less reflected on their 
websites.  Multilingual platforms and communication are necessary conditions for the creation 
of linkages in the pan-European context and for the creation of a vibrant European public 
sphere (see Koopmans & Statham 2002; Koopmans & Zimmermann 2003; Trenz-Jorg 2004, 
2005). However, though the official EP website has been translated into all 27 EU languages, 
only 20 per cent of MEPs’ websites showed to be multilingual. Interestingly, more than half of 
the multilingual websites belonged to MEPs from new EU member states while MEPs from 
Southern member states (i.e. Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Malta) were less likely to 
include multilingual features on their websites.   These findings suggest that a fairly low 
number of MEPs attempts to reach out to citizens and publics beyond their own linguistic 
group(s). 
                                                          
35  The EP website lists a complete set of MEP’s standardized profiles which include personal information such as age, 
(domestic  and  EP)  party  affiliation,  key  EP  activities  (committee  and  delegation  membership),  overview  of 
speeches, voting record and forms of contact. 
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Table  6.3  Features on MEP websites  
 
Website Features % Website Features % 
Explaining own work 64 Comment, feedback forms 37 
Press releases 60 You Tube 25 
EU news 58 Blog 23 
Photo gallery 56 Casework 21 
Podcasts 52 Multilingual 20 
EP speeches 52 Personal & private life 15 
Facebook 46 E-forums 9 
Agenda overview 44 E-poll 8 
Annotated CV 43 Twitter 7 
E-newsletter 39 E-petition 6 
N=144    
 
 
 
 
Explaining Work  ONLINE 
 
 
As established in Chapter 5, MEPs consider explaining their legislative work and informing their 
constituencies about EU issues as an important part of their job; they consider it as important 
as their parliamentary and legislative work.   Offline, they do so through traditional media by 
issuing press  releases, offering  media  interviews,  through  telephone  calls  or  face-to-face 
interactions during  group visits from their constituencies in Brussels and at public events or 
one-on-one consultations in  their constituency offices. Online they can do it via their website, 
blog or increasingly via social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter or You Tube. 
 
Based on previous research of national representatives’ online behavior, H2 expected that MEPs 
will prioritize one-directional, non-interactive ‘explaining work’ website features such as 
information about the EU and EP and various forms of self-promotion over two-way, interactive 
features related to casework and various forms of feedback (e.g. e-petitions, e-polls, comment 
forms, e-discussion forums, online consultation hours and links to SNS).   
 
In view of the observations made in Table 6.3, H2 was confirmed. The six most common 
features appearing on MEPs’ websites were all one-directional and included: ‘explaining work’, 
‘press releases’, ‘EU news’, ‘photo galleries’,  records of MEP’s ‘speeches and interventions’ and 
podcasts.  In addition to informing and educating their public(s) about EU affairs, MEPs used 
these features for professional and personal self-promotion purposes in several ways. 
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1)  The first most common way appeared under a variation of the same website 
feature typically called ‘my work’, ‘my activities in Brussels’, ‘what I do’ or ‘what I stand 
for’.  This feature appeared on 64 per cent MEP’s websites or blogs. Content of these 
features included annotated text-form exposes highlighting different issues that the EU 
and MEPs take on and supplemented by links to related documents and institutions 
linked to the specific issues. 
 
 
2) The second common online channel  for  explaining  work  is  a  listed  record  of  MEPs’ 
speeches – either in the form of text or live video feeds, questions to the EU 
Commission and other formal interventions. This feature appeared in 72 per cent of MEP 
websites. It is questionable  the  extent  to  which  constituents  peruse  these  pages,  
nonetheless,  the frequent use of this feature by MEPs suggests its perceived 
importance by the latter in order to provide a sense of transparency. 
 
 
3) The third popular mode of explaining MEPs’ work is via podcasts, common to 69 per 
cent MEP websites.  Podcasts mostly resemble personalized mini video newscasts, 
where an MEP in person, acting  as  a  newscaster,  offers  small  reports  and  updates 
explaining  latest  aspects  of  their  work,  their  positions  on  specific  policies,  and  
their responses  to  pertinent  EU  issues  discussed  in  EP.  They also sometimes include 
live footages from MEP’s parliamentary interventions or media interviews. Though 
podcasts are a fairly new online application, and their fairly high usage suggests that 
MEP are quick to adopt new ways of reaching out to their public(s) and signal the 
preference for a personal account of explaining their work. Podcasts thus serve as MEP’s 
own, self directed and   personalized   news channel   through   which   they   can   bypass   
the main media communication outlets. 
 
 
4) The fourth way of providing a personalized account and overview of their work were 
e- newsletters;  56  per  cent  MEP  websites  incorporated  e-newsletter  subscriptions  
and online access to previous issues.  E-newsletters usually list a pot pourri of latest 
updates on   diverse   topics   linked   to   MEPs’   work   but   also   to   EU   related   issues   
in   their constituencies. 
 
 
The author’s MEP survey results closely correspond with the website content analysis (see 
Table 6.3).  When asked to self-assess the frequency of their own use of different online media 
to  communicate  with their constituents, email and websites were by far the most often used, 
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respectively  followed  by  plenary  speeches,  questions  to  the  European  Commission  and  e- 
newsletters. Blogs and features linking their national party websites or work were listed as used 
the least often. 
 
It was encouraging that observations derived from website analytics on the explaining work 
dimension corroborated results in the MEP survey and offline observations on the same 
dimension made in Chapter 5.  All converge to the conclusion that explaining legislative work 
and informing their constituencies about EU issues is a leading priority for MEPs, at par with 
their parliamentary and legislative work. Moreover, the consistency of website analytics 
corresponding with the survey responses is also important from a methodological perspective. 
 
 
 
 
Casework ONLINE 
 
In Chapter 5, it was established that MEPs receive significant amount of casework which takes up 
approximately  20  per  cent  of  their  time.  But what role  does  the  Internet  play  in  MEP’s 
management of casework? 
 
 
Because casework cannot be conducted entirely online36, a proxy  - the extent to which MEPs 
made references to or solicited casework online - was used to measure the online 
constituency dimension.  On websites that did incorporate them, website features appeared as 
specific sub-pages under the label of  ‘services’ (German MEP), ‘activities in Czech republic’ 
(Czech MEP), ‘e-consulting37’ (Czech MEP) or as ‘something useful’ (Bulgarian MEP). 
 
 
In addition to the presence of an online casework feature, two additional aspects were also 
looked at:  i)  whether  promotion  of  ‘casework  assistance’  factored  into  MEP’s  motives  for 
creating their website, and ii) whether citizens lodge ‘cases’ to MEP via online channels. 
 
 
The findings show that MEPs’ websites are used the least for casework when compared to the 
online ‘explaining work’ or ‘interactivity’ dimensions.  Only 22 per cent MEPs  incorporated  
casework features on their website.  At the same time, casework features show to be more 
                                                          
36 Casework, namely the ‘harder cases’ often require diverse means – potentially both online and offline  means 
of intervention  (i.e.  preparatory  research  and  investigation,  follow  up  by MEP’s  personal  contact,  phone  
calls, meetings etc.). As a result, this makes it difficult to accurately distinguish the exact role of websites and how 
they impact MEP’s constituency work. 
37 (trans.) “E-consulting - Its aim is to speak to the private sector as well as small towns to assist with them with the 
early stages of applying for financial mechanisms such as EU Structural funds and the 7
th  
Framework Program. 
Three basic activities will be supported: Structural funds, Research and innovation, and Public requests. Based on 
filled out online application forms, our analytical team will provide relevant assistance and possible solutions. The 
second line of assistance will be provided to Managers of EU research projects also through online forms.” (MEP 
Bobosikova, Czech Republic). 
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common than the interactive e- petitions or e-forums but less common than MEP’s use of SNS, 
comment forms, podcasts, photo galleries, biographical data, parliamentary speech records or e-
newsletters. 
 
Interestingly, in a separate survey question, though 62 per cent o f  MEPs believed that 
having a website increased their casework load, based on MEPs’ estimates, citizens   show a 
preference for using more direct and personal channels such as email or letters when lodging 
casework requests rather than websites (see Table 6.4 below). 
 
 
Table 6.4  Channels for receiving casework requests 
 
Channel for receiving casework requests (citizens) % 
Email 93 
Letters 37 
Telephone 35 
Brussels office 27 
Website 24 
National party office 10 
N = 138  
 
 
The low use of websites for casework purposes among MEPs is not surprising.  Attending to 
cases is known to take up sizeable amount of representatives’ time with precarious returns.   
Actively soliciting cases means commitment.   One reason why MEPs are hesitant to shift their 
casework duties online is their concern for overstretching their capacities. MEPs’ active 
promotion of their willingness to assistant may invite new casework.  Given that MEPs already 
receive a fair amount of it (via various communication channels), inviting more casework than 
they and their staff could handle would overextend their capacity to respond to casework  and  
subsequently  erode  their  accountability  to  their  constituencies.  Interview testimonies 
suggested that MEPs are quite conscious about these dynamics and realities. 
 
The second reason is that websites are not the most suitable platforms for handling all 
‘cases’. While websites may remove the burden of lighter cases, such as specific information  
seeking  or  the  provision  of  specific  forms  and  announcements,  more complex   cases   will   
require   MEP’s   personal   attention.   Thus   it   is   understandable   why constituents would 
resort to more direct and personal channels e-mail, phone calls or letters.  
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Interactivity ONLINE 
 
 
What distinguishes interactivity  from  other  communicative  acts  is  that  it  seeks  two-way 
communication - the sending of a message with the expectation of a response. In other words, 
interactive communicative acts implicitly presume a dialogue and a sense of continuity between 
the sender and the receiver. In political communication studies the vector of communication 
between legislators and citizens has been  presumed  for the most par to  be  one-directional  
and  top  down.   According to proponents of participatory democracy, the inherent lack of 
reciprocity, feedback, transparency and accountability has been detrimental to a balanced two-
way representational relationship. 
 
 
However, as much as it has been criticized, interactivity has not been commonly empirically 
studied as a distinct component of constituent-representative relationship. For the most part, it 
is merely assumed.  To test this assumption here, interactivity has been isolated as distinct 
dimension of (MEP’s) constituency work.   Moreover, by its proponents, the Internet has been 
claimed to facilitate interactivity but little is known thus far the extent to which this applies to 
MEPs. 
 
To determine MEPs’ interactivity online, an interactivity index was created (Table 6.5)38 based 
on different features’ interactive properties.  Interactive features were considered those that 
solicit two-way interactions between MEPs and their constituents.  For example, a blog  
offers content-comment  and  feedback  properties  which  make  it  more  interactive  than  a  
simple website with information pages or podcasts which merely reinforce conventional one-
way communication. Not having a website at all features at the most minimum end of the scale 
which online discussion forums and social networking sites rank the highest39.  The reverse, 
constituent MEP vector, is measured through two survey questions based on MEPs’ own 
estimates about their constituents’ media preferences and means of contact as well as by 
features that MEPs consider to attract the most website traffic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Cumulative scores on individual level MEP - constituent interactivity, measuring individual communicative acts 
(i.e. MEP sending, constituent replying) – their content, thread and thread length of reciprocity would be the 
most precise way of measuring interactivity, however, access to this level of data (i.e. emails, comments) is 
difficult for a representative sample of MEPs and their constituents. 
39 There are more tricky ones such e-petitions which seem interactive, but in reality fail to promote direct 
MEP→constituent interactivity. They merely enable horizontal social interactivity and activism. 
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Table 6.5 Online Interactivity Index 
 
Participatory 
Potential 
NUL LOW 
One-way 
MEDIUM 
Two-way (feedback) 
HIGH 
Two-way (dialogue) 
On-line format No web site 
No e-mail 
Web site + …(1) Web site + …(2) Web site + …(3) 
(MEP) Web 
features 
None • Explain work 64% 
• Podcasts 53% 
• Speeches 51% 
• E-newsletter 40% 
• E-mail 
• Feedback 
• Blog 
• E-poll 
• E-petition 
84% 
37% 
  24% 
7% 
6% 
•   Social networking 
sites (SNS) 
•   E-forums 
46% 
 
  9% 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, unlike many Internet studies which tend to isolate online behavior/ phenomena 
from their offline contexts, results in the following section show that the online and offline 
worlds are inextricably linked, they condition each other.   They challenge the skeptics’ rather 
simplistic accounts that Internet brings nothing new to politics and the idea that political 
actors solely pursue top-down one-way communication style.  MEPs’ communication style and 
online constituent-interactivity is more complex. It needs to be contextualized against the 
intersecting demands placed on representatives by   new trends in political communication and 
citizens’ expectations of what political representation means to them.   
 
When examining MEPs’ actual online interactive behavior a paradox emerges. While 94 per 
cent MEP survey respondents considered communication with citizen as ‘important’ or ‘very 
important’ and 81 per cent listed ‘increasing direct contact with citizens’ as the principal reason 
for creating their website, MEPs’ actual website content showed that only a minority of MEPs 
incorporated medium and highly interactive features listed in Table 6.5.  In 2009,  46% MEPs 
were members  of  social  networking  sites  such  as Facebook where their number of ‘friends’ 
range anywhere from 38 to 4977, or 236 on average. Moreover, 84 per cent publicly listed 
their email despite the fact that email generates the most volume than any other contact 
medium. Only 37 per cent had comment or feedback forms, 24% had blogs, 7% e-polls but only 
10% of MEPs’ websites incorporated the highly interactive synchronous debate forums.   
At first glance this observation supports the early skeptics’ (Coleman & Gotze 2001; Bentivegna, 
2002; Margolis & Resnick’s 2001) views  of  Internet  failing  to  generate two-directional 
representative-citizen  interactivity  -  except  for  one  glitch.  While greater majority of  MEPs’ 
websites  do indeed score low on medium to highly interactive content, 84 per cent of  MEPs 
list their e-mails as a means  of  contact on their EP personal profiles while 46 per cent appear 
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on social networking sites (SNS) such as Facebook and Twitter40. Both of these features belong 
to the ‘medium’ and  ‘maximum interactive’  category. While e-mail fosters direct,  interactive  
and  asynchronous communication, SNS are known to be personalized networking and 
interactive spaces that include various synchronous or asynchronous feedback loops and two-
way dialogue sub-features.  The website content results are in line with previous research (Dai 
2006, 2007) and my survey data which confirm MEPs’ preference for using e-mail in  
maintaining  contact  with  constituents, closely followed by their websites. 
 
Three plausible factors explain why MEPs use interactive online features less.  The first puts to 
question MEPs’ intentions to  maintain  active  constituency  relations  versus being constrained  
by  their  busy workload.   While MEP’s personal interest to maintain active communication 
with constituents is often genuine, it is more difficult to execute in practice. MEPs engage in a 
range of daily   activities   such   as   party   group   meetings,  legislative   and   committee   
work,  press conferences and traveling as part of their delegation duties. Similar to casework, 
interactivity takes time and individual attention.   
 
MEPs claim that the expediency and increasing volume of communication enabled by new 
ICTs add to MEP’s workload. Citizens expect ‘instantaneous responses’ which are not always 
easy to provide. The large size of Euro-constituencies with high MEP-constituent ratios do not 
help. Even if a small margin of constituents contacts their MEP, replying to citizen queries is 
time consuming.  MEP receive hundreds of emails - “500 per day and never below 300” (UK 
MEP) from various groups and individuals daily. Moreover, not all incoming emails are 
constructively linked to MEPs’ work and priorities.   With limited staff resources and personal 
time at MEPs’ disposal, the expectation that MEP will personally respond to every citizen’s 
query is thus unrealistic. It is therefore understandable that MEPs are cautious about  how wide 
they open their gates of online interactivity.   As one Belgian MEP put it, ‘I cannot multiply 
myself and be everywhere, all the time’ while another explained  ‘because citizens expect 
immediate responses, I must be careful what response time I promise to them’.  Hence the low 
inclusion of interactive features maybe a matter of pragmatic choice to prevent solicitation of 
request but not due to disinterest to interact but rather not to make false promises that are 
outside of MEPs’ capacity to keep. 
 
 
Thus though  ‘increasing  direct  contact  with  citizens’  and  facilitation  of  accessibility  and 
accountability may ideally be a sound motive for establishing a website, it comes at a price.    
                                                          
40 At the time when this thesis was written SNS were still a novel phenomenon that has likely risen over time. 
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One coping mechanism is to engage in activities that give MEPs the greatest return on their 
time investment. Moreover, MEPs are conscious of the utility offered by different online tools. 
As a result, they tend to use those that facilitate rather than complicate their work and t h e y  
dismiss others that invite lower quality of interactive exchanges.  For example, several MEPs 
tried to launch online discussion forums but explained that they tended to attract  “non-serious”  
participants and low deliberative quality of interactions.  So they abandoned them.  Ploughing 
through daily spam messages, blanket email campaigns, citizens’ flaming or non- substantive 
whimsical messages are additional examples of ‘waste-of-my-time’ interactivity that MEP and 
their staff deal with daily. In response, MEPs staff develop hefty screening mechanisms and 
become very good at sorting out ‘unserious’ emails.  Still, to remain ‘in touch’ and ‘on top of 
things’, at the end of the day, MEPs often end up sifting through their own inboxes or “(I try) 
to have a policy of responding to them all” (UK, MEP). 
 
 
The  third  factor  influencing  MEP-constituent  interactivity  is  constituents’  communication 
preferences.   Given that constituents are MEP’s clients, it is conceivable that MEP adapt their 
own  communication style to  those of their clients. This aspect has not been researched in 
explaining representative-citizen interactivity. While political communication analysts focus on 
political elites or the mass media as the principal drivers of communication patterns, Section 6.3 
below demonstrates that MEP- constituent modes of online communication mirror each other. 
Given the limitations of my data41, though it is difficult to disentangle which causes which, the 
general picture points to a level of mutual interdependence in the use of online media as both 
sides prioritize the same media in contacting each other. 
 
 
MEPs’ dependence on their constituents’ communication preferences is further reinforced by 
the fact  that unlike citizens, who can contact MEPs through various channels - phone, letter, 
e-mail, website, blog etc.  – MEP’s means are more limited.   Because MEP serve large, 
country-wide constituencies, gaining access to their constituents’ phone numbers and 
addresses is difficult. Even if attempted their databases would be enormous requiring 
resources to manage them. Still, MEPs show to derive a sense of ‘satisfaction’ in constituent e-
mail and mailing lists that they accumulate during their term in office either from constituent 
initiated contact, groups coming to visit  them  in  Brussels,  or  subscribers  to   their  website  
newsletters.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 To gain a more accurate measure of the citizen-MEP communication vector, a constituent survey would fill in this gap. 
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  Table 6.6 Frequency of media used by citizens to contact MEP 
Media channels Scale 
 1-5*  N 
 
Email 
 
4.6 
 
133 
Brussels Office 4.0 131 
Telephone 3.6 132 
Public Meetings 3.6 118 
MEP website 3.4 130 
Letter 3.3 130 
Constituency Office 3.1 133 
National Party Office 2.6 126 
National party website 2.3 129 
MEP blog 2.1 125 
  N=118 -133, *Scale: (1) never, (2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) often, 
  (5) most often 
 
 
Table 6.6 above shows MEPs’ survey responses based on their own estimates of constituents’ 
preferences in media usage.  According to MEPs’ estimates of constituent MEP interactivity,  e-
mail  is  the  most  frequently  used  channel  for  contacting  them.  MEPs’ websites, however, are 
apparently accessed less, only ‘sometimes’ and show to be used as often as mail or letters – the 
more traditional (non-ICT mediated) channels. National party websites and MEPs’ blogs, 
compared to other online or offline media are used the least by citizens. Features attracting 
the most traffic on MEPs’ websites appear to be information pages and those linked to MEP’s 
legislative work while  ‘medium’ to ‘highly’ interactive features such as debate forums, 
comment/ feedback forms and e-polls, on the other hand, are ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ used. 
 
 
These findings are consistent with observations in Table 6.6 where websites are less preferred 
by  citizens  when  contacting  their  MEP.  For  the  latter,  citizens  seem  to  prefer  more  direct 
channels  such  as e-mail, face-to-face encounters during public meetings and group visits to 
Brussels or the telephone. This goes to show that  when contacting their MEP, citizens prefer 
direct individual attention – to be personally heard and seen – hence cultivating a more 
personalized relationship with their representatives. 
 
According to Chapter 5, the largest proportion of MEPs’ casework comes from interest groups 
and individual citizens. These results are difficult to corroborate online since it citizens or 
interest groups were not surveyed.  
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                      Table 6.7  Comparative MEP ↔ Citizen Online interactivity 
 
 
Response category 
MEP → Citizen 
 
Mean Frequency 
Citizen → MEP 
 
Mean Frequency 
E-mail 4.1 4.7 
MEP’s website 4.1 3.4 
National party website 3.1 2.3 
MEP’s blog 2.3 2.1 
*Scale: (1)never, (2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) often, (5) most often 
 
 
 
So, what do observations in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 tell us about MEP-constituent interactivity then?  
The first notable observation is that uses of online communication channels on both sides 
mirror each other.  Going down the columns, both MEPs and citizens use the same media with 
decreasing intensity.  However, when comparing them per ‘(single) media’ basis, some 
differences emerge. While MEPs tend to use both e-mail and websites with the same intensity 
(‘often’), citizens show to contact MEPs more often through email than via websites.   Citizens 
are also less likely to use national party websites than MEPs but blogs are ‘rarely’ used by 
both. 
 
 
On the one hand, this mirroring effect can be explained on the basis of a rationale that MEPs’ 
low provision of interactive web content negatively preconditions citizens’ use of interactive 
features.  In other words, due to a lack of top-down supply of interactive opportunities by MEPs, 
citizens by default do not use them. This reasoning supports the classic – politics as usual 
skepticism where the Internet is seen to  perpetuate   conventional  top-down  modes  of 
communication (Margolis and Resnick 2000;  Bentivegna 2002, 2006). 
 
On the other,  the  reverse  is   also  conceivable   where   MEPs  interpret   citizens’  disinterest  
– manifested in  low  traffic  (on  interactive  features)  and  poor  quality – ‘unserious’ or ‘non-
attitudes’ –online  interaction (Kinder 2006: 199) as low demand for, poor conducive-ness of 
their websites for their interactivity with constituents.  In response to citizens’ non-responsive 
cues MEPs consequently pragmatically reduce the relevant features to a minimum. 
 
 
MEPs taking cues from citizens through the communication channels they use is supported by 
their  high  use of email. On the one hand, MEPs find email management to be time-taxing as 
hundreds of e-mails pour into their inboxes on a daily basis. However, given that responding to 
constituents forms part of their ‘job’ and given that citizens contact them the most via email, 
MEPs  end  up  responding  by  default  via  the  same  medium.  In  doing  so,  they  adapt  to  
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the communication preferences of their  clients.  
 
The  third  explanation  points  to  the  selective  rationality  and  utility  maximization  of  online 
features;  both MEPs and citizens use different features for self-serving purposes. Judging from 
citizens’ communication patterns and website traffic, email fares better in facilitating direct 
interaction while websites are used for information seeking.   Conceivably, email offers and 
satisfies a sense  of  direct  contact42 whereby  individual  constituents  are  listened  and 
responded to on a personal basis.   MEPs, on the other hand, prefer to use email and websites 
equally often when reaching out to their constituencies.  This makes sense as MEPs have much 
more to gain from using their websites in ‘presenting themselves to a wider audience’, 
‘providing information materials and projecting transparency over their work for credibility 
gains. The level of outreach offered by a website would be more difficult and costly to attain 
otherwise. 
 
 
At the same time, there are several caveats that circumscribe these explanations. The first two 
relate to the limited survey data or website analytics from the citizens’ side.  The survey was 
only limited to MEPs’ personal estimates which raises the question of estimation accuracy and  
response  bias  skewing  answers  in  favor  of  pro-citizen  and  pro-technology orientations. 
The potential measurement error in MEPs’ answers is reinforced by 23 per cent respondents 
admitting that they were  ‘not sure’ about which features attracted the most traffic. The third 
caveat, as already mentioned, it is difficult to clearly decipher the arrows of causality as to 
whose   communication   preferences   and   patterns   affect   whom   –  do   MEP   precondition 
constituents communication preferences or vice versa? 
 
 
On the same token, answers to most of the survey questions corresponded with results in 
our website  content analysis which was conducted separately from the survey. Since MEPs 
were unable to influence outcomes in the latter, and given that results were similar – suggests a 
level of consistency and frankness in MEPs’ survey responses thus offsetting the concern about 
MEP inflating their answers.  MEP’s ability to specify the number of hits their websites 
generate or the number of ‘friends’ they have on Facebook during interviews also suggests that 
many MEP are interested and well  aware about their online activities (unlike the 23% who 
were unsure about their website traffic).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 This is also supported in the way constituents use offline media – showing strong preference for phone and letters. 
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6.3      Determinants of MEPs’ ONLINE Constituency Orientations   
 
 
 
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, few established theories exist on the determinants 
of political actors’ online behavior.  In earlier theories, when the use of Internet was beginning 
to be mainstreamed, demographic factors - age, education and gender were considered as 
important determinants for Internet usage.  Higher educated, younger, males showed to be 
the most prototypical Internet users. Though with the narrowing of the digital divide and 
widespread Internet penetration, the validity of determining factors needs to be validated.  
Another classic hypothesis positively linked Internet penetration with internet usage - higher 
internet penetration and online literacy in a given population was expected to yield higher 
Internet usage43. Under the assumption that the way MEPs think determines the way they act, 
an exploratory hypothesis linked to MEPs’ positive attitudes or motives for ICT usage was 
introduced. 
 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the logit and OLS regression analyses included dependent 
(dummy) variables based on three online proxies (derived from website analytics) for the three 
constituency outreach dimensions – explaining work, casework and interactivity.    Based on 
classic theories on political representation and similarly as in Chapter 5, the four sets of 
independent variables linked to electoral systems, institutional/ political, role orientations and 
constituency characteristics - were then used as four models to be tested.  For example, the PR 
system was hypothesized to be similarly inimical to MEPs’ online constituency outreach while 
the greater number of responsibilities in Brussels and incumbency were also.   
 
More significant to online constituency outreach was the role of geographic remoteness or 
distance to constituency and Internet penetration. Though working remotely is a reality that all 
MEPs have to deal with, MEPs from far Eastern European and Southern member states (e.g. 
Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Cyprus, Bulgaria) are more disadvantaged, hence were hypothesized to 
be more proactive users of online platforms in order to offset the distance constraints when 
cultivating relations with their constituencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43  While by now (2012) variation in the Internet penetration has been significantly reduced (due to lower costs of PCs) in 
2006-2009, MEPs from countries with lower income per capita (from Central and Eastern European and some Southern 
countries – e.g. Portugal, Cyprus, Greece etc.) were expected to have lower Internet penetration than their Western and 
North European counterparts. 
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Determinants for Explaining work ONLINE  
 
 
With respect to the three constituency outreach dimensions, as established earlier ‘explaining 
work’ is the most common o n l i n e  feature used in 64 per cent of MEPs’ websites (N=143, 
Std. Deviation .483) which suggests a relatively low variation for the explaining work dimension.  
 
 
Logit regression outputs (refer to Table 6.1 in the Appendix) to a great extent confirmed 
this where Models 2-4 - role orientations, political responsibility variables and constituency 
factors failed to be significant.  Moreover, MEPs’ motives for creating a website also proved 
insignificant.  More interestingly, however, electoral systems did prove to be significant where 
being from an electoral system with open (Coeff. .851, Std. Err .450 P>z 0.06, N= 139) or ordered 
(Coeff. 1.58, Std. Err .623 P>z   0.01, N= 139) ballot structure was positively correlated with this 
dimension. 
  
These findings thus confirm that with respect to explaining work online whether an MEP is 
pro-constituency oriented or not, partisan or a delegate, from an open or closed electoral system, 
prone to be representing the EU or his/her country, being from a distant constituency with high 
or low Internet penetration does not really matter.  Hence pointing to the fact that the online 
explaining work feature is a standard or minimum feature incorporated by majority MEPs on 
their websites irrespective of their specific personal background.  This observation further 
coincides with findings in Chapter 5 which observed that a great majority of MEPs consider 
‘explaining their work’ as an important aspect of their jobs. 
 
 
This being said, however, the analysis did show that demographic factors, namely age and 
education in Model 1 did matter where higher educated (Coeff. 0.140, Std. Err .078, P>z   0.07, 
N= 139), younger MEPs (Coeff. -.039, Std. Err .020 P>z   0.05, N= 139) showed to be more pro-
active in incorporating the explaining work feature on their websites than older and those with 
lower educational attainment.  While gender proved to be insignificant, these findings coincide 
with the early Internet usage theories where demographic factors – indeed education and age 
were observed to be positively correlated with Internet usage.  
 
 
 
Determinants for ONLINE Casework  
 
Results in Chapter 5 established that there is a fair bit of variation with respect to how much 
time MEPs’ spend on casework – over a quarter of MEPs reported that casework consumes 
over 30% of their time, while 10% say it takes more than half of their time. However, less than 
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one-third of MEP survey respondents (21 per cent) had an online casework feature. Though as 
already noted in earlier sections, it is rather difficult to conduct casework online. Most of the 
casework features found on MEPs’ websites therefore included advertisements of the  types  of 
services that MEPs can provide or past successful projects or services rendered.  ‘Nonetheless, 
what sets the 21 per cent of MEPs apart who did go the extra mile from others that did not have 
an online casework feature? 
 
One observation derived from website content analytics is that the online ‘caseworkers’ 
though small in number, were more likely to incorporate other interactive online features. 
They were more likely to explain their work online, to have an online ‘petition’,  ‘feedback’ and 
‘e-poll’ - in other words, the more interactive online features.   Moreover, they were also more 
likely to have positive attitudes toward Internet usage and interactivity-prone motives for 
creating their websites such as  ‘receiving feedback’, ‘promoting ‘casework’ and ‘personalizing 
their message’.   
As illustrated in Table  6.2 in the Appendix,  however,  the  four  sets  of  independent  variables  
provided  weak  directional  value  for determining MEPs’ online casework orientations.  Among 
the few variables that did prove to be significant included the positively but weakly 
correlated role of education (Coeff. .137, Std. Err .087, P>z 0.10, N=136) which parallels 
findings from the previous section on the online explaining work dimension, but age has 
proven to be insignificant.  Political responsibility in Brussels such as membership in 
numerous parliamentary committees (Coeff. -1.99, Std. Err 1.05, P>z 0.06, N=132) were less 
likely to include a casework feature on their websites while. 
 
Incumbency, electoral systems, role orientations and constituency characteristics proved to be 
insignificant. In other words the offline theories from which most of the variables were derived 
were  weakly  relevant  for  explaining  the  variation  for  this  online dimension.   
 
Interestingly, however, bivariate OLS regression analysis showed that there was positive 
correlation yet no difference between MEPs from old (Coeff. 1.77, Std. Err. .785, P>z 0.02, 
N=140), or new member states (Coeff. 2.12, Std. Err. .800, P>z 0.01, N=140), when it came to 
incorporating the casework feature on their websites. At first glance, this somewhat counters 
the observations made with respect to the offline casework where MEPs from the new member 
states were shown to be more pro-active offline caseworkers than MEPs from older member 
states.   
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On second glance, it makes sense since the coding of the online casework feature did not 
distinguish between ‘lighter’ versus ‘harder’ types of casework.  And it is along this distinction  
that the two groups tend to differ where MEPs from new member states solicited ‘harder’ 
cases such as promoting their assistance o n -  a n d  o f f l i n e  to ‘small and medium size 
entrepreneurs or smaller towns’, regional administrations, and civic organizations with access 
to various structural funds and EU grants though the provision of targeted guidelines, useful 
tips, on-line application forms, and offline information workshops in MEPs’ constituency offices. 
MEPs from older member states, on the other hand, promoted more lighter forms of 
casework such as the provision of links to various EU institutions, information about EU 
internships, upcoming seminars or EU-related constituency activities offered by the MEP or 
application forms for office visits to Brussels.  
 
 
Determinants for Interactivity ONLINE 
 
 
As mentioned earlier in this section, up to 88 per cent of MEP websites incorporate at least one 
features in the medium-high interactive category while over 49 per cent of them have at least 
four of such features (Table 6.5). The dependent variable and proxy for online interactivity – 
was derived from content analysis of survey respondents’ websites that coded for the ‘presence 
=1’ (‘non-presence =0’) of select interactive features on MEPs’ personal web sites  or  blogs  (as  
indicated  in  Interactivity  Index  -  Table  6.5).  A composite,  cumulative  score  for  each  MEP  
on  the  total  number  of  features  their  websites contained was then awarded. Each feature 
was ascribed a value between 1-3 based on its minimum or maximum interactive potential 
(e.g. in the ‘high’ category, e-forums and SNS sites =3 points while uni-directional listing of 
speeches, in the ‘low’ category were ascribed the value of 1). The maximum possible score was 
21. 
Though this constituency dimension is quite novel with few established and tested theories, 
based on extant literature, the general hypotheses with respect to online interactivity expected 
demographic variables – age, gender and education to play a role where younger, well educated 
males were expected to be the prototypical users of interactive online applications that tend to 
be more sophisticated, requiring a certain level of IT skills and savvy than the simple one-
directional communication features such as webpages with MEPs’ speeches or the uploading of 
information about the EU.  MEPs with larger staff size would also be more likely candidates for 
this type of features. 
 
As to the results, with the exception of gender and education results for which were insignificant, 
the demographic background hypothesis – of being younger (Coeff - .013, Std. Err. .008, P>z 0.1, 
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N=138) was confirmed with respect to online interactivity (Table 6.3 in the Appendix).  Older 
MEPs being less willing to use  interactive  online  features was well summarized by an 
Estonian MEP who explained: 
 
“… No I do not have a website. Look, I am 66 years old and am not into those things. My 
assistant was very eager to do it but I decided against it. I believe in tangible things, 
paper in front of you to read and face to face contact.” 
 
 
Electoral systems – Model 1 also showed to be significant but with a rather surprising finding 
where ordered ballot structure was positively correlated with online interactivity.   Though 
without robust theoretical grounding, it was rather expected that MEPs from electoral systems 
with open ballot structure would be more prone to be interactive online as open ballot 
structures are known to prompt delegate-like or more pro-citizen orientation.  An explanation 
for this finding is thus inconclusive. 
 
Going down the list, while role orientations – Model 2 and constituency characteristics – Model 4 
showed to be inconclusively linked, among the political variables – Model 3 and contrary to 
expectations, incumbency showed to be positively correlated with online interactivity (Coeff 
.334, Std. Err .169, P>z 0.05, N=137) as were previous public office holders (Coeff  .121,  Std.  Err  
.064,  P>z  0.06,  N=137)  show  to  be  positively  correlated  with  online interactivity. 
 
 
With respect to incumbency, the finding was somewhat surprising.  Political wisdom holds 
that incumbents, seasoned politicians who are more electorally established tend to focus more 
on   legislative   and   parliamentary   activities   than   on   chasing personal votes and   
interacting   with   their constituents.  Hence it is puzzling why they would be more prone to 
incorporate interactive features on their websites.  The positive correlation with previous public 
office holders, on the other hand, was less surprising.   In an effort to maintain their popularity 
and linkages and not to loose touch with their established constituencies, it was expected that 
they would be inclined to pursue interactive behavior online. The online platform perfectly 
enables and facilitates such possibilities over distance. 
 
 
Providing these findings, it can be concluded that with respect to online interactivity more 
research needs to be conducted as more dynamics are at play and where other variables may be 
more suitable in determining MEPs’ propensities for online interactive behavior than the usual 
suspects identified here. 
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Chapter  Summary  
 
So how do MEPs use the Internet in the context of constituency outreach?  Most notably, findings 
in this chapter support that MEPs do indeed use the online platform for constituency purposes. 
Though email showed to be the most common channel of communication for both MEPs and 
constituents, 72 per cent MEP have an active website or a blog.  Out of those that are online 
64 per cent use their websites for explaining their work, 22 per cent for casework related 
functions, while over 49 per cent MEP websites incorporated up to three of the ‘medium to 
highly’ interactive features (Table 6.5). 
 
 
With respect to their allocation of resources, MEPs on average spend approximately 10 per cent 
of their time on website management while their top motives for creating a website are to 
increase direct contact with citizens, to educate citizens about the EU, to personalize their 
message as well as to increase their accountability by providing transparency over their work 
(Table 6.1).   Reduction of office costs and promoting party activities were interestingly the 
least likely motives for creating a website. From the side of the constituents, MEPs are most 
contacted by individual citizens and lobby groups. 
 
 
While their websites may not be fully replacing offline, conventional constituency offices, they 
fulfill several functions and complement the latter.  During their face-to-face or e-mail 
encounters MEPs frequently divert citizens’ queries to their websites.  MEPs’ websites are 
thus places ‘to go to’ serving as clearing houses and virtual resource platforms - to which 
MEP commonly delegate a share of citizens’ requests.  They act as a reference point for 
information which offloads some of the lighter casework related to information seeking or 
interest in MEP’s work.  Their virtual constituency office, in this sense, is open and accessible 
24/7 to their constituents. 
 
 
In terms of their interactive usage, on average, MEPs’ website contain four out of the seven 
features in the medium to high interactive category thus showing that MEPs invite online 
interactivity. According to MEPs’ estimates, constituents, however, prefer to use email to 
websites when communicating with their MEP.  This finding dispels the common criticism that 
elites use website as a continuum for top-down communication.  Instead, the observation 
indicates that while MEPs may offer interactive features, constituents do not necessarily 
reciprocate by using them but rather prefer to use M E P s ’  websites for information seeking; 
this is consistent with previous research (Tolbert & Mossberg 2006). At the same time, 
constituents do enjoy and seek out MEPs’ personal attention when they need it, particularly with 
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respect to casework, however, this preference manifests more in interactivity via email. 
 
The reciprocal  utility maximization and interdependence in MEP-constituent communication 
has been less depicted in previous research. In other words, while constituents depend on 
the types of channels through which MEPs reach out and/ or provide, MEPs t o o  reciprocally 
depend on how citizens communicate with them.  For example, though MEPs may want to 
pragmatically devolve more interactivity to their websites to offset the volume of emails 
coming into their office, constituents may not necessarily use them for the same  purpose.  
They may prefer email instead, thus subjecting MEPs to respond via the same medium.  This 
utility maximization has implications for how we evaluate online interactivity and dynamics of 
political communication where the latter has presumed Internet usage by elites to be a uniform 
top-down with constituents passively consuming the latter. But as demonstrated, this is not 
necessarily the case. 
 
 
It was also established that MEPs use their websites more for presenting themselves than for 
promoting their parties. Only 6 per cent MEPs listed party links in their EU official profile, 
among which majority were Spanish and German MEPs. On MEPs’ own websites, this number 
was slightly higher (47 per cent) but represented merely symbolically in the form of a party 
logo or a link to their national party’s website. Interestingly, 53 per cent websites also featured 
European party group’s link, a percentage which is slightly higher than for those featuring their 
national parties’ logos.  In terms of  European party group affiliation, ALDE MEPs were most 
likely to have a website, to explain their work and to use interactive online features. This may 
have to do something with the fact that ALDE has declared a party policy of being the  ‘first 
paperless party in the EP’ (interview with MEP Graham Watson, ALDE Party group leader in 
2008-2009).  With respect to EP Social Democrats, though the party had an IT savvy and 
highly interactive website, this did not translate into its MEPs’ online behavior44.  
 
 Another sign for the highly personalized use of websites was the fairly common use of podcasts, 
SNS and You Tube broadcasts which seem to fulfill the role of quasi self-directed mini TV 
channels where MEP is the lead actor - ‘seen and heard’ in a personal rather than party capacity. 
In this sense, the online platform provides MEPs’ a carte blanche for self-presentation which 
would be difficult to obtain via other media. 
 
                                                          
44 It is to be noted, however, that though the overall survey is statistically significant, when survey responses were 
broken up by EP party groupings, the individual sub-samples became very small, likely non-representative hence 
affecting the  rather  inconclusive  OLS  and  logit  analytic  results.  By increasing the survey sample or targeting 
certain EP Groups over others may correct for this shortcoming in future research. 
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With regards t o  the determinants of MEP online behavior, demographic factors - age and 
education -  still showed to be strong predictors while gender showed to play a lesser role.   In 
other words, younger and higher educated MEPs were more likely to be online and have more 
interactive features on their websites. The significance of  the  demographic  factors  for  the  
different  online  constituency  outreach dimensions  is noteworthy  in   that   they  failed  to  
play  a  comparatively important role  in  the  c a s e  o f  offline constituency outreach. 
 
Electoral system variables also showed to be pertinent for most of the online dimensions.  MEPs 
from systems with open and ordered party lists were most likely to reach out to their 
constituents online than those from systems with closed party lists. This in line with the 
electoral systems theory for offline constituency orientations.    
 
In the group of political and institutional determinants – the effects were mixed. Both party 
affiliation and political responsibility showed to be a  relatively  weak  predictor  of different 
aspects on online constituency activities. MEPs having more political activities appeared to have 
no effect on their online constituency outreach. Previous public office and incumbency, however, 
showed to be stronger predictors for two out of the three online dimensions.   Constituency 
characteristics on the other hand indicated to be less salient. In other words,  MEP-Constituent 
ratio, distance to constituency and in the case of online constituency outreach internet penetration 
did not show to matter. Focus of representation and MEPs’ role orientations in the 
comparative table also showed to be insignificant apart from the explaining work dimension. 
 
In summary, results in Chapter 6 demonstrated that MEPs use their websites quite actively for 
various purposes.  With respect to the three dimensions, MEPs’ websites tend to be used for the 
explaining work dimension and interactivity the most while for casework the least. Evidence 
shows that MEPs are also being contacted by individual citizens, interest groups and civic 
organizations on a daily basis.  This reality dispels the misnomer that MEPs are insular and 
disconnected from the public. 
 
Overall, observations made in this chapter have shown that MEPs deliberately think about and 
are quite conscious  about the value added of online platform but also about the detriments of 
what it takes to be online’. And even though at the end of the day MEPs may delegate the 
technical and administrative website management tasks to their assistants, they do care about 
what goes on their websites content-wise.  Hence having a website is very much an MEP’s 
personalized affair. 
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From a research perspective, the chapter also showed that it is possible to use concepts derived 
from  offline  theories  and  adapt  them  to  measure  online  phenomena.  Interestingly,  it  also 
demonstrated  that  MEPs’  survey  responses  and  website  analytics  which  were  conducted 
independently and  without MEPs’ knowledge coincided.   In other words, MEPs were truthful 
hence strengthening the credibility and validity of the survey  as such. 
 
 
On a methodological note, it was further encouraging to see that the survey results obtained 
from the author’s original survey tended to consistently coincide with the results found in the 
website content analysis. This evidence hence provides the MEP survey conducted by the author 
more credibility.
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7.   Toward a Virtual Constituency Office?:  Comparing MEPs’ Constituency Outreach 
OFFLINE and ONLINE  
 
 
While Chapters 5 and 6 outlined the way MEPs’ constituency orientations play out both offline 
and online, this chapter compares the two levels and thereby traces the extent to which the 
Internet prompts MEPs to adopt more pro-active or simply different forms of constituency outreach 
online than they would conventionally – offline.  Or pushing the envelope even further, the central 
question of this chapter asks – is it conceivable that MEPs are shifting all (or predominant amount) 
of their constituency outreach online hence using the online platform as a quasi virtual constituency 
office? 
 
 
Using a comparative online-offline approach and under the assumption that ICTs may have an 
enhancing effect on MEPs’ constituency outreach, three plausible hypotheses were proposed. The 
null or politics as usual hypothesis (H4) with the expectation that there is no difference or no effect 
observed when comparing MEPs’ constituency outreach off- or online.  In other words, the null 
hypothesis posits that MEPs will emulate similar types of behavior online as they already pursue 
offline - where the latter determines the former - in terms of the three constituency outreach 
dimensions: explaining work, casework and interactivity.  
 
To the contrary, the two alternative hypotheses propose that ICTs could either affect all three 
constituency dimensions - the virtual office hypothesis (H4a) or only partially where differences 
are observed in some rather than across all three dimensions (casework, explaining work, 
interactivity).   
 
 
In the analysis, online proxies for the constituency outreach dimensions served as the dependent 
variable(s) while offline casework proxies served as independent variable(s).  Using logistic 
regression analysis and a covariance matrix, the strength of the correlation between the four 
dimensions MEPs’ was tested. Strong correlation between the online-offline comparisons along 
the three constituency dimensions was considered as evidence for accepting the null hypothesis.  
MEPs’ own assessment of Internet’s impact on their constituency outreach was also used as a 
qualitative measure. 
 
 
Chapter 7 is structured  in  two parts.  The first part introduces qualitative results from MEPs’ 
own estimates of Internet’s impact on their constituency outreach while the second outlines the 
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key findings and puts the comparative online-offline approach into perspective. 
 
 
 
7.1 MEPs’ (own) Assessment of Internet’s Impact on Their Work 
 
 
A stand-alone question in the survey requested MEPs to assess Internet’s impact on different 
aspects of their work (Table 7.1). 
 
 
 
Table 7.1 Perceived impact of websites on MEP ‘s work 
 
How has your MEP website affected the following aspects of your work? 
 
 
 
Response Category 
 
Decreased 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
Same 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
Increased 
(5) 
 
Unsure 
 
Mean* 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
N 
Contact with citizens 1 2 26 32 52 11 4.3 1.0 124 
Contact with interest groups 1 3 55 31 23 11 3.9 1.1 123 
Office efficiency 1 1 36 33 41 11 4.2 1.0 123 
Policy feedback 1 1 25 40 47 8 4.3 0.9 122 
Chances of being re-elected 3 1 42 23 23 28 4.2 1.3 121 
Requests for assistance 1 2 31 44 34 10 4.1 1.0 122 
Contact with young people 1 1 21 37 51 13 4.4 0.9 124 
* (2) Slightly decrease, (4) Slightly increase. The mean has been calculated on the basis of responses per 1-5 scale. 
 
 
 
 
Based on Table 7.1 several observations can be made.  Firstly, the standard deviation for all seven 
response categories is low with the mean for most categories being very close to the ‘4’ value 
which corresponds   to  Internet  usage  (use  of  websites)  causing  a  “slight  increase”  in  the 
corresponding  activity.  When taking MEPs’ own  estimates  for  their  face  value,  the  existing 
general  trend  suggests  that  the  Internet  has  a  slight  rather  than  significant  impact  on  the 
mentioned aspects of an MEP’s work. 
 
 
However, percentage-wise the most positive impact was felt in the area of ‘policy feedback’ and  
‘contact with youth’ and confirmed by 71 per cent of MEP respondents. 68 percent of MEPs also 
felt that their  ‘contact with citizens’ has increased, while casework and office efficiency were next 
in line.  Interestingly,  ‘chances of being re-elected’ was an area least prone to impact and judging by 
the number of ‘unsure’ answers, it was also a response segment most difficult to estimate for 
respondents.  This is interesting given that pro-active constituency outreach is normally seen as 
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strongly motivated by electoral incentives to build credits of ‘good will’ among constituents that 
are to be remembered at the next election.  Two plausible explanations for this include: i) t h a t  
MEPs a r e  not being driven by electoral incentives when reaching out to their constituencies 
online, and (ii) a likely corollary of the former MEPs have not associated nor extensively  use the 
Internet in the election context, unlike their national counterparts tend to do.  
 
While another commonly assumed added value of the Internet is expediency and cost efficiency 
through which MEPs could cut back on long-distance communication costs, only 2 per cent MEPs 
estimated that the Internet has significantly reduced their costs while 61 per cent suggested that it 
had ‘slightly increased’ or ‘increased’ their office efficiency while 29 percent stated it remained the 
same and 9 per cent admitted that they were not sure. 
 
 
 
 
7.2  Comparing MEPs’ Constituency Outreach OFFLINE and ONLINE  
 
 
 
7.2.1  The Virtual Office – Full impact Hypothesis 
 
The virtual office hypothesis (H4a) postulates that MEPs are shifting their offline constituency 
outreach entirely or fully – in all three constituency outreach dimensions - online.  To the 
contrary, the no impact or the politics as usual hypothesis expected that MEPs’ constituency 
outreach online would emulate their conventional constituency outreach offline – hence the use of 
the Internet platform bringing nothing new to the way MEPs conduct constituency outreach. In 
regression analysis, this would manifest as a positive correlation between ‘not having a 
constituency office’ and ‘ not having a website’ but also between ‘having a constituency office’ and 
‘having a website/ blog’. 
 
 
In the results, the virtual constituency office hypothesis was not confirmed. Descriptive statistics 
show that 72 per cent MEPs had either a website or a blog, while 28 per cent did not. Offline, 94 
per cent MEPs had a physical office in their constituencies and only 6 per cent reported not having 
one at all.   In a 2x2 cross-tabulation matrix (see Table 6.2 below), the comparison is more visible.   
For the virtual constituency office hypothesis to hold true, it was expected that the proportion of 
MEPs  appearing  in  the   upper  right  quadrant,  representing  those  without  a constituency 
office but also those with a website/blog instead would be the largest in proportion to others. This 
is not the case. Instead, greatest proportion of respondents (69%) clusters in the lower right 
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quadrant that corresponds to MEPs having both constituency office as well as a website while 
only 3 MEPs (2%) appear in the expected quadrant – those with a website but no constituency 
office. 
 
   Table 7.2  Constituency Office v. Website/ blog status 
 
Website/ Blog 
     Staff Home       No    Yes    Total 
 
No constituency office 5 (4%) 3 (2%)              8 
 
                                                        Yes constituency office     35 (25%)     97 (69%)         132 
 _ _ 
 Total   40 100                   140     
 
 
 
In other words, the results suggest a fairly high correlation (Coeff.  1.33, Std. Err.788 P > |z |= 
0.04, Pseudo r2 = .017, N=145) between being online and having a conventional constituency 
office offline which also holds true for MEPs without a constituency office to be less likely online.  
Hence results for this first comparative dimension support the acceptance of the null rather than 
the virtual office hypothesis where MEPs who are pro-constituency oriented offline tend to be also 
pro-constituency oriented online by having a website.  In other words, with respect to this first 
dimension, MEPs are seen to emulate similar behavior patterns online as they already have 
offline. 
 
 
 
 
7.2.2  OFFLINE-ONLINE Explaining Work (feature) Comparison 
 
 
“We have incomparable public and media visibility to national MPs (much lower) 
– whatever they do, how they legislate appears next day in the news since their 
work immediately affects peoples’ lives. Though we in principle do similar work… 
we legislate, we work on much more macro issues at the European level which 
take a long time before they touch peoples’ lives.” (Spanish MEP) 
 
 
As established for both the offline and online dimensions, MEPs feel quite strongly about their role 
and duty to bridge the information divide or disconnect between citizens and EU institutions.  They 
feel that the mass media does not provide adequate or objective information about the work of the 
EP and other EU institutions.  As a result, MEPs fill this informational gap by investing a sizeable 
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amount of their energy into various communicative acts to educate their constituencies and the 
public at large about their own work, and the work of the EU.   
 
 
Table 7.3 below provides a comparison of typical offline and online media channels via which 
MEPs reach out to their constituencies.  The table provides both one-directional forms of 
communication features indicative of the ‘explaining work dimension (shaded areas) as well as 
two-directional modes that enable feedback and dialogue.  It also provides constituents’ preferences 
on the same channels of communication (based on MEPs’ preferences). 
 
 
Table 7.3: Channels and frequency of MEP ↔ citizen communication 
 
MEP’s 
OFFLINE Preference 
Citizens 
Preference 
 
ONLINE 
MEP’s 
Preference 
Citizen 
Preference 
 
Response category Mean Mean Response category Mean Mean 
Newspapers 3.7 - E-mail 4.1 4.7 
Public meetings 3.6 3.5 Website 4.1 3.4 
Radio 3.2 - E-newsletters 3.2 - 
TV 3.2 - Your party website 3.1 2.3 
Mailed newsletters/ mail 3.2 3.3 Your blog 2.3 2.1 
  Telephone 3.1 3.6 
Party bulletins/party 
office 3.0 2.6 
 Office visits (Brussels ) 4.0 
Office visits (Home) 2.0     3.1 
1-5 scale range: (1) never, (2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) often, (5) most often; N = 129-136 
 
 
 
From the table, couple of comparative trends can be observed.  The first observation is that MEPs, 
be it offline or online prefer to use communication channels that optimize wide audience capture 
and predominantly those that cater to one-directional information provision.  Offline, it is 
newspapers and public events, even though the latter have some level of interactivity, the while 
online it is multi-purpose websites with 24/7 accessibility.  Even when looking at website’s sub-
features – explaining work, press releases are the most common features appearing on MEPs’ 
websites.    
 
The second trend when comparing the frequency of usage between the two levels of 
communication suggests that MEPs and constituents use online channels –  email and websites  –  
more frequently than their offline homologues – newspapers and public meetings. MEPs explain 
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that the utility value of websites is its multi-purpose functionality where MEPs can upload diverse 
information and explain their work to their constituents and public at large in ways that they could 
not do otherwise. Serving as a non-stop, 24/7 point of reference symbolic of MEP’s accessibility to 
constituents is another appeal of the website.  Interestingly, however, no difference is apparent 
between online or offline communication via party channels.   
 
At the same time, it is important not to overstate the importance of the MEPs use of their websites 
and email for constituency outreach.  The fact that MEPs spend an estimated 20 per cent on media 
relations versus 10 per cent on website management accounts for this reality.  60 per cent of 
MEPs’ websites also dedicate specific sections to ‘press releases’ for ‘media uses’ that include 
their latest press releases, personal logos, bio sketches and photos for media to download.  At 
the same time, when it comes to scheduled appointments in their constituencies, attendance of 
public events seems to outnumber those of meetings with the media.  
 
Hence, in summary, MEPs indicate to be using the online and offline communication channels in a 
complementary way.  While the online platform is conducive to providing didactic and personalized 
information that MEPs may want to share with the public domain (e.g. explaining their policy 
stances without the filter and spin of the mass media), they still need the mass media such as 
newspapers, TV and radio to further widen their audience and constituency capture.  Competing for 
public attention is particularly important due to MEPs and EP’s rather low institutional visibility as 
national MP and other EU institutional heavyweights such as the Council or the Commission tend 
to steal the frontline spotlight in the media.  A British MEP’s explanation well depicts the 
precarious relationship b e t w e e n  MEPs and mainstream media: “while many of my colleagues do, 
I personally do not invest lot of time into press releases. There is not much return on them. I mean, 
when did you hear that the press release launched by MEPs, has become a big new story?” On a 
similar note, a Belgian MEP explained: 
 
“T]here is  not much demand for MEP’s views or general visibility  in the public domain. For 
the most part they, as well as the (European) issues they represent remain in the shadows of 
national politics.  Their presence in national media such as radio, television is minor. And 
even when they do appear, the debates  on Europe are most likely to be about the Council, 
national ministers and European commissioners etc. Therefore, in order for MEPs to become 
protagonists in debates at the European level, they need to strategically create very targeted 
– tres, tres pointu - dossiers on current events and issues where the Parliament has a co-
decision competences and power.“ www.pierrejonckheer.be) 
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Being conscious of these realities, it is no surprise that MEPs diversify and resort to alternative 
means   of   public   outreach.   In   this   sense,  ICTs   and   the   Internet   platform   offer   them   a 
disintermediating utility whereby MEP can bypass mainstream media to create and control their 
own stories (Bentivegna 2002, 2006) or in the words of a Spanish MEP, “through my website I 
create my own media”. 
 
This all being said, however, is it possible to disentangle the Internet’s effect on the ‘explaining 
work’ dimension? With respect to the explaining work dimension, the null hypothesis conjectured 
that MEPs emulate similar types of  ‘explaining work’ activities online as they already 
conventionally pursue offline while the virtual office hypothesis posited that MEPs who did not 
invest as much time into explaining their work offline would do so more online.  
 
For determining the online-offline correlation, the presence of the online ‘explaining work feature’ 
served as the dependent variable while the offline indicators for the ‘explaining of work’ dimension 
included MEPs’ propensity to use uni-directional communication channels including holding press 
conferences with TV media, newspapers, public events and party bulletins. These channels of 
communication are uni-directional (MEP initiating to speak to an audience) in character and act as 
proxies for modes of constituency outreach that enable MEP to explain what he/she does in Brussels 
and the types of policy issues he stands for as MEP. However, they are not necessarily interactive 
(e.g. TV or newspaper print).  A covariance matrix below (Table 7.4) and logistic regression 
analysis were used to determine the direction and strength of the bi-variate relationship.  
 
                              Table 7.4 Covariance Matrix: Online-Offline Explaining work  
N=106 Explaining 
work 
Use of TV Use of 
newspapers 
Party 
Bulletin 
Explaining work .250135 x x x 
Use of TV -.028212 .666038 x x 
Use of 
newspapers 
-.007367 .40575 .720216 x 
Party Bulletin .030189 .132884 .244924 1.09084 
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Table 7.5 Explaining work ONLINE                               
 
 
Using TV for constituency outreach  .030(.313) 
Using newspaper for constituency outreach -.318 (.346) 
Using party bulletin for constituency outreach .070(.208) 
Public evens as channels of constituency outreach .517*(.290) 
Pseudo R-squared   .26 
N=106, ***≤0.01 **≤0.05 *≤0.1 
 
  
Results from the covariance matrix show that apart from the use of TV and mailed party 
bulletins, the relationship between offline-online ‘explaining work’ (dependent) variable is 
positive. Though the covariate logistic regression results confirm and mimic the direction of the 
online-offline relationships, apart from appearance at public events being positively correlated with 
the online explaining work dimension (Coeff .517, Std. Err .290 P > |z |= 0.075, Pseudo r2 = .03, 
N=106) majority of the results proved to be insignificant.   Though the positive correlation between 
MEPs’ propensity to use public events as a means of reaching out to their constituencies and their 
proclivity to also explain their work online steers in the direction of accepting the null hypothesis, it 
also needs to be noted that the sample size for both analyses was not statistically relevant (N = 106) 
at 13.5 per cent.  Providing this caveat, it is thus not possible to accept or reject the null hypothesis 
with great degree of confidence. 
 
 
 
7.2.3  OFFLINE-ONLINE Casework Comparison 
 
 
The key question posed for the offline-online comparison related to casework, is whether Internet 
enhances or in any way changes how MEPs conduct casework?  In other words, do MEPs pursue 
more, or different types of casework online than they to conventionally offline?  
 
To determine the extent to which there is indeed a difference between MEPs offline and online 
way of conducting casework, an online ‘case work’ proxy (presence of a casework feature or 
not) was selected as the dependent variable while several characteristic indicators for offline 
caseworker acted as the independent variables (see Table 7.6).  The null hypothesis argued that 
MEPs who were pro-casework oriented offline would also be so online thus Internet not 
contributing to changes in MEPs conduct of casework while the virtual hypothesis expected that 
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MEPs who are not necessarily caseworkers offline would be more so online due to the online 
platform’s assumed convenience.   
 
When looking at descriptive statistics, in Chapter 4,  we learned that in general MEPs receive 
sizeable amount of casework.  On average, casework takes up 20 per cent of MEPs’ time but 
nearly a quarter of MEPs report that casework consumes over 30 per cent of their time, while 10 
per cent say it takes more than half of their time. A great majority of MEPs, 60 per cent, reported 
that on average they try to respond to 80-100% of  the  requests  for  assistance. These genera 
figures on casework, however, do not disaggregate through what channels MEPs receive and 
respond to casework. 
 
When it comes to online casework, as noted in Chapter 5, MEPs’ use of their websites or blogs for 
casework purposes shows to be f a i r l y  low. Both website analytics and survey responses show 
similar results where only 21% MEP websites/ blogs incorporated a casework feature while 
similarly a low percentage, 24 per cent MEPs reported ‘casework promotion’ as a motive for 
creating their website. Both scores were comparatively among the lowest in the pool o f  
responses (in the corresponding survey question asked) thus confirming the earlier conjecture that 
websites/ blogs cater poorly to casework functions in the context of the constituency outreach.  
These results thus steer in the direction of acceptance of the null rather than the virtual office 
hypothesis. 
 
When looking at the covariance matrix and logit regression results (Tables 7.6), it is observed that 
i) there is a positive relationship between online and offline casework proxies though with a 
numeric value very close to zero while the logit regression results showed and insignificant 
correlation between the online and offline casework dimensions – time spent on casework (Coeff. 
0.026, Std. Err. 0.104 P > |z |= 0.79, Pseudo r2 = .02, N=123) and responsiveness to casework  
(Coeff.  0.211, Std. Err. 0.195 P > |z |= 0.28, Pseudo r2 = .017, N=145).  Hence providing these two 
results, there seems to be a positive (in favor of the null hypothesis) but most likely a spurious 
relationship between the on and offline casework  dimensions.  
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                                  Table 7.6  Covariance Matrix: Online-Offline Casework  
 
N=123 Online 
casework 
Time spent on 
casework 
Responsiveness 
to casework 
Online casework .18166 x x 
Time spent on 
casework 
.05251 4.508 x 
Responsiveness to 
casework 
.05731 .102292 1.64468 
   
 
 
There are two plausible explanations for this finding and for the generally low usage of the online 
platform for casework purposes. The first is that not all casework can be conducted entirely online.  
While lighter cases such as requests for information could be effectively dealt with through the 
online platform, harder cases typically require MEPs’ offline intervention. Moreover, constituents’ 
preferences (based on MEPs’ estimates) in Table 7.7 below confirm that websites are not a favored 
channel for communicating casework requests. Though email appears to be the most preferred 
choice, conventional offline channels such as letter and telephone prevail as second choices for 
lodging casework requests.  Website ranks fairly low and represents only a quarter of requests. 
 
A notable characteristic of the three mentioned communications channels (email, letters and 
telephone) is that they facilitate direct contact. Because heavier ‘cases’ typically involve more 
personal issues, problems and requests, constituents’ use of direct and personalized forms of 
communication is understandable. At the same time, office visits also facilitate means of direct 
face-to-face contact, but show to be less commonly used by constituents in the casework context. 
Then again not all citizens know that MEP may have a constituency office – thus resort. Moreover, 
the high preference for e-mail may also be reinforced by MEPs’ tendency to demand requests 
coming in via other channels to be “put in writing”, reference made during interviews. Thus, e- 
mail contact in many cases may have been preceded by other forms of initial contact. 
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Table 7.7 Channels of receiving casework 
 
Through which of the following channels do you receive most of 
your assistance requests? 
 
E-mail      93% 
Letters  37% 
Telephone 35% 
Office visits in Brussels or Strasbourg 27% 
Your website 25% 
Consultation hours in your country office 25% 
Your national party's office 11% 
N=136 
 
 
 
The second plausible reason is that interdependence between both offline and online communication 
channels demonstrated here, though likely reflective of what happens in reality, poses challenges for 
disentangling the cause and effect of Internet’s utility and the offline-online comparison with 
respect to the casework dimension. Moreover, the descriptive statistics seem to suggest that the 
offline-online channels seem to be reinforcing each other or where individuals, be it MEPs or 
constituents, may use both online and offline channels (for example if one fails, they may resort to 
another) for lodging or responding to casework. Hence the spurious result between the two levels. 
 
  
7.2.4     OFFLINE-ONLINE Interactivity Comparison 
 
Different media channels produce different types of communicative acts.  MEP-constituent  
interactivity  represents a two-way  communicative  act between MEP and his/her constituents.   
In the context of the online-offline comparison for this dimension, the question to be answered is 
whether the online platform provides new means for MEP-constituent interactivity and affects the 
way MEPs interact with their constituents. 
 
 
In an earlier Table 7.3, the measure of MEP – constituency interactivity zeroed in on MEPs’ own 
estimates about their own frequency of using a list of offline and online media that provided a 
measure for the MEP-constituent vector.   In a separate question, MEPs were also asked to assess 
the frequency and the media with which constituents contact them thus representing the reverse 
constituent-MEP communication vector.  Jointly these two bi-directional vectors (though limited to 
MEP’s assessment) provide a measure of MEP-constituent interactivity.  For either vector, MEPs or 
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constituents can in principle choose to communicate via online or offline media. 
 
When comparing the online-offline descriptive results in Tables 7.3 in terms of interactivity, 
several trends can be observed. First it is notable that e-mail, which ranks among the highest on 
the interactivity index of online features and websites are used the most, comparatively more than 
any other offline channel medium, by both MEPs and citizens alike.  Email is preferred as it 
provides easy to use, highly accessible and personal mode of contact while websites cater well to 
MEPs being able to offer different types of interactions (comment, e-polls, podcasts, SNS etc.). This 
confirms findings from previous research (Dai 2006, 2007) and suggests that the online 
communication channels are more preferred than offline channels in the context of constituency 
relations. Thus this observation can be taken as evidence supporting the virtual office or partial 
effects hypotheses that conjectures that MEPs will move some or all of their conventional offline 
constituency outreach duties online.  
 
At the same time, when looking at MEPs’ use of 2-directional interactive sub-features on their 
websites such as comment forms (37%), e-forums (9%), e-polls (7%) – it is still low when 
compared to one-directional non-interactive features still tend to dominate. This being said, MEPs 
claim, as other studies have confirmed, that the volumes of their correspondence have 
significantly increased with the advent of email.  Over 67 per cent respondents in the MEP survey 
conducted for this thesis, reported that it the availability of the Internet has increased their direct 
contact with citizens; 71 per cent reported that it has also increased their ‘policy feedback from 
the public’ while 71 per cent stated that it has increased their ‘contact with young people’. 
 
The second observation suggests a level of observed asymmetry in the comparative MEP-
constituent online-offline media usage. While MEPs report to use emails as frequently as they do 
websites, when it comes to offline media, they resort to use the press (newspapers) and public 
meetings the most, while telephone, party offices as well as consultations via their own 
constituency offices (in Brussels or home) score the low. Citizens on the other hand, appear to 
use the offline media telephone, office visits in Brussels more frequently than websites. Though 
clearly one cannot ignore the potential bias in MEPs’ estimations about citizens’ communication 
preferences.   
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Website (features) % Website traffic** % 
E-mail* 84 
 
Website 63 
 
Podcast 59 
 
E-newsletter 39 
 
Comment/ feedback forms 37 
SNS 46 
 
Blog 24 
 
E-forums 9 
E-polls 8 
Email   - 
Website   - 
Podcast 11 
E-newsletter 12 
 
Comment/ feedback 11 
Info issues 37 
 
Overview of legislative 37 
work 
 
E-forums 0.5 
Unsure 24  
                      Table 7.8    Website features vs. Website traffic  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly,  when looking at the comparative dimensions of Table 7.3 and MEPs’ use of websites in 
particular, the findings indicate that even where MEPs do provide interactive content on their 
websites, citizens’ interest to use them for interactive purposes is claimed to be low. Instead, 
according to MEPs, the non-interactive ‘information driven’ pages on their websites are more 
popular among citizens while their own experience with the use of interactive features shows 
that even when online interactive features are used, they do not necessarily stimulate high 
quality of interactions from the side of citizens which has lead MEPs to perceive such initiatives a 
‘waste of time’ and abandon them altogether.  
These dynamics show that MEPs do make themselves available and offer several means of being 
interactively contacted, at minimum via their email addresses, but they are also subject to 
reciprocal interaction preferences of their subjects. Moreover, the cost-benefit considerations - 
the time required for engaging in interactive and the quality of interactive communication 
generated are also a concern. These dynamics need to be considered when analyzing MEP-
constituency interactions online. 
 
But what do the above insights tell us about the impact of the Internet on the fourth constituency 
dimension?  
 
When examining the covariance and regression estimates where the dependent variable 
comprised the online interactivity (a cumulative variable of four different interactive proxies) and 
series of independent offline interactivity variables (see Table 7.9), it was observed that i)  MEPs 
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with proclivity to use the phone for constituency outreach was negatively correlated with online 
interactivity – both the covariance and regression analysis (Coeff. -0.0955, Std. Err. 0.088 P > |z |= 
0.79, Adjusted R2 = .001, N=118) confirmed this finding though statistically the relationship 
proving to be insignificant; ii) while a significant positive relationship was found between MEPs 
who are pro-active in using  public events as an offline outreach activity and propensity for 
online interactivity.    
 
Based on these findings the null hypothesis was accepted as most of the relationships between 
offline and online interactivity were positive thus suggesting that MEPs’ constituency outreach 
coincides with MEPs’ constituency outreach online even though descriptive statistics suggest 
that MEPs do show a alight preference for using websites for interactive purposes.  However, 
likely due to the fairly small size of the sample the conclusion is not robustly supported hence 
accepted.  It can be also inferred that there are several different types of subgroups of MEPs with 
different offline-online uses. For example, the phone users being negatively linked to online 
interactivity are likely those that are not online all together due to their dominant preference for 
using offline instead of online media. There are after all over quarter of MEP that fell in this 
category in 2009. 
 
 Table 7.8 Covariance Matrix: Online-Offline Interactivity 
 
N=118 Online 
Interactivity 
Use of phone 
for outreach 
Use of public 
events for 
outreach 
Use of 
office for 
outreach 
# of 
appointments 
with citizens 
Online Interactivity .915327 x x x x 
Use of phone as 
outreach 
-.05027 1.1404 x x x 
Use of public events 
as outreach 
.12625 .29277 .68934 x x 
Use of MEP office 
for outreach 
.09800 .04780 .16116 .23519 x 
# of appointments 
with citizens 
.11118 .08634 .172316 .395263 .308054 
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Chapter  Summary  
 
 
The principal aim of this chapter was to address whether MEPs shift some or majority of their 
constituency outreach duties online, and if so, could the virtual constituency office concept be 
replacing the conventional (offline) constituency office as we know it?   Moreover, it tested the 
extent to which the offline-online comparative approach could be used for studying online 
behavior and contributing to better assessments on the impact of the Internet on political 
behavior. 
 
 
With regards to the first question, findings in this chapter demonstrate that it is premature to 
conclude that MEPs are replacing their physical constituency offices with virtual constituency 
office platforms.  Instead evidence for all three dimensions validated the null or politics as usual 
hypothesis where MEPs were observed to have a propensity for pursuing similar types of 
constituency outreach online as they already do offline.  For the most part, the Internet, though 
certainly adding some new outreach capacities provides another platform and tool for 
reinforcing MEPs’ offline outreach rather than completely replacing it.    
 
 
The analysis in this Chapter has also shown that a more nuanced approach to understanding of 
Internet’s influence on MEPs’ constituency outreach is necessary. The nuance approach recognizes 
Internet’s softer impacts on MEPs’ constituency outreach.  Such nuances include slight asymmetry 
in interactive usage of online-offline media by MEPs and their constituents where the former show 
a preference for using online channels and communication channels that cater to wide audience 
capture while constituents, with the exception of e-mail, prefer more conventional and direct 
offline media when contacting an interacting with their MEPs.   The asymmetry can be attributed 
to  the utility maximization of different media by both parties base on their needs and particular 
vantage points – MEPs needing to reach our to large constituencies and audiences, and 
constituents seeking personal one-on-one attention from MEPs.  In other words, out of sheer 
pragmatics, MEPs  find   one-to-many  rather  than  one-on-one communication  channels  more  
useful and efficient while  citizens in  seeking  personal attention from MEPs find  direct channels 
such as email, telephone and office consultations more useful. 
 
Where the Internet platform does add another new value to conventional constituency outreach is 
that it indeed does act as a new virtual resource person.  Though websites do not yet fully replace 
MEPs’ constituency or Brussels offices, they do serve as new ‘clearing houses’ for lighter casework 
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and as 24/7 information or reference platforms for MEPs’ work.  Given that  most  of  MEPs’  
casework  includes  requests  for  information,  the  preventive posting of relevant information 
online addresses such requests on an ongoing 24/7 basis.  Moreover, during their offline 
interactions with constituents, MEPs commonly refer people to their websites and request them to 
put their questions or need for assistance “into writing”. 
 
 
Thirdly, websites provide a platform for transparency that would be difficult to execute offline or 
through any other conventional  media.  In addition to  serving  as  platforms  for  storing 
information,   citizens  having  24/7  accessibility  to  MEPs’ speeches,  updates  on  their  latest 
achievements  or  personalized  accounts  of undergoing events in  the  EU, website embedded 
features such as MEP podcasts fulfill a level accountability in MEPs’  mandate as  representatives. 
 
 
The disintermediating power of ICTs is and additional value added that the Internet brings to 
MEPs’ constituency work.   On the one hand acknowledging their remoteness and lower 
institutional visibility in EU’s multi-level pecking order, MEPs recognize their dependency on 
mass media that provide them access to wider audiences and their d i s t a n t  constituencies.   
MEP also compete with MP and other EU institutions for media exposure. These realities thus 
force them to seek alternative means of outreach or ways to create  their ‘own media’ channels via 
their websites, through which they can to talk in f i rst  person, to express themselves freely  and 
t o  communicate directly without an intermediary filter  while personalizing their message.  
 
In summary, this Chapter concludes that MEPs are  neither  communication  insulars  nor 
technophobes as some earlier ICT studies claimed.  To maximize their constituency outreach 
potential, they experiment with, engage in and pursue several tracks of offline and online 
communication channels.   While it was  observed  that  one-directional  forms  of  outreach  prevail  
over  casework  and  two-way interactivity online,  this may not be out of MEPs’ disinterest in 
reaching out to their constituencies but rather due to their limited resources – time and number of 
staff – that force them to discriminate between different the use of different communication based 
on cost-benefit considerations. For example, using interactive features is particularly time 
consuming but according to MEPs does not provide proportional benefits of increasing 
constituents’ interest and engagement.  Using the online platform for casework purposes is also 
not entirely suitable for all forms of casework as harder casework, for example, typically requires 
a combination of offline and online interventions.  
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Consequently, these findings dispel earlier skeptical claims that MEPs’ websites are content-less 
showcases.  Methodologically, the online-offline approach introduced has also proven to have its 
merits for Internet studies. It demonstrated that offline political or social science theories can be 
adapted to measure online behavior. Though not always easy to operationalize,  yet  the  online-
offline   approach  caters  for  conceptual  adaptations  that  in  turn  enable  the researcher to 
establish or at least approximate offline-online proxies.  Nonetheless, more needs to be done 
conceptually and empirically in this direction in the future.  The approach also expands on the 
extant uni-dimensional analyses that tend to overly focus on the online dimension without 
regard how the latter relates to or can be contextualized vis-à-vis the offline context. 
 
 
Moreover, the approach has shown that the online and offline worlds are inextricably linked. 
They mutually condition and reinforce each other. At the same time, this dynamic can make it 
difficult to accurately disentangle causal relationships under study. Which world affects which? 
And are we by colonizing, predisposing or shaping our online worlds to resemble the offline 
world by measuring it on superimposed conceptual measures derived from the offline world?   
More research on these questions is welcome.  Moreover,  future  research  endeavors  in  this  
direction  can  be  significantly  strengthened  by adding   the  time-series  dimension  which  is  
significantly  lacking  in  this  thesis.  While the comparative online-offline approach helped to put 
online behavior into perspective vis-à-vis its offline homologues, it failed to validate how these 
observations feature over time.  
 
8.      CONCLUSION(S) 
 
 
This thesis empirically examined political representation in the EU by examining how MEPs form 
linkages with their constituencies. However, instead of looking at how MEPs’ maintain their 
constituency outreach during elections – the emphasis was placed on the day-to-day dynamics 
of representation and MEPs’ cultivation of constituency linkages in the off election period.  In this 
context, the thesis explored how MEPs think about their constituencies, how they communicate 
with, interact and explain their work to their constituencies and the types of casework they take on.  
The importance they attach to their constituency work and factors that determine the variation in 
their MEPs’ constituency outreach were also discussed. In general, given MEPs’ geographic 
remoteness from their constituencies, their generally low political salience and public visibility 
and having to represent large constituencies, it was  expected that MEPs’ constituency orientations 
will be low.  
In addition to examining MEPs’ modes of (conventional) constituency outreach offline, this thesis 
introduced a unique analytical dimension, by also looking how MEPs do so online. Using original 
dataset based on a self-administered MEP survey (2009) and website content analytics, it 
empirically examined how MEPs use the Internet platform for constituency outreach.  The main 
research question for the online context therefore asked whether the online platform in any way 
alters the way that MEPs conduct their constituency outreach. To this effect three hypotheses were 
explored: the virtual office hypothesis which expected MEPs to shift most if not all of their 
constituency work  (from offline to) online; the partial effects hypothesis that saw only some rather 
than all of the three constituency outreach dimensions affected while the null hypothesis 
conjectured that the availability and MEPs’ use of the online platform will not change the way they 
conduct constituency outreach. Instead it conjectured that MEPs’ constituency outreach online will 
simply emulate their already existing constituency outreach offline.  
 
In addition to addressing these empirical questions, the thesis aim to advance the exploration of 
how the constituency linkage can be conceptualized, operationalized and measured at the EU 
level of representation but also online. 
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8.1  MEPs’ Constituency Orientations OFFLINE 
 
 
While the first three chapters explained extant theories and research related to constituency 
outreach in the EU context, Chapter 4 exposed empirical as well as qualitative observations related 
to how MEPs perceive their constituencies and the types of offline constituency work and outreach 
they pursue.  It was hypothesized that due to EP’s geographic remoteness and MEPs’ low political 
salience at the national level, MEPs would have low pro-constituency orientations and outreach 
manifested in low constituency presence (less than 0.5 days - H0b), proportionally less time spent 
on constituency work than on Brussels-based political activities (H0c) and employing less staff in 
their constituency office than in their Brussels office (H0d). 
 
With respect to  MEPs’  perceptions  about  their  constituencies  the thesis’ findings observed  
several  trends.  The first observable trend showed that MEPs perceive their constituencies as 
heterogeneous mosaics rather than uniform territorial or strictly electoral entities. Moreover, 
though MEPs do select  more  specific  sub-constituencies  on  whom  they focus,  the  boundaries  
between  them  tend  to  be  fluid and  not electorally  defined or  as  one  German  MEP  explained 
“sometime theme specific, some times regional, other times Europe or something in between”.  
In comparison to the more pro-active approach among national MEPs who tend to  target and 
respond to specific (sub)constituencies based on electoral importance, the fluid or reactive 
approach to constituency focus among MEPs is likely unique and coinciding with their prevalent 
trustee role orientations since they claim to be more free to make political decisions and assume 
policy positions based on their own judgment rather than on partisan or public opinion cues. 
 
A second notable trend in how MEPs think about their constituencies is that they distinguish 
between the constituencies they represent ‘officially’ and those they represent  ‘in practice’.  While 
the former refer to their  ‘official’, electoral  (national or regional) constituencies, the latter 
represent more ‘workable’ and ‘personalized’ sub-constituencies that MEPs end up focusing on 
and working with more closely.  Most often these groups include supporters or interest groups in 
specific policy areas or flagship causes that MEPs take an interest in. 
 
 
The third trend showed that representing ‘Europe’ or ‘European people’ factors strongly into 
whom MEPs’ perceive ‘their constituency’ to be. More than half MEPs surveyed considered 
Europe and its people as the ‘constituency they represent’ or listed it in combination with other 
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types of sub-constituencies.  MEPs’ loyalty to representing ‘Europe’ or a trans-border ‘European 
constituency’ demonstrates that MEPs’ representational loyalties run wider than their national 
boundaries.   For example, a Finnish MEP may take on casework from a Bulgarian citizen or a 
group of European citizens that are not Finnish nationals.   According to electoral theories this is 
counterintuitive as representatives should in principle invest into casework that is electorally 
advantageous for MEPs.  Representational loyalty to constituencies that hardly bring MEPs 
electoral rewards (in EU elections) deviates from national MPs’ behavior who tend to be strongly 
influenced by electoral incentives.   
When asked about their own representational focus, m a j o r i t y  o f  MEPs report to adhere to a 
trustee rather than to a delegate role orientation where 87 per cent MEP respondents claimed 
that they decide and vote in the EP based on their own judgment rather than on instruction from 
their parties (EU or national), national governments or citizens. This finding coincides with earlier 
work by Katz (1999).   In this sense,  MEPs perceive themselves as representational  ‘free agents’ 
with a greater sense of political freedom, where “nobody breathes down their neck’  and where 
they ‘are free from the daily pressures of party politics common in the national arena’. 
Lastly, MEPs’ constituency orientations tell us that MEPs perceive an ‘official’ obligation to 
represent their home constituencies but once in office they tend to carve out or reshape their 
sense of a constituency into more realistic, practical sub-constituencies where their ‘European hat’ 
plays a strong role.  On the one hand these observations confirm previous research on national 
level representatives (Fenno 1977) who are known to narrow down their ‘constituencies’ into 
three or four concentric circles determined by electoral significance.  On the other, MEPs are 
different in that electoral significance seemingly plays a lesser role in the selection of their sub-
constituencies.  Still, more research is required to determine how and when MEPs select their sub-
constituencies. 
In determining MEPs’ constituency orientations based on attitudinal importance that MEPs attach 
to their constituency work, the thesis shows that MEPs attach more importance to constituency 
work than was hypothesized. A great majority of MEP respondents considered being active in 
their countries, educating public about EU issues and communicating with citizens as an 
important or very important part of their job. In fact, attitudinally, MEPs seem to find 
constituency outreach as important as their parliamentary work. 
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With respect to self reported allocation of resources  – time and staff  – MEPs spend 2.5 working 
days per week in their constituencies; this is significantly higher than the official expectation of 
0.5 days indicated in the EP Calendar.  In terms of staff, majority of MEPs show to employ similar 
number of staff in their constituency offices as in their Brussels office. This further suggests that 
a great majority of MEPs deem constituency work at par with their parliamentary work.   At 
the same time, when asked to assess the time that MEPs spend on  constituency  work in 
comparison  to  other  duties,  MEP respondents admitted that they spend slightly more time 
(10%) on parliamentary and political work than on constituency work.   MEPs prioritizing 
political, committee work over constituency work places MEPs into the trustee model of 
representational role orientations. 
Among offline constituency activities that MEPs pursue, attending face-to-face public meetings and 
talking to the national and local media is the most common.  MEPs thus show to prefer 
constituency outreach that caters to wider audience capture than one-on-one office consultations 
or conventional mail outs.   With some MEPs representing tens of millions of citizens, this is 
understandable.  However, a more surprising finding was that MEPs also conduct fair bit of 
casework, an activity that consumes approximately 20 per cent of their time and where trans-
border cases from individual constituents or interest groups being the most common.  This is 
significant in that trans-border ‘European-ness’ of political representation shows to be 
reportedly two-directional.  Not only do MEPs consider ‘representing Europe and its people’ as 
important but individual citizens or interest groups also show to be bypassing nationality as a 
means of connecting and seeking representation from MEPs. S t i l l ,  more research is required in 
this direction.  
 
As to impediments to MEPs’ constituency work, overcharged schedules with political 
responsibilities and the time spent on travel between Brussels and their constituencies pose the 
greatest challenges.    
 
In spite these general tendencies linked to offline constituency work, variation in some 
dimensions (of MEPs’ constituency work) was also noted.  While nearly all MEPs regarded 
constituency outreach - ‘communication and education of citizens on EU matters’ - as important 
aspects of their jobs, the most notable variation resulted in the casework dimension. Though MEPs 
from new member states were less likely to interact directly with citizens, they were significantly 
more prone to take on ‘harder’ or also known as pork barrel casework.  CEE MEPs’ proclivity to 
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take on heavier casework, such as helping various sub-constituencies getting access to new 
resources from EU institutions, is likely attributable to their constituencies being new to the 
EU system and in need of intermediaries who can help them gain access to resources or 
opportunities offered by the EU while their Western (older member) counterparts need them less. 
 
Based on the above observations, when revisiting the hypotheses for offline constituency work, it 
can be generally concluded that MEPs show to be more pro-constituency oriented than was 
originally assumed. Though their political activities in Brussels take up more of their time,  they 
spend significantly more time and staff on constituency work than initially expected. 
 
8.2       MEPs’ constituency orientations ONLINE 
 
 
While Chapter 5 elaborated on MEPs’ constituency orientations and outreach offline, Chapter 6 
examined them online.   With respect to constituency outreach online, the central hypothesis was 
that MEPs will be pro-active users of the convenient, distance-reducing online platform for all or 
some of their constituency outreach. It was also hypothesized, however, that incorporating one-
directional rather than interactive, two-directional features will be higher. 
 
The conclusions in Chapter 6 showed that a great majority (72%) MEPs were indeed online via a 
website or a blog. Moreover, email, a two-directional feature showed to be the most commonly 
used channel by both MEPs and constituents for contacting each other while one-directional 
features for explaining work to the public in different ways were the most commonly 
incorporated on MEPs’ websites.  In second place came the ‘medium to highly’ interactive two-way 
features such as comment or feedback forms while casework was the least popular.  The latter is 
likely due to the fact that though light casework can be addressed online, harder cases still 
require MEP’s offline intervention hence website showing to be less conducive for casework. 
 
As to why MEPs use the online platform, ‘increasing direct contact with citizens’ and ‘educating 
citizens about the EU’ were the top motives for MEPs creating a website, personalization of 
outreach and contact was the third reason while interestingly, ‘reducing office communication 
costs’ was at the bottom of the list. 
This first layer of results  to some extent confirmed as well as challenged skeptical theories about 
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Internet usage for constituency purposes.  On the one hand the results confirmed that MEPs’ use of 
one-directional communication features prevails, on the other, they also revealed more nuanced 
observations.  The first is that MEPs actually do offer two-directional opportunities for citizens to 
interact with them.  In fact, they claim to prefer to receive interactions and feedback (e.g. via online 
forums, petitions, feedback forms) online rather than offline.  Yet they also explained that when 
they do offer such interactive features, the volume of traffic generated tends to be low (website) 
with low quality interactions.  Ins t e a d  MEPs claim that citizens prefer to use their websites for 
information seeking and more direct offline c o m m u n i c a t i o n  channels such as email or phone 
calls for establishing direct contact with MEPs.   
 
 
These findings confirm previous research (Xai 2006;  Tolbert  and  Mossberg  2006) but also 
challenge skeptics’ claims as they point to an i) apparent asymmetry between MEPs’ and 
constituents’ online-offline communication preferences, but more importantly ii) to the supply-
and-demand dynamics where MEPs are equally subject to citizens’ demand and communication 
preferences as the latter are to MEPs’ supply of opportunities for interaction. 
 
The bidirectional dynamics, utility maximization in communication preferences and mutuality or 
interdependence in MEP-constituent communication have not been factored in political 
communication accounts that tend to criticize politicians’ lack of provision of interactive 
opportunities and constituents’ passive consumption.  Findings in this thesis are thus important 
for how we evaluate online interactivity.  They add insights to the study of political communication 
by showing that the process of MEP-constituent interaction is  more dynamic and dependent on 
the mutuality of communication preferences among MEPs and constituents rather than based on 
MEPs’ unilateral decision-making as it is often portrayed.  It can be further concluded that 
websites are potentially less amenable for reciprocal direct ‘interaction’ and deliberation in formal 
settings than other forms of offline communication. 
When it comes to assessing the importance that MEPs attach to conducting constituency outreach 
online, MEPs allocate a relatively low amount (10 per cent) of their personal time to website 
management which is less than to any other duty.  However, when it comes to staff allocation, 
while for having a basic website the number of staff employed in Brussels or in the constituency 
office did not make a difference, when the data was disaggregated by specific features, MEPs with 
explaining work and casework website features tended to employ more staff both in their 
Brussels and in their constituency office.  Inferentially, this suggests that more elaborate websites 
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do require more staff. 
Furthermore, though MEPs may not manage their websites personally, they do allocate staff 
resources to this activity and claim to be closely involved in screening and regulating what goes 
‘online’ content-wise.  Moreover, MEPs with committee, party and media responsibilities could 
not possibly manage incoming emails and website uploads alone. Receiving and sorting through 
300-500 emails daily is time and labor intensive especially as constituents increasingly seek 
“instantaneous responses”.  Consequently, MEPs are “careful as to what [they] promise to deliver”.  
In this sense, availability of new media interlinked with demands for transparency pose new 
resource  challenges for representatives, namely in terms of MEPs’ staff time.    
 
To summarize, results in Chapter 5 demonstrated that MEPs use their websites for various 
constituency duties.  Be it during their face-to-face encounters or in e-mail MEPs frequently  refer  
constituents  to  their websites/ blogs for further information.  In this sense, websites do play a 
role of clearing houses for incoming lighter casework or a ‘virtual administrative resource ‘person’ 
to which MEPs can delegate a share of citizens’ requests.   They also serve as a virtual reference 
point or a virtual ‘open door’ that provides constituents with 24/7 access to and transparency 
over MEPs’ work.   At the same time, for some forms of constituency outreach  such as casework 
or interactivity, websites show to be less suitable while email or offline – phone contact continue 
to be more preferred by constituents.  These observations lead us to conclude that bidirectional 
constituency outreach requires a mix of different communication media and it is thus premature to 
conclude that MEPs’ websites are fully replacing  their  physical constituency  offices.  
 
8.3   Determinants of MEPs’ Constituency Outreach OFF and ONLINE 
While it was established that attitudinal importance attached to constituency work was high among 
majority of MEPs, there was more variation when ‘constituency work’ was disaggregated along the 
three dimensions.  MEPs’ attitudes towards the casework dimension varied the most where MEPs 
from new member states were significantly more prone to take on pork types of casework.  As to 
other determinants of pro-constituency orientations, as it was expected, open ballot structure 
(Model 1) and MEPs prone to take instruction from citizens (Model 2) tended to be more pro-
constituency oriented while demographic and political determinants (Model 3) such as past 
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political career and political affiliation, showed to be insignificant. ‘Constituency characteristics’ 
such as distance to constituency and MEP-constituent ratio in Model 4 also showed to be poor 
predictors of MEPs’ constituency orientations.  
 
For offline constituency outreach it was expected that electoral system characteristics (Model 1) 
and MEPs’ role orientations – those prone to take instruction from citizens (Model 2) would be 
more pro-constituency oriented. Results have shown, however, that MEPs’ constituency 
orientations vary on some pro-constituency dimensions more than on others. Interestingly, being 
from new member states was positively correlated with harder types of casework  while  as it was 
expected, open ballot structure (Model 1) and MEPs role orientations – those who were prone to 
take instruction from citizens (Model 2) tended to be more pro-constituency oriented. 
Demographic and political determinants (Model 3) such as past political career and political 
affiliation, however, showed to be insignificant in the case of offline constituency orientations. 
‘Constituency characteristics’ such as distance to constituency and MEP-constituent ratio in Model 
4 also showed to be poor predictors.  
For explaining variation in MEPs’ online constituency outreach age, distance to constituency (from 
Brussels) and Internet penetration in MEPs’ countries were expected to play a determining role.   
While the results for MEPs’ online constituency outreach confirmed that demographic factors –  
age and education –  do play a role in determining MEPs’ constituency orientations, gender plays 
a lesser role.   In other words, while age showed to be a weak predictor for basic online status 
where older MEPs were as likely to be online as were younger MEPs, when the data was 
disaggregated by specific website features, for the interactivity dimension for example,  age  was  
negatively  correlated.  
Interestingly, in addition to the demographic factors, electoral system variables also showed to be 
pertinent for most of the online dimensions.  MEPs from systems with open and ordered party 
lists were more likely to reach out to their constituents online than those from systems with 
closed party lists. This is an interesting finding as it also held to be true for the offline constituency 
outreach.    
 
For political and institutional determinants – the effects were mixed. Both party affiliation and 
political responsibility showed to be relatively weak predictors of MEPs’ online constituency 
outreach while being more politically active in Brussels or constituency characteristics appeared 
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to have no effect on MEPs’ online constituency outreach.  In other words, MEP-Constituent ratio, 
distance to constituency and internet penetration did not show to matter. Focus of representation 
and MEPs’ role orientations in the comparative table also showed to be insignificant apart from 
the explaining work dimension. Previous public office and incumbency, however, did play a role in 
two out of the three online dimensions.    
 
Because many of the indicators were derived from national level theories, their (in)significance 
for  determining  online  behavior  is important for future research.   For example, incumbency, a 
known strong predictor for offline pro-constituency orientations failed to be significant for both 
offline as well as online dimensions of MEPs’ constituency outreach while MEPs’  role  orientations,  
a  recognized  determining  offline  factor  was also insignificant.  Partisanship also weakly 
manifested in MEPs’ online behavior. These observations thus hint that other factors likely 
impinge on how representatives’ behave online. 
  
Methodologically, an interesting aspect in the online findings is that the survey respondents’ 
answers about their own online behavior and analytics of MEPs’ actual behavior online  
corresponded even though  the  coding  of  MEPs’  websites  was  conducted  separately  and 
without MEPs’ awareness. This observation thus adds reliability to the survey and the offline-
online triangulation method. 
 
 
8.4   Internet, so what? Assessing Internet’s Influence on MEPs’ Constituency Outreach 
 
 
 
After determining  MEPs’  constituency  orientations  both  off  and  online,  Chapter  6 then 
compared the two in order to test the null or politics as usual hypothesis , the virtual office and 
the partial effects hypotheses. While the former expected that Internet will have little influence on 
MEPs’ constituency outreach, the latter two expected that MEPs will shift all or some of their 
constituency outreach activities from offline to online.   
 
 
Overall, f i n d i n g s  i n  Chapter 6 confirmed that it is premature to conclude that MEPs are 
replacing their physical constituency offices with virtual constituency office platforms.  Instead 
evidence for all three constituency work dimensions – explaining work, casework and interactivity 
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validated the null or politics as usual hypothesis where MEPs constituency outreach online tends 
to closely emulate their constituency outreach offline.  In other words, though the Internet 
certainly adds some new communication and outreach capacities it merely reinforces or 
amplifies MEPs’ existing constituency offline.   
 
 
The analysis in Chapter 6 has also shown that a more nuanced approach to t h e  understanding 
of Internet’s influence on MEPs’ constituency outreach is needed.  The nuance approach 
recognizes Internet ’s  softer impacts on MEPs’ constituency outreach such as the slight 
asymmetry in interactive usage of online-offline media and utility maximization of different media 
by MEPs and their constituents or websites’ utility in acting as ‘clearing houses’ for lighter casework 
and as 24/7 information or reference points for MEPs’ work but at the same time, showing to be less 
conducive for direct interaction or casework. For these aspects of constituency work, email and 
offline media such as the telephone show to be more commonly used.  
Acting as conduits of transparency that would be difficult to execute offline through other 
conventional media  and the disintermediating power of ICTs is additional value added that the 
online platform brings to MEPs’ constituency work. In their remoteness and lower institutional 
visibility in EU’s multi-level pecking order, MEPs recognize their dependency on mass media 
that provide them access to wider audiences and their d i s t a n t  constituencies.  In their 
competition with MPs and other EU institutions for media exposure, MEPs thus seek alternative 
means of outreach through which they can talk in 1st person, to express themselves freely and 
t o  communicate directly without an intermediary filter of the mass media.  In this sense, 
websites provide MEPs a carte blanche for creating their ‘own media outlets’ for uncensored self-
expression, self-promotion and direct communication with their constituencies which would be 
difficult to obtain otherwise. 
 
 
8.5 Implications for Political Representation at the European Level 
 
 
So what implications does this thesis and all its findings bear for political representation and the 
MEP-citizen linkage and in the EU context?   Moreover, what benefits could future research draw 
from the online-offline approach when studying behavioral impacts of Internet usage in the 
political arena? 
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One of the key findings in this thesis is that, be it offline or online, MEPs d o  allocate resources and 
a t t a c h  importance to constituency work more than was initially expected. Despite the low 
electoral incentives and the lack of concrete expectations in the EP’s Code of Conduct, nearly all 
MEPs have constituency offices, on average they employ similar number of staff in their 
constituency offices as they do in Brussels and they conduct fair amount of casework.  Their 
willingness to respond to trans-border casework that may come outside of their national 
(territorial) constituency was particularly surprising. In this sense MEPs are fulfilling the role of 
trans-border ‘European’ representatives.  As it is at the constituency  level  where  
representatives  are  in  the  closest proximity to the voters and where representative - 
constituent ties are “created, nurtured and  changed” these findings are encouraging for political 
representation in the EU and for the commonly perceived disconnect between the European 
Parliament and the people it represents.  
 
At the same time, the results have also shown that proportionally MEPs still personally spend 
more time on political work and base their political decisions on their own judgment rather than 
on  citizens’  or  any  other  sources (national  government,  party,  EP  party  group  etc.). In 
other words, when it comes to representational style, MEPs ascribe to the trustee rather than 
delegate  or partisans role orientation.  MEPs’ trustee orientation should comes as less of a surprise 
as it is a response to the institutional incentives provided by the European Parliament in its Code 
of Conduct for MEPs. 
 
 
As trustees MEPs have the freedom and discretion to cultivate relations with citizens or to focus on 
their political work.  In other words, few obligations are placed on MEPs with respect to their 
constituency work.  In view of the widespread concerns about EU’s democratic deficit, providing 
incentives for MEPs to assume the role of trustees is somewhat contradictory.  On the other, the 
current discretionary approach pertaining to MEPs’ responsibilities with respect to constituency 
outreach seems to work  as MEPs end up doing fair bit of constituency outreach even when they 
are institutionally not expected to.  In addition to MEPs, citizens are also given the opportunity to 
‘connect with’ and address their grievances to the EP via the   Parliament’s   petitions   committee   
or   via the  European Ombudsman.  
 
 
The extent to which this formula for representation and linkage between citizens and the EP is 
sufficient and effective remains a good question.  The absence of an explicit constituency 
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mandate or a more detailed list of representational responsibilities for MEPs, however, does 
implicitly project EP to be a technocratic and co-legislative institution rather than the citizen-
oriented institution that the Lisbon Treaty aspires it to be.  It is questionable the extent to which 
the provisions of the Lisbon treaty will enhance the quality of linkage between the EP and 
European citizens.  Moreover, ultimately the EP needs to ask itself the type of institution it 
envisions itself to be, more legislatively oriented or more citizens oriented, or potentially both, and 
what would it take to establish?   
 
In EP’s defense, it is difficult to estimate what would be the right or balanced formula for MEPs’ 
representational mandate – a 50-50 or a 40-60 split between parliamentary and constituency 
outreach activities, or the seemingly present 70-30 split, according to MEPs?  Moreover, how 
should the quality of constituency service be assessed? 
 
 
Because the EP is in effect the sum of its constitutive parts - MEPs,  how  MEPs represent and  the 
types of constituency linkages they cultivate with their constituencies between elections matters.   
Thus if the EP aims to bolster its electoral connection with citizens and the European public at 
large, setting some minimum standards for MEPs’ constituency outreach could be useful.   
Though seeing that constituency outreach does take up significant time and staff resources, 
expanding MEPs’ constituency outreach may have implications for MEPs’ workload and resources.  
Therefore such factors should be considered when making corresponding decisions.  
 
 
Alternatively, the constituency function could also be left ‘as is’ – discretionary, fluid, reactive 
and left for MEPs and their constituencies to define.   Such an approach can potentially breed 
more creativity for MEPs to adapt their representational and constituency outreach style best fit 
to their and their constituencies’ needs.  
 
 
As to the significance of online platforms for political representation and constituency linkage, as 
noted, it is yet premature to conclude that they are fully replacing MEPs’ use of physical 
constituency offices. Nonetheless, the effect of the Internet and IT mediated communication for 
MEP-citizen linkage hence political representation is not to be underestimated. Citizens’ rising 
demands for transparency and instantaneous responsiveness facilitated by online 
communication puts new pressures on MEPs’ accountability.  Accommodating and responding to 
a volume of 300-500 emails per day is proving to be challenging for an average MEPs’ team of 5-6 
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staff.  Therefore, though offering various communication benefits, for MEPs to ‘be online’ also 
involves careful (re)allocation of resources, content management and budgetary considerations.  
‘Scaling back’ in the supply of online features in fear of ‘over promising’ about what they cannot 
deliver or installing various spam, e-mail content filters to eliminate ‘unserious’ requests are some 
coping strategies that MEPs grapple with in the new era of increased communication.   
 
The volume, immediacy and speed of online communication is also affecting the quality of 
communication. While online platforms increase 24/7 accessibility and opportunities for 
interactivity, MEPs have noticed that these opportunities do not necessarily improve the 
substantive aspects of mutuality, feedback and transfer of political cues from citizens.  Many 
citizens using online channels, MEPs claim, are not ‘serious’ about interacting on substantive 
issues; interest groups also tend to use blanket campaigns of flooding rather than personalized 
modes of more substantive lobbying.  This in turn leads MEPs to scale back their continued use of 
time-consuming online features such as e-debate forums or online consultation hours.  
 
Moreover, the results in this thesis demonstrate that both constituents and MEPs are rational 
‘shoppers’ rather than passive users of different communication tools.   MEPs also tend to 
anticipate and adapt or mirror their constituents’ communication preferences in their own use of 
communication channels. In other words, our results show that MEPs cater to citizens’  
communication preferences than the other way around. Though more research would need to be 
conducted to determine the exact direction and magnitude of how these dynamics work, the fact 
that MEPs cater to their constituents’ communication preferences challenges the one-directional 
elitist theory in political communication (where the relationship is thought to work in reverse). 
 
Lastly, though websites are not replacing offline constituency offices, majority MEPs are online 
and majority consider their online presence as an important aspect of their job.  This further 
suggests that being online is thus inextricably becoming an important part of a contemporary 
politician’s mandate.  In order to function in an information and technology era,  using a wide 
range of communication media – TV, mobile phones, radio, newspapers blogs in order to 
maximize one’s personal outreach and to acquire social capital (Castells  1999) is inescapable. 
Results in this thesis have shown that MEPs are not immune to these trends.  Navigating in an 
increasingly mediatized space in pursuit of a  wider domestic and European audience capture, 
MEPs exploit both off and online media to optimize their constituency outreach. 
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8.6         Implications for Future Research 
 
 
A side objective of this thesis was also to test the online – offline approach for measuring Internet’s 
impact on political behavior.  On many levels, the approach proved to be useful.  It enabled the 
operationalization of a research question into an empirical study that went beyond the typical uni-
dimensional descriptive analysis of politicians’ websites.  The offline-online comparison provided 
grounds for a more comprehensive analysis by incorporating the comparison between offline and 
online worlds. In other words, MEPs’ online behavior was placed in the context of their existing 
offline behavior in order to assess any effects.  
 
In general, the comparative online-offline approach introduced in this thesis showed that the 
online and offline worlds are inextricably linked.   The results demonstrate that the online 
platform tends to amplify existing behavior rather than introduce brand new forms of interactions 
or behavior. At the same time, the thesis also alludes to the fact that it is difficult to accurately 
disentangle the direction of inherent causal dynamics between on- and offline worlds (e.g. MEPs’ 
multi-media approach to constituency outreach).  To disentangle these, further research is needed 
and relevant theories need to be developed.  To advance new areas of online research, relevant 
indicators need to be conceptualized and tested in order to ensure that we do not by default 
superimpose conceptual derivatives of our experiences from the offline w o r ld  on the online 
world – hence our research being subjected to systematic measurement errors.  
 
 
To prevent such sources of error, several suggestions could be considered.  First is the systematic 
future collection of time-series data on MEPs’ both offline and online constituency outreach (or 
other relevant forms of political behavior).  If relevant data is not collected, the future of Internet 
studies will stand the risk of being a patchwork of disparate studies without proper theoretical 
grounding.  As ICTs applications evolve and change rapidly, Internet research is particularly prone 
to effervescent studies traci ng the latest ICT-enhanced flavors of the month.  While unavoidable, 
this tempting reality prevents researchers from adopting a systematic approach to data collection 
and theory building. In the future, empirical data collection on the subject should be advanced 
through the triangulation of primary data from MEP surveys, web analytics and qualitative 
analytics. These three sources will provide a more in-depth understanding about both the 
attitudinal as well as behavioral dimensions of MEPs constituency orientations and outreach both 
off and online.  
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Expanding the surveys by including citizens’ perspective on the constituency linkage is also 
necessary in order to push the research agenda on political representation in the EU f orward. 
This aspect is grossly missing in current literature and theory building.  The leading EPRG MEP 
surveys and the MEP survey conducted for this thesis solely relied on MEPs’ perspectives hence 
provided a somewhat lop-sided ‘supply’ account of the MEP-citizen constituency relationship.   
Empirical exploration of the reverse – constituents’    demand arrow in the MEP constituent 
relationship is therefore necessary to explore in more detail in the future.   
 
To summarize, the interplay between the online and offline worlds when determining the effects 
of Internet usage on political behavior is dynamic and far from uni-dimensional.  Though the 
virtual constituency office hypothesis that assumed websites to take over the classical offline 
constituency office functions was not confirmed, this thesis has demonstrated that MEP are 
neither technophobes  nor insulars when it comes to conducting their constituency outreach.   
Unlike what was expected, cultivating strong citizen relations and educating the public on EP 
issues also rank high among MEPs’ priorities.   MEPs show a preference for delegating and 
conducting the interactive aspects of their constituency outreach to the virtual platform than 
traditional offline channels, while citizens prefer more direct and mixed online-offline  forms of 
communication with MEPs . Using ICTs, however, has shown to come at a price.  The increasing 
speed and volume of o n l i n e  communication, and citizens’ rising expectations of immediacy and 
instant responses adds new accountability and resource allocation pressures for MEPs’. Resorting 
to a combination of both offline and online media, rather than one or  the  other,  shows to best  
optimizes MEPs’  capacity  for  maximum  audience  capture  and constituency outreach. 
 
Lastly, this   thesis   attests   to   the   complex   nature   of   conducting   research   on   political 
representation at the EU level.   The multi-layered complexity and political uniqueness of the 
EU polity renders the teasing out of causal intricacies and dynamics challenging. In addition to 
the medley of cognitive predispositions   that influence political  representatives’  behavior,  the  
range  of  possible institutional and contextual influences doubles in the EU context.  This affects 
the way MEPs conduct their day-to-day constituency linkage between two election points. 
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 APPENDIX 1 – DATA COLLECTION: Survey Administration and Representativeness 
 
Because no comprehensive dataset specifically on MEPs’ constituency orientations exists, an 
original dataset was compiled.  The data set included data on both the offline as well as online 
dimensions of MEP constituency orientations and outreach.  To construct the dataset, four 
different data sources were used:  
i) a self-administered MEP online survey (2009) by the author  
ii) EP’s official website  (MEPs’ profiles) and respondent  
iii) website analysis of MEP respondents’ personal websites/ blogs  
iv) qualitative data from 32 structured MEP interviews (please see bibliography for 
details) supplemented  the quantitative analysis with additional insights. 
 
Self-administration and distribution of 2009 MEP Survey  
The online survey targeted responses from members of the European Parliament (MEPs) serving in 
the Parliament’s sixth session (2006-2009).  At the time the total number of MEPs in the European 
Parliament amounted to 785.  The exact distribution of MEPs by country is listed in Table 1 – 
Appendix below.  
Survey Questions.  A full original copy of the survey is provided in Appendix 2.   The survey 
contained four modules, each containing four questions, thus the entire survey had sixteen 
questions in total.  The typology of questions was mixed – majority were multiple choice, two 
included fields for open-ended answers while others (namely the attitudinal ones) were based on a 
5-point Likert scale.   The   first   module of questions   related   to   MEPs’ perceptions   about   what 
they think about their constituencies and their role orientations while the second and third focused 
on the importance that MEPs attach to constituency work an on their comparative constituency 
outreach.  The last module specifically examined MEPs’ perceptions about their constituency 
outreach online and how it impacts their work.  While several of the questions build on and were 
taken from EPRG’s survey questions, majority were newly constructed. 
Distribution of Survey.  The online survey was created (on) and distributed via an online survey 
provider Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com)  between 10 February – 20 May 2009.  This 
means that the survey was made available to MEPs 24/7 for the time period listed.  Because the 
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intention was to map out both MEP’s offline as well as online constituency outreach, before the 
survey’s distribution, individualized IP addresses and links were created for each MEP.  This 
enabled the easy tracking of each MEP respondents’ identity which would be later required for the 
coding of respondents’ personal websites and for determining their online constituency 
outreach. The individualized IP addresses also allowed for an easy identification of non-
respondents to whom three waves of reminders (February – May 2009) were sent with 
approximately monthly intervals in between.   Individualized l i v e  links to the survey were then 
created and inserted into body of an e-mailed survey invitation that was sent out to all MEPs with 
traceable and active e-mails listed on the official EP website45.  The individual email invitations to 
participate in the survey, with the exception of the Lithuania and Latvia, were translated into all 
official EU languages.  The survey itself was translated into seven languages which in effect 
covered official languages in eleven EU  member  states.  Links to  the  English  version  were  
provided  to  the  rest  unless otherwise  requested  (there  were  such  cases).   
Response rate. Over 167 MEPs accessed the online survey. 159 responded to 1-3 opening 
questions but only 147 surveys were retained for empirical analysis, while 138 fully answered the 
survey.  Hence these figures suggest a 13 per cent drop off rate from the survey46  and over all 
yielding a 19 per cent response rate and a 19 percent sample of the entire MEP population.  
Because the online survey provider allowed oversight of when MEPs started and  ended each 
individual survey, on average, the online the survey took MEPs between 7-9 minutes to complete. 
From the batch of 39 ‘hand delivered’ surveys only two surveys were completed by MEPs and sent 
back to the author. Ten MEPs expressed an interest in receiving the survey results. 
 
                                                          
45 Though in principle, all MEPs should have an official EP e-mail which is normally composed of their first and last name 
and the affix « @europarl.europa.eu », not all MEPs were found to list their e-mail address on the EP website; the  common  
inclusion of  middle names, or hyphenated surnames  (in  the    body of  the  e-mail) thus  made the construction of e-
mails (where not available otherwise) impossible, There were approximately 5% of such cases. 
46 Observing the patterns in completed and non-completed surveys, it is likely that a significant portion of the drop-off rates 
were attempts to complete the survey by MEPs’ staff who wanted to take the initiative to answer the survey for their ‘boss’ 
but realized that the questions increasingly required personal perceptions that they were perhaps not equipped to answer. 
Alternatively, the drop-off rate could have been also caused by MEPs being interrupted by a phone call or their assistant 
while completing the survey and never returning back to filling it out. The survey set up saved MEPs’ last answer and 
allowed them to return back to the last  question they answered at any later point. Interestingly, some MEPs did indeed 
start and return to the survey at a later point hence potentially suggesting that they took answering the survey seriously. 
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Representativeness of results.   The full breakdown  of  the  survey’s  representativeness  in 
terms of – gender, country, and online status is  listed  the Appendix Table 1 below.  Overall, the   
respondents   were   representative   in   terms   of   gender   and   age, where 30% of the 
respondents were females.  Country representativeness was also solid with the exception of 
Greek, Irish, Spanish, Swedish MEPs who were under-represented. 
Sources of response bias Before conducting the survey three potential areas of response bias 
were identified and a series of steps were taken to mitigate them:  (i) self-selection bias favoring 
‘survey-friendly’ MEPs with predisposition to  respond  to  surveys  (Scholl  1986:  319)  or  who  
were  comfortable  with  or interested in the survey’s topic;  (ii) computer and ICT literacy bias in 
targeting those with e-mail addresses who are potentially  more ICT literate; and lastly iii) given 
MEPs’ diverse linguistic backgrounds  language bias may  have  skewed  the  response  rate  
toward  those  more  at  ease speaking the seven languages that the survey was translated into.  
To offset the ICT literacy bias, MEPs without a listed e-mail address on the official EP website or 
whose email bounced back, a hard copy of the survey was hand delivered directly into MEPs’ 
mailboxes at the European Parliament47. 
Data for MEPs’ online constituency orientations were derived from the coding of individual 
MEPs’  websites. MEPs’ online status (having a e-mail. website, or blog) was derived from the 
official EP website.  During coding, however, it was discovered that though generally reliable, the 
official EP website was not accurate in approximately 5% cases. When MEPs without website or 
blog listed on the EP official website, were randomly googled, in at least 5% cases, they actually 
had a blog or a website.  This could be attributed to an administrative error or MEPs may also 
target and send out links to a limited constituency. 
Interviews.  As part  of  this  thesis’  triangulation  approach,  to  supplement  the  survey  and  
coding, 32 qualitative semi-structured interviews with a sub-sample of MEPs were conducted.  
U s i n g  a  s n o w b a l l  s a m p l i n g  m e t h o d ,  s e l e c t i o n  o f  MEPs for the interviews was 
dependent on their availability and willingness – hence self-selection bias at play; pinning down 
                                                          
47 I spent three months (February to April 2010) on a « Research Stay » at the European Parliament in Brussels working at the 
Petitions Committee and simultaneously interviewing MEPs in Brussels and Strasbourg. This provided me easy access to 
MEPs. In addition, I spend 2 weeks in 2009 at the EP conducting lined up interviews (via email) prior to my arrival. 
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‘busy’ elites is not easy. 
Three interviews were conducted in the MEPs’ actual constituency office, and the rest in MEPs’ 
Brussels or Strasbourg based offices. A disproportional number of those interviewed were 
males with a slight pro-incumbency bias but well spread out across country and party groups. In 
spite the threat of a  self-selection  bias,  the  interviews  were  informative  and  enabled  the 
capturing  of  MEPs’  more   in-depth  attitudinal  perspectives  as  to  how  they  perceive  their 
constituency work and Internet usage.  This level of insights were not possible to capture in the 
survey. 
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APPENDIX  1 (Table 1) -  Representativeness of Survey Response rate: Country, gender, 
online/ offline 
 
Country  Actual No. 
MEPs  
No. 
Respondents 
Male  Female  % of 
country  
Online Not 
online 
Austria 18         5 (3.6%) 4 1 (28%) 3  2 
Belgium 24         7 (5.1%)   3 4 (25%) 6 1 
Bulgaria 18         6 (4.4%) 3 3   (6%) 4 2 
Czech Republic 24         8 (5.8%) 7 1 (33%) 7 1 
Cyprus 6           1 (0.7%) 1 0 (17%) 1 0 
Denmark 14         3 (2.1%) 2 1 (21%) 2 1 
Estonia 6           1 (0.7%) 0 1 (17%) 0  1 
Finland 14         5 (3.6%) 2 3 (35%) 5 0 
France 78       12 (8.8%) 7 5 (15%) 10 4 
Germany 99     14 (10.2%) 9 5 (14%) 14 0 
Greece 24         2 (1.5%) 1 1   (8%) 2 0 
Hungary 24        6 (4.4%)   4 2 (25%) 4 2 
Ireland 13        1 (0.7%) 1 0   (8%) 1 0 
Italy 78       13 (9.5%) 10 3 (17%) 11 2 
Latvia 9            0           0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 13         2 (1.5%) 2 0 (15%) 1 1 
Luxembourg 6           4 (2.9%) 3 1 (67%) 2  2 
Malta 5           1 (0.7%) 1 0 (20%) 1 0 
Netherlands 27         3 (2.2%) 2 1 (11%) 2 1 
Poland 54         6 (4.4%) 4 2 (11%) 4 2 
Portugal 24         6 (4.4%)   5 1 (25%)         3 3 
Romania 35         7 (5.1%) 4 3 (20%) 4  3 
Slovakia 14         3 (2.1%) 3 0 (21%) 2 1 
Slovenia 7           2 (1.5%) 2 0 (14%) 1 1 
Spain 54         5 (3.6%) 4 1   (9%) 1 4 
Sweden 19         1 (0.7%) 1 0   (5%) 1 1 
UK 78        14 (10.2%) 12 2 (18%) 12 2 
TOTAL 785 138 fully  
complete 
145 drop off in 
last 3 Qs 
70%   
of 
sample 
30% 
of 
sample 
(17%) 76%  24% 
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APPENDIX 2  - CODEBOOK  and  LIST OF VARIABLES  
 
Variable Name  Full Description Coded Value(s) 
Age MEP’s birth year 2009 – year of birth 
Appointig Number of appointments scheduled in 
constituency per week with interest groups 
1 – 0 
2 – 1 to 5 
3 – 6 to 10 
4 – 11 to 15 
5 – ≤ 16  
Appointcitizen Number of appointments with individual 
citizens 
Same as above 
Appointgovt Number of appointments with government Same as above 
Appointreggovt Number of appointments with regional 
authorities 
Same as above 
Appointmedia Number of appointments with media  Same as above 
Appointcivicassoc Number of appointments with civic 
associations 
Same as above 
Appointpubevent Number of appointments for public events Same as above 
Attractresources Importance of attracting EU resources to 
constituency 
1 - Not important                          
2 - Somewhat important               
3 - Moderately important             
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
Ballot   Type of ballot structure  1 – Closed 
2 – Open  
3 – Ordered 
Blog MEP has a blog 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Casework MEP’s website has casework feature(s), 
references 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
 Caseworkeroffline   Additive score of 3 dummy variables: MEP 
spends above average time on casework + 
responding to casework  
0 – 3 
 Caseworkeronline   Presence of casework feature on MEP’s 
website/ blog + created website for 
promoting casework 
0 – 2 
Citizenltr Frequency and medium of communication 
chosen by citizens to contact MEP - letter 
Same scale as above 
Variable Name  Full Description Coded Value(s) 
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Citizenphone Frequency and medium of communication 
chosen by citizens to contact MEP - phone 
Same scale as above 
Citizenemail Frequency and medium of communication 
chosen by citizens to contact MEP - mail 
Same scale as above 
Citizenwebsite Frequency and medium of communication 
chosen by citizens to contact MEP - website 
Same scale as above 
Citizenoffc Frequency and medium of communication 
chosen by citizens to contact MEP - office 
Same scale as above 
Citizenreach Importance of communicating with citizens 1 - Not important                           
2 - Somewhat important               
3 - Moderately important             
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
Comcwrkemail Casework received by email     0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Comcwrkcoffice Casework received through constituency 
office (consultation hours) 
    0 – No 
1 – Yes 
ComcwrkBRoffc Casework received through Brussels office     0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Comcwrkpartyoffc Casework received through national party 
office 
    0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Comcwrkwebsite Casework received through website     0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Comcwrkltr Casework received in letters 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
#committees Number of EP committees that MEP is a 
member of as indicated on EP website 
         1,2,3, <3 
Comtteework Importance of committee work 1 - Not important                          
2 - Somewhat important               
3 - Moderately important              
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
ComSr MEP is a Head or Deputy of a EP Committee 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
ConstEU Considers all EU as constituency 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Constoffice MEP has constituency office in home country       0 – no 
    1 – yes 
Constsize Constituency size per MEP – number of 
people in constituency 
0….continuous 
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Variable Name  Full Description Coded Value(s) 
ConstNation Considers own country as constituency 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
ConstSubregion Considers sub-region as constituency 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Constpartyvoter Considers party voters as constituency          0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Constpersonalvote Considers personal voters as constituency 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Constituencywork Importance of maintaining active presence in 
constituency 
1 - Not important                          
2 - Somewhat important               
3 - Moderately important             
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
CV CV feature on MEP’s website 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
daysinconstituency  Time spent in (home) constituency 1 - ≥ 1 day per month 
2 - ≤ 1 day per month but ≥ 
1 day per week  
3 - 1 day per week 
4 - 2 days per week 
5 - 3 days per week 
6 - ≤ 3 days per week 
Distoconstituency Distance to constituency from Brussels (km)     0….continuous  
#delegations Number of EP delegations that MEP is a 
member of 
1,2,3, <3 
Dompolitics Held prior political office in own country 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Education  MEP’s level of education  0 -  High school 
1 – High school 
2 – BA 
3 – MA 
4  - Doctorate  
Eforum MEP’s website has an e-debate forum feature 0 – No 
        1 – Yes 
EPentry Year of MEP’s first elected to EP 1952…2006 
Epetition MEP’s website has an e-petition feature 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
EUSouth Portugal, Greece, Spain, Cyprus 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
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Variable Name  Full Description Coded Value(s) 
EUold Old member states (original 15)  0 – No 
1 – Yes 
EUEast  MEPs from new (post-2006) CEE member 
states 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
EUNordic  MEPs from Finland, Sweden 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
EUpg MEP’s European Party Group Affiliation 1 – EPP 
2 – SD 
3 – ALDE 
4 – Greens 
5 – UEN 
6 – United Left 
7 – N/A Independent 
EPgrpweb MEP listing EU party group’s website on his/her 
EP profile 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
epoll MEP’s website has an e-poll feature 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Explainingwork MEP’s website has oversight of legislative work 
feature 
0 – No 
        1 – Yes 
Facebook  MEP’s Presence on Facebook  0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Feedback 
 
MEP’s website has feedback, write me feature 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Foreignrelations Importance of promoting EU internationally 1 - Not important                          
2 - Somewhat important               
3 - Moderately important             
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
ID ID number ascribed to MEP 1…137 
Incumbent Whether MEP is an EP incumbent 
(≤ 2
 
terms) 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Impactcitizen Perceived impact of website on contact with 
citizens 
           1- decreased 
2 - slightly decreased 
           3 - remained the same 
4 - slightly increased 
5 - increased 
6 - not sure 
Impactinfoeu Perceived impact of website on information 
provision on the EU and my work 
Same as above 
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Variable Name  Full Description Coded Value(s) 
Impactcasework Perceived impact of website on casework load Same as above 
Impactyouth Perceived impact of website on Same as above 
Impactcosts Perceived impact of website on reduction of 
transaction costs 
Same as above 
Instructnatparty Takes instruction from national party 1 - Never 
2 - Rarely 
3 - Sometimes 
4 - Often 
5 - Very often 
Instructnatdeleg Takes instruction from national delegation 1 - Never 
2 - Rarely 
3 - Sometimes 
4 - Often 
5 - Very often 
Instructreggov Takes instruction from regions 1 - Never 
2 - Rarely 
3 - Sometimes 
4 - Often 
5 - Very often 
Instructexpert Takes instruction from policy expert 1 - Never 
2 - Rarely 
3 - Sometimes 
4 - Often 
5 - Very often 
Instructnatgov Takes instruction from national government 1 - Never 
2 - Rarely 
3 - Sometimes 
4 - Often 
5 - Very often 
Interactiveonline Additive score of 6 dummy variables with ‘2’ 
point weights attached to presence of email, 
eforum, FB or Twitter: MEP having email+ 
website+feedback+epoll +epetition+eforum 
0-11 
ITpenetration Internet penetration rate of country that 
MEP comes from  
Percentage 1-100% 
Mediarelations Importance of maintaining media relations 1 - Not important                          
2 - Somewhat important               
3 - Moderately important             
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
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Mepradio MEP’s use of radio as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
1 - Never 
2 - Rarely 
3 - Sometimes 
4 - Often 
5 - Very often 
Mepnewsp Frequency of MEP’s use of radio as channel 
for constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Meptv MEP’s use of TV as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Mepnewsltr MEP’s use of newsletter as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Mepoffice MEP’s use of office hours as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Mepphone MEP’s use of office hours as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Mepemail MEP’s use of email as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Mepptyweb MEP’s use of national party website as 
channel for constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Mepwebsite MEP’s use of personal website as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Mepblog MEP’s use of personal blog as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Meppubevnt MEP’s use of public events as channel for 
constituency/citizen outreach 
Same scale as above 
Multilingual MEP’s website is multilingual        0 – No 
       1 – Yes 
Newsletter MEP’s website has newsletter feature        0 – No 
        1 – Yes 
Online  MEP has a website or a blog 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Ownopinion Takes instruction from self 1 - Never 
2 - Rarely 
3 - Sometimes 
4 - Often 
5 - Very often 
Partyweb MEP listing national party’s on his/her EP 
profile 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Podcasts MEP’s website has podcast feature(s) 0 – No 
1 – Yes 
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Variable Name  Full Description Coded Value(s) 
Proconst MEP’s cumulative pro-constituency 
orientation 
1 – 0-1 positive score (Low) 
2 – 2 positive scores (Med.) 
3 – 3-4 positive scores (High) 
Proconstituency Additive variable of 2 constituency 
orientations 
0 – 2 
Reccwrknatcitizen Number of cases received from nationals (per 
week) 
1 – 0 
2 – 1 to 20 
3 – 21 to 40 
4 – 41 to 60 
5 – 61 to 80 
6 -  < 80 
Reccwrknatpg Number of cases received from national 
interest groups (per week) 
Same as previous  
ReccwrkEUintrst # of cases received from EU interest groups Same as previous 
Reccwrkcivassoc # of cases received from civic associations Same as previous 
RepEU Importance of representing ‘all people in the 
EU’ 
1 - Not important                         
2 - Somewhat important              
3 - Moderately important            
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
Representnation Importance of representing ‘all people in own 
country 
1 - Not important                         
2 - Somewhat important              
3 - Moderately important            
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
Representregion Importance of representing ‘people in 
subregion’ 
1 - Not important                         
2 - Somewhat important              
3 - Moderately important            
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
RepresentEUpg Importance of representing ‘EU party group’ 1 - Not important                         
2 - Somewhat important              
3 - Moderately important            
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
Representnatparty Importance of representing ‘own national 
party’ 
1 - Not important                         
2 - Somewhat important              
3 - Moderately important            
4 - Important                                
5 - Very important 
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Variable Name  Full Description Coded Value(s) 
Respondnatpartyvoter Importance of representing ‘national 
partyvoter’ 
1 - Not important                         
2 - Somewhat  important              
3 - Moderately  important            
4 - Important                                
5 - Very  important 
Respondcitizen % of casework that MEP responds to from  
individual citizens 
1 – 0 % 
2 – 1 to 20 % 
3 – 21 to 40 % 
4 – 41 to 60 % 
5 – 61 to 80 % 
6 – 81 to 100 % 
Respondnatig % of casework that MEP responds to from  
national interest groups 
 
Same as above 
Respondig % of casework that MEP responds to from  
EU interest groups  
Same as above 
Respondcivassoc % of casework that MEP responds to from  
civic associations  
Same as above 
Respondreggov % of casework that MEP responds to from  
regional authorities  
Same as above 
Repspecific Importance of representing ‘specific group in 
society’ 
1 - Not important                         
2 - Somewhat  important              
3 - Moderately  important            
4 - Important                                
5 - Very  important 
Sex Sex of MEP 0 – male  
1 – female 
 
Staffbx 
 
Number of staff that MEP has in Brussels 
office 
 
1 - no staff 
2 - 1 staff 
3 - 2 staff 
4 - 3 staff or more 
Staffhome Number of staff √in Brussels office 1 - no staff 
2 - 1 staff 
3 - 2 staff 
4 - 3 staff or more 
Staffhomeabvavg Above (MEP respondents’) average number of 
staff in the constituency office 
0 – no 
1 – yes 
Staffhomeblwavg Below (MEP respondents’) average number of 
staff in the constituency office 
0 – no 
1 – yes 
 200 
 
Variable Name  Full Description Coded Value(s) 
Timeparlwork On a 10 percentile scale from 0-100%, 
proportion of time spent on legislative, 
committee work 
      0 - 100% 
 
Timemedia Percentile proportion of time spent on media 
relations 
Same scaling as above 
Timewebsite Percentile proportion of time spent on 
website management 
Same scaling as above 
Timecasework Percentile proportion of time spent on 
casework 
Same scaling as above 
Timeig Percentile proportion of time spent on 
interest group activities 
Same scaling as above 
Twitter MEP’s Presence on Twitter  0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Webcitizen Reasons for creating MEP website – having 
direct contact with constituents 
   0 – No 
 1 – Yes 
WebinfoEU 
 
Reasons for creating MEP website - providing 
information to constituents 
   0 – No 
 1 – Yes 
 
Website  MEP has website listed on EP Profile  0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Webtransparency Reasons for creating MEP website –offering 
transparency over my work 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Webpartypol Reasons for creating MEP website – it is my 
national party’s policy 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
WebEPpartygrppol Reasons for creating MEP website - it is my 
European party group’s policy 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Webvisibility Reasons for creating MEP website – to 
personalize my message and increase visibility 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Webcosts Reasons for creating MEP website – to reduce 
office costs 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Webfeedback  Reasons for creating MEP website – to receive 
feedback on my work 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Webtraffiinfoissues MEP’s reflection about features that attract 0 – No 
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the most traffic – info provision feature 1 – Yes 
Webtrafficdebate MEP’s reflection about features that attract 
the most traffic – stimulate online debate 
feature 
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
Webtrafficfeedback MEP’s reflection about features that attract the 
most traffic – feedback feature  
0 – No 
1 – Yes 
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APPENDIX 3  - REGRESSION OUTPUT TABLES FROM CHAPTERS 5 AND 6 
 
Chapter 5  - Table 5.1 
Time spent on casework (N = 119) 
 
 
Importance of pork politics .004 (.144) 
Importance of communication with citizens          .304(.312) 
Appointment with citizens  .497*** (.222) 
Receives Casework .192 (.158) 
Preference for Constituency Office Consultations .199 (.222) 
Adjusted R2                 .079  
 
 
 
   
 
Chapter 5  - Table 5.2   Determinants for the Casework1  Dimension OFFLINE   
Time spent on casework 
 
Model 1 
Electoral 
System 
Model 2 
       Role Orientations 
Model 3 
Political 
Model 4 
Const.Character 
Age .013 (.018)    
Gender .056 (.407)    
Education  -.060 (.072)    
Open .533 (.445)    
Ordered .218 (.554)    
Regional   .327 (.399)    
Representing EU  .005 (.186)   
Representing nation  .049 (.233)   
Representing national party  .413 (.353)   
Representing national party voter     -.658*(.374)   
Takes instruction from citizens      .633***(.298)   
Takes instruction from national party     -.379 (.263)   
Own opinion     -.364 (.290)   
EP incumbent    -.250 (393)  
# committees   .178(.461) 
# delegations   -.918*(.481)  
Committee Sr.   .001(.408)  
Domestic politics   -.224(.148)  
EPP   1.54 (2.16)  
SD   1.74(2.14)  
ALDE   2.38(2.19)  
Greens   .624(2.24)  
UEN   2.41(2.45)  
United Left   .832(2.38)  
N/A Independent   1.80(2.44)  
MEP-Constituency ratio     -1.34(.748) 
Distance    0 (0) 
New member state    .481(.433) 
Adjusted R-Squared        0.011           0.003                     0.02                            0.01 
N           127                                                       111                             127                      138 
***≤0.01 **≤0.05 * ≤0. 
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Chapter 5  - Table 5.3  Determinants for the Casework2  Dimension OFFLINE   
 
4.1 Pork Casework style 
 
Model 1 
Electoral 
System 
Model 2 
       Role Orientations 
Model 3 
Political 
Model 4 
Const.Character 
Age -.018 (.011)   
Gender .485*(.254)    
Education  .058 (.072)    
Open -.267 (.273)    
Ordered -.045 (.342)    
Regional   -.264 (.242)    
Representing EU  -.040(.100)   
Representing nation     .270**(.123)   
Representing national party  -.069 (.184)   
Representing national party voter    .225 (.201)   
Takes instruction from citizens          .284*(.298)   
Own opinion     -.186 (.151)   
EP incumbent    -.833 (.223)  
# committees   -.213 (.261) 
# delegations   -.506*(.255)  
Committee Sr.   -.404 (.233)  
Domestic politics   .077 (.148)  
EPP   -.311 (1.27)  
SD   -.679 (1.26)  
ALDE     -.619 (1.29)  
Greens   -1.17 (1.31)  
UEN   -1.94 (1.52)  
United Left   .832 (2.38)  
N/A Independent   -.769 (2.44)  
MEP-Constituency ratio    .260 (.416) 
Distance    .001***(0) 
New member state    1.045***(.243) 
Adjusted R-Squared        0.039                              0.10                         0.14                             0.19 
N           134                                                122                                   127                      138 
***≤0.01 **≤0.05 * ≤0.1 
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CHAPTER 5  - Table 5.4 Determinants for the Casework3 Dimension OFFLINE   
 
 
4.RResponsiveness to casework            
(individuals) 
 
Model 1 
Electoral 
System 
Model 2 
       Role Orientations 
Model 3 
Political 
Model 4 
Const.Character 
Age -.019*(.011)   
Gender -.320 (.320)    
Education .040 (.046)    
Open .557**(.445)    
Ordered -.309 (.346)    
Regional   .040 (.243)    
Representing EU  -.045 (.110)   
Representing nation  .129 (.135)   
Representing national party  .235 (.213)   
Representing national party voter     -.218 (.219)   
Takes instruction from citizens      -.172 (.173)   
Takes instruction from nat.party    -.197 (.157)   
Own opinion     .049 (.173)   
EP incumbent   .158 (.240)  
# committees   -.017 (.284)  
# delegations   .315 (.255)  
Committee Sr.   .042 (.186)  
Domestic politics   -.067 (.068)  
EPP                 2.14 (1.37)  
SD   1.92 (1.36)  
ALDE   2.61*(1.08)  
Greens   1.89 (1.42)  
UEN   2.17 (1.55)  
United Left   2.16 (2.38)  
N/A Independent   2.83*(2.44)  
MEP-Constituency ratio     .760*(.456) 
Distance    .246(.197) 
New member state    -.518**(.114) 
Adjusted R-Squared        0.024                            0.003 0.30                   0.023 
N                        133                                  118                                  133                  137 
***≤0.01 **≤0.05 * ≤0.1 
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CHAPTER  5 - Table 5.5  Determinants for the Explaining Work Dimension OFFLINE   
 
Explaining Work Important 
 
Model 1 
Electoral 
System 
Model 2 
       Role Orientations 
Model 3 
Political 
Model 4 
Const.Character 
Age  -.004 (.006)   
Gender -.212 (.135)    
Education .013 (.023)    
Open -.254*(.145)    
Ordered .034 (.181)    
Regional   .089 (.128)    
Representing EU  .075 (.056)   
Representing nation  .011 (.068)   
Representing national party  -.139***(.108)   
 Representing national party voter     .274 (.111)   
Takes instruction from citizens      .076 (.088)   
Takes instruction from nat.party     -.174**(.115)   
Own opinion  .035 (.085)   
EP incumbent   -.262**(.125)  
# committees   -.001 (.145)  
# delegations   .168 (.132)  
Committee Sr.   -.168 (.130)  
Domestic politics   .018 (.048)  
EPP                 .477 (.705)  
SD   .579 (.700)  
ALDE   .880 (.714)  
Greens   .710 (.731)  
UEN   .055 (.777)  
United Left   .829 (.799)  
N/A Independent   1.13 (.759)  
MEP-Constituency ratio     .208(.242) 
Distance    0 (0) 
New member state    .007(.141) 
Adjusted R-Squared            0.024                            0.007                     0.030                           0.01 
 N                       134                                  120                                  133                   134 
***≤0.01 **≤0.05 * ≤0.1 
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Table 5.6  OFFLINE INTERACTIVITY 
 
Time spent on communicating with citizens 
 
 
Number of appointments with citizens per week .613***(.144)  
Preference for using constituency office for interacting with citizens                                     .325(.312) 
Preference for using phone for interacting with citizens    .453***(.169) 
Adjusted R2                 .17  
N = 121    
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5  - Table 5.7    Determinants for the Interactivity Dimension OFFLINE 
 
OFFLINE INTERACTIVITY 
 
Model 1 
Electoral 
System 
Model 2 
       Role Orientations 
Model 3 
Political 
Model 4 
Const.Character 
Age .002 (.018)   
Gender -.302 (.409)    
Education -.055 (.073)    
Open .660 (.443)    
Ordered .798 (.557)    
Regional   .773*(.398)    
Representing EU  .007 (.181)   
Representing nation  -.045 (.217)   
Representing national party   .738**(.108)   
 Representing national party voter    -.973*** (.368)   
Takes instruction from citizens      .678** (.291)   
Takes instruction from nat.party     -.431 (.268)   
Own opinion  -.439 (.288)   
EP incumbent   -.639 (.415)  
# committees   .517 (.475)  
# delegations   -.577 (.132)  
Committee Sr.   .083 (.423)  
Domestic politics   -.100 (.155)  
EPP                 .712 (2.30)  
SD   .844 (2.28)  
ALDE   1.25 (2.32)  
Greens   .145 (2.4)  
UEN     1.67 (2.60)  
United Left   .829 (.799)  
N/A Independent   1.99(2.5)  
MEP-Constituency ratio    .227(.375) 
Distance    0 (0) 
New member state    -.040(.215) 
Adjusted R-Squared            0.019                            0.007                     0.030                               0.01 
   N                 131                                  117                                  131                129 
***≤0.01 **≤0.05 * ≤0.1 
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CHAPTER 6  - Table 6.1  Determinants for Explaining Work Dimension ONLINE 
ONLINE  EXPLAINING WORK 
 
Model 1 
Electoral 
System 
Model 2 
       Role Orientations 
Model 3 
Political 
Model 4 
Const.Character 
Age -.039**(.020)    
Gender -.580 (.409)    
Education .140*(.078)   
Open .851*(.450)    
Ordered  1.58***(.623)    
Representing EU  -.154 (.181)   
Representing nation  -.168 (.217)   
Representing national party   .434 (.108)   
 Representing national party voter    -.382 (.351)   
Takes instruction from citizens      .372 (.259)   
Takes instruction from national party     -.431 (.268)   
Own opinion  -.120 (.288)   
EP incumbent   -.118 (.397)  
# committees   .058 (.442)  
# delegations   -.173 (.397)  
Committee Sr.   .480 (.425)  
Domestic politics   .313 (.167)  
EPP                 N/A  
SD   N/A  
ALDE   N/A  
Greens   N/A  
UEN   N/A  
United Left   N/A  
N/A Independent   N/A  
Internet penetration    -0.01(.375) 
Distance    -0.001 (0) 
New member state    .076(.449) 
Pseudo R2            0.09                              0.03 0.08.                           0.007 
N                        139                                  119                                  138                    140 
***≤0.01 **≤0.05 * ≤0.1 
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CHAPTER 6  - Table 6.2  Determinants for the Casework Dimension ONLINE 
 
ONLINE  CASEWORK 
 
Model 1 
Electoral 
System 
Model 2 
       Role Orientations 
Model 3 
Political 
Model 4 
Const.Character 
Age -.019 (.021)    
Gender -.678 (.456)    
Education .137*(.087)    
Open .943 (.610)    
Ordered  .797 (.729)    
Representing EU  .027 (.209)   
Representing nation  -.321 (.259)  
 
 
 
Representing region   .706 (.396)  
 Representing national party     -.087 (.465)   
Takes instruction from citizens      .578 (.488)   
Takes instruction from citizens     .173 (.318)   
Takes instruction from national 
party 
 .173 (.318)   
Own opinion  -.217 (.288)   
EP incumbent   .108 (.455)  
# committees   -1.99**(1.05)  
# delegations   -.533 (.598)  
Committee Sr.   -.182 (.481)  
Domestic politics   -.059 (.170)  
EPP                 N/A  
SD   N/A  
ALDE   N/A  
Greens   N/A  
UEN   N/A  
United Left   N/A  
N/A Independent   N/A  
Internet penetration    -0.03(.027) 
Distance    -0.001 (0) 
New member state    .761(.531) 
Pseudo R2            0.06                               0.07 0.08                            0.05 
N                        136                                  113                                  132                     137 
***≤0.01 **≤0.05 * ≤0.1 
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CHAPTER 6  - Table 6.3     Determinants for the Interactivity Dimension ONLINE 
 
ONLINE  INTERACTIVITY 
 
Model 1 
Electoral 
System 
Model 2 
       Role Orientations 
Model 3 
Political 
Model 4 
Const.Character 
Age -.014*(.001)    
Gender .051 (.456)    
Education -.02(.033)   
Open .133 (.201)   
Ordered  .519**(.253)    
Representing EU  -.127*(.077)   
Representing nation  -.101 (.099)  
 
 
 
Representing region  -.074 (.109)  
 Representing national party   .152 (.465)  
Representing national party voter  -.150 (.165)   
Takes instruction from citizens  .059 (.123)       
Takes instruction from national party  -.007 (.111)   
Own opinion  -.094(.123)   
EP incumbent   .334**(.169)  
# committees   .093 (.209)  
# delegations   . 062 (.598)  
Committee Sr.   .068 (.481)  
Domestic politics   .121*(.170)  
EPP                 .396 (.967)  
SD   .634 (.960)  
ALDE   1.14 (.980)  
Greens   .327 (1.00)  
UEN   .382 (1.10)  
United Left   .167(1.06)  
N/A Independent   1.3 (1.04)  
Internet penetration    -.001(.008) 
Distance     (0) 
New member state    .057(.208) 
Adjusted R2            0.02                              0.07                         0.06                            0.05 
       N=                              138                                  114                                137                        139 
***≤0.01 **≤0.05 * ≤0.1 
 
Page 1
MEP Survey on Constituency Work and the Use of New Technologies
Dear MEP, 
You have successfully accessed the MEP Survey on Constituency Work and the Use of New Technologies (2004-2009). 
The survey contains a total of 16 questions. Please note that once you complete and exit the survey, you will be unable 
to return to it again. Please proceed to the first question. 
1. As a member of the European Parliament, when you think of ‘your constituency or 
district’ it is composed of: (please tick all that apply) 
2. How important is it to you to represent the following groups in the European 
Parliament (EP)? (tick one box per line) 
 
 
 
Not important Somewhat important Moderately important Important Very important
All people in Europe nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
All people in your country nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
All people in your sub-
region
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your national party nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your national party's voters nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your EP party group nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
A specific group(s) in 
society
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
European Union and all its people
 
gfedc
The national territory and all people of your member state
 
gfedc
A sub region in your member state
 
gfedc
People who voted for your party
 
gfedc
People who voted for you
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
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MEP Survey on Constituency Work and the Use of New Technologies
3. How often do you rely on recommendations from the following sources on which way 
to vote in the European Parliament (EP)? (one tick per line) 
4. In your work as MEP, how important are the following activities? (tick one box per 
line) 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Almost every vote
Your national party leaders nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your EP party group 
leaders
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your national party 
delegation of MEPs
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your EP committee leaders nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your national government nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your country's regional 
authorities
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Interest groups nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Policy experts nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Citizens nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your own independent 
opinion
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
Not important Somewhat important Moderately important Important Very important
Attracting EU resources for 
your country
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Parliamentary and 
committee work
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Communicating with 
citizens
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Advancing EU policies in 
the world
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Promoting your national 
party's position on EU 
issues
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Maintaining active media 
relations
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Educating the public about 
the EU
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Maintaining an active 
presence in your country
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
Page 3
MEP Survey on Constituency Work and the Use of New Technologies
5. How many full-time, paid staff do you employ in your:  
6. In your overall workload, about what proportion of time do you personally dedicate to 
the following activities? (tick one box per line, the total value in boxes ticked should not 
exceed 100%)  
 
 
 
7. On average, as MEP how much time do you spend on political work in your home 
country? (tick one box) 
No office You only 1 staff 2 3 4 >4 staff
Brussels office nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Strasbourg office nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Home country office nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Preparation for your 
committee and 
parliamentary work
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Website management nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Citizen relations nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Media relations nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Interest group relations nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Responding to assistance 
requests
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
 
One day per month or less
 
nmlkj
More than one day per month but less than one day a week
 
nmlkj
One day per week
 
nmlkj
Two days per week
 
nmlkj
Three days per week
 
nmlkj
More than three days per week
 
nmlkj
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8. When working in your own country, in an average week, about how many 
appointments do you schedule for the following groups and activities? 
9. MEPs receive requests for assistance from various groups. On average, how many 
requests for assistance do you receive per week from the following groups? (tick one 
box per line) 
 
0 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20
Interest groups nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your party leaders nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
National government 
administration
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Individual citizens nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Regional and local 
authorities
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Civic associations nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Public events nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Media briefings nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
0 1-20 21-40 41-60 61–80 >80
Individual citizens from your 
country
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
National interest groups nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Regional authorities in your 
country
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
European interest groups nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Civic associations nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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10. Through which of the following channels do you receive most of your assistance 
requests? (tick one box) 
11. On average, what proportion of all the assistance requests that you receive do you 
respond to?  
 
 
 
0% 1-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61–80% 81-100%
From individual citizens 
from your country
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
From national interest 
groups
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
From regional authorities in 
your country
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
From European interest 
groups
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
From civic associations nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
Consultation hours in your country office
 
gfedc
Office visits in Brussels or Strasbourg
 
gfedc
Your national party's office
 
gfedc
Your website
 
gfedc
E-mail
 
gfedc
Letters
 
gfedc
Telephone
 
gfedc
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12. How often do you normally (not during election campaigns) use these channels to 
communicate with citizens? 
13. In general, through what channels do individual citizens contact you? (tick one box 
per line) 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Most often
Radio (in your country) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
TV (in your country) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Newspapers nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Party bulletins nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Office consultations nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Mailed newsletters nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Telephone nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
E-mail nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Party website nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your personal website nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
E-newsletters nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Public events nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your Blog nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very often
Letters nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Telephone nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
E-mail nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your MEP website nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your national party’s 
website
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your blog nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
During public meetings nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your national party's office nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Visits to your country office nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Visits to your Brussels or 
Strasbourg office
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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14. What were the main reasons for creating your personal website as MEP? (pls. tick all 
that apply) 
15. Which feature(s) of your website attract the most traffic, or, are used the most? 
(please, choose 2 boxes maximum) 
 
 
Not applicable, you do not have a website
 
gfedc
Increase direct contact with citizens
 
gfedc
It is your national party’s policy
 
gfedc
It is your EP party group’s policy
 
gfedc
Personalise your public message and visibility
 
gfedc
Receive policy feedback from citizens
 
gfedc
Offer public transparency over your work
 
gfedc
Provide educational information about EU
 
gfedc
Reduce office communication costs
 
gfedc
Advertise the types of assistance you offer
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
Overview of your legislative work (speeches, voting record)
 
nmlkj
Information pages on specific issues
 
nmlkj
Debate forums
 
nmlkj
Write me or “your views” comment forms
 
nmlkj
e-newsletter
 
nmlkj
E-polls
 
nmlkj
Podcasts (videos)
 
nmlkj
Policy feedback commentaries
 
nmlkj
I’m not sure
 
nmlkj
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16. How has your MEP website affected the following aspects of your work? (tick one 
box per line) 
17. YOUR PERSONAL COMMENTS 
 
Your answers will be valuable for our research and we thank you for participating! 
For any additional questions, you may contact Jordanka Tomkova at jordanka.tomkova@eui.eu, or tel: +39 320 575 
4889. 
Decreased Slightly decreased
Remained the 
same
Slightly increased Increased You are not sure
Direct contact with citizens nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Contact with interest groups nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your office efficiency nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Policy feedback from public nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Your public visibility nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Chances of being re-elected nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Requests for assistance nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Contact with young people nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Provision of information 
about your work and EU 
matters
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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